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ABSTRACT
Current theories of marketing channel structure have stressed product and
industry characteristics. We develop a theoretical framework which emphasizes the
importance of the markets for each of the functions required by the distribution
channel. This framework was used in an extensive and in depth case study for 23
companies in 6 industries in Venezuela. Imperfections in the market for loans, lack of
specialized markets for certain channel functions, spatial monopolies enjoyed by
retailers and agency problems were identified as crucial elements affecting vertical
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INTRODUCTION
In the managerial literature, strategic decisions regarding distribution channels
are often analysed as part of the marketing mix. In this context, the emphasis of the
marketing plan is placed on the development of products which "satisfy consumer
needs" while channel design is often regarded as a complementary process. Managers
are supposed to "choose" the best alternative, based on product characteristics and
consumer's buying patterns, to make goods available to the targeted client. The
general impression given in the literature is that managers are supposed to search
through a long menu of alternative ways to reach the consumer, and choose the one
which is most suitable (Kotler, 1991), (Pride and Ferrel, 1987).
However, companies tie up a significant amount of resources developing
channels with very complex structures and which provide them with different degrees
of control over the whole distribution process. Vertical integration seems to coexist
with other forms of control and with looser forms of organisation in such a diverse
way that, as pointed out by Anderson and Weitz (1986), they appear as "variations
without a theme". Faced with such a disorderly world, some researchers have tended
to concentrate on narrating merely what exists. Thus, as indicated by Frazier (1991,
p.268) there is the need"...to change the purely descriptive orientation of the research
on channel functions". This dissertation is a contribution to this research effort.
We have found that distribution cannot be viewed as a homogeneous task but
as a variety of functions, where each one of them can be (and usually is) organised in
different ways. In other words, the structure of the channel depends on the structure
of the market for each of the functions it performs. Thus, "variations without a
theme" may be the distorted perception of various themes playing at the same time.
Each channel function within its market is a theme, and different market
imperfections have a diversity of impacts on the way those functions are organised.
The objective of this research is to identify the trade-offs between cost and
control facing management decisions vis a vis channel structure. The trade-offs
between administrative costs and vertical control are discussed. The evaluation of
these trade-offs is carried out in terms of how they are affected by financial market
imperfections, transaction costs and agency problems.
2We analyse some of the economic determinants behind the organization of
transactions in each of its many alternatives (e.g. hierarchies and other forms of non-
market transactions) and we study the different degrees of control they yield. Finally,
given the fact that channels are network structures, we analyse how a systemic
expression of distribution functions is some times achieved and how harmonization
of agents objectives is accomplished. We also study how management decisions are
affected by market imperfections such as oligopolistic behaviour in highly
concentrated industries, capital market imperfections and lack of specialists in
distribution functions.
Since we intend to analyse distribution channel design in light of these
elements, we have gone beyond marketing theory, which tends to restrict channel
decisions to product characteristics or consumers buying patterns (Aspinwall, 1958).
Instead, we have incorporated theoretical frameworks from the field of industrial
organisation and from new theories of the firm. The main objective of this work is to
expand the traditional marketing paradigm by applying concepts and theories through
"cross-fertilization with other disciplines" (Day & Wensley, 1983). In this sense, a
conceptual framework is developed in Chapter 3.
In fact, a growing literature has been incorporating new economic concepts
into the question of distribution channel structure. Mallen (1973) developed Stigler's
functional view and applied it for predicting spins-offs in distribution. Also,
transaction cost economics highlighted the possibility of product debasement and
other externalities as a criteria affecting decisions on vertical integration into
distribution (Williamson, 1985). It also supplied the concept of asset specificity
which has been applied to the understanding of similar issues (Anderson, 1985),
(John & Weitz, 1988). These different strands of the literature are discussed in
Chapter 1.
Alternative theories provide different arguments about the critical
determinants of channel structure. For some, product characteristic is supreme.
Others emphasize the desire to establish barriers to entry. Industry cycles have been
proposed as a determinant of the evolution of structures over time. Agency problems
due to incentive incompatibility have also been proposed. We argue (Chapters 1 and
3) that the problem of organising intra-channel fmancing when capital markets are
imperfect is also crucial in this respect.
Given the many determinants proposed in the different theories, we chose to
rely on an extensive and in depth case analysis of selected industries. Since existing
theories stressed product and industry characteristics instead of competitive
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dynamics, we needed to find a method that would allow us to understand the space
for managerial discretion, its determinants in different scenarios, and the manner in
which various contexts were perceived by the actors. Moreover, we wanted to
understand how these elements changed over time, as companies grew, industries
matured and the overall environment changed. A justification of this methodological
option is presented in Chapter 2. There, we also provide a motivation for the choice
of industries and companies.
We opted for six industries in order to bring out different issues in each of
them. Fruit juice and dairy products were chosen because they have two lines (cold
pasteurized products which need to be stored under refrigeration and "hot" canned
products with much longer shelf life). This introduces a key difference, i.e.
perishability, between goods which would otherwise be very similar. Cold pack
products are different from their hot pack equivalents, not only in the sense stressed
by marketing theory (inter alia, they require different outlets and are purchased with
different frequencies), but in two other crucial ways. First, their perishability
generates problems of product debasement and other externalities. Second, they give
retailers a monopoly power over the control of the scarce refrigerated space. The
contrast between these two different channels of apparently similar products in the
same firms is brought out in Chapter 4.
In a world of perfect credit markets, commercial or manufacturing firms
would never take up the role of providing other intermediaries with capital. However,
when different channel members have differentiated access to credit, the
responsibility for providing the necessary financing may fall on one of them. This
role will interact with other dimensions of the commercial relationship. To highlight
this issue we study in Chapter 5 the case of men's wear in the apparel industry, where
companies decided to integrate into retailing after a period in which competition led
them to provide a growing volume of increasingly longer term credit to retail shops.
How a combination of intra-channel financing and spatial monopoly enjoyed by
retailers induce manufacturers to integrate forward is analysed in this case. The loss
of economies of scope, the gains from integration and other advantages of control are
discussed.
The creation of barriers to entry has often been identified as a goal followed
by companies when they invest in distribution channels. A typical such example in
Venezuela is the case of the breweries (Chapter 6). An impressive, highly controlled
distribution system was organised by the leading firms in the sector who dedicated
immense resources to the creation and development of a retailing network. However,
4a careful look at its history emphasises the point that when distribution channels do
not exist and must be created, the necessary process of building such channels may
itself result in the barrier. Also, since this industry is some fifty years old, it allows us
to discuss the industry cycle theory of spin-offs.
In a similar vein, the leader in the chocolate and sweets industry has
developed a distribution network with almost 100,000 outlets visited weekly. In
Chapter 7 we discuss how manufacturers in the industry have faced externalities and
product debasement in an environment where retail networks are dominated by
scattered, small and low capital shops. Industry cycle theories are also discussed in
this chapter, where the leader has kept the same highly integrated channel structure
since it began operations in 1941.
High quality sale and post-sale service have been considered key elements in
developing competitive advantage through product "augmentation" (Levitt, 1980). In
other words, services can be added to the factory output in order to offer the
consumer a better product-service combination than other competitors. In achieving
this objective, marketing channels are strategically important, especially when
dealing with durable or semi-durable products which require repair and guarantee
services. In Chapter 8 we discuss the impact which these corporate objectives have
had in the evolution of channel structure within the electrical appliance industry.
Specific attention is given to the differences in channel strategy followed by
manufacturers of branded and non-branded products. This allows us to evaluate how
channel structure reflects the strategic importance given by management to brand
image. We also evaluate the diverse impacts which financing may have on the
having-off of functions.
In Chapter 9, the case of the pharmaceutical industry offers an interesting
opportunity for the analysis of bilateral monopoly relationships between wholesalers
and retailers. The industry presents a highly atomistic structure at the manufacturing
level, but with important degrees of market concentration at the wholesale level.
Because of government regulations which increase entry barriers, we found
exacerbated monopolistic behaviour among agents. This situation permits us to
evaluate bargaining costs between wholesalers and retailers, and their impact on the
vertical integration strategies followed by them.
The conclusions are summarized in Chapter 10 where a cross-case analysis is
presented. Some of the most important empirical findings are derived from the fact
that distribution must be seen as a set of different functions which have to be
performed by the most efficient agent, and that market imperfections in each function
5affect channel structure. This implies that channel control can be achieved by
choosing to vertically integrate specific, and not necessarily all, channel functions.
This is reflected in the empirical fmdings which reveal that channel structure is
affected by the control objectives defmed by management (e.g. to promote sales or to
control quality) and by the market structures of each function (e.g. transportation,
fmancing or services). Also spatial monopolies enjoyed by retailers, moral hazard
problems and externalities are found to affect vertical control decisions into
distribution.
The managerial implications and the policy issues which can be derived from
this work are discussed in Chapter 11, where some new avenues for research are also
mentioned. In the managerial implications, a "check list approach" of the theoretical
framework is developed to offer managers a guideline for vertical control decisions.
Policy issues regarding new developments in competition law are identified, and.
special mention is given to "monopolistic" practices in channel functions such as tied-
loans, exclusivity contracts and territorial restrictions. As far as new research areas
are concerned, specific ideas are put forward. We stress that the general orientation of
future research should be less product and industry specific and more geared to





The issue of vertical control and its impact on corporate profit and consumer
welfare has been the source of a long and prolific debate. The big question has
centered on the purposes behind the decision to substitute the classical market1 by
negotiated rules of exchange. Why would firms want to replace the efficient classical
market by more complicated forms of transaction?
Within the firm, the decision of whether or not to extend the direct control of
the organisation over the market is a matter of corporate strategy, but usually,
government competition agencies must decide whether those strategic moves are
socially desirable. Profit maximization and consumer welfare are objectives which
might not be reached in unison.
Two lines of thought have influenced economic theory in answering this
question. The monopoly interpretation argues that the search for monopolistic rents
by increasing barriers to entry explains management decisions for vertical integration.
(Bain, 1956) (Scherer, 1980) (porter, 1980). On the other hand, the efficiency
approach holds that economizing purposes are behind non-market agreements since
information asymmetries and high degrees of uncertainty have a negative impact on
the cost of transactions (Alchian & Demsetz, 1967) (Simon, 1955,1972) (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976) (Anderson, 1982) (Williamson, 1985).
The views given in both approaches have been the theoretical source of debate
on competition policy due to the different implications they have on the social cost2
of non-market structures (consumer welfare). Nevertheless, from the corporate
strategy point of view the objective is to increase net corporate profits; whether it is
for efficiency or monopoly reasons, it is for competition law to decide.
1
2
Where products and services are sold without restriction at a uniform price.
For an extensive review of the legal analysis and social impact of vertical control see Blair
and Kaserman (1983).
7Nevertheless, the policy implications vary depending on which point of view
.
IS assumed to evaluate corporate strategy. The monopoly interpretation explains
vertical integration into distribution channels as a strategic move in order to raise
barriers to entry, deter new competition and enjoy monopolistic profits. The
efficiency approach, however, may interpret vertical integration as an unavoidable
move for survival due to high degrees of uncertainty or inefficiency in output
markets3.
To interpret the logic behind management decisions regarding organisational
alternatives and to understand the global evolution from competitive markets towards
domesticated markets4 (Ardnt,1979), contributions from both theoretical branches
are illuminating.5
The literature review also shows that the unit of analysis has been changing
away from the traditional industrial organisation view, which focuses on the structure
of the industry and its impact on the firm's conduct and performance (Scherer,1978).
New theoretical developments recognize that firms are complex organisations which
operate under uncertainty, imperfect information and conflicting objectives
(Arrow,1975), (Simon,1955,1972), (Stiglitz,1981), (Jensen and Meckling,1976).
Since the 1960's much emphasis has been given to the process by which firms deal
with these elements. More specifically:
"What determines the nature and extent of their activities, how
they organize their internal decision making processes and how
they deal with problems of control loss in absence of perfect




The case of Savoy, a chocolate manufacturer in Venezuela which owns over 1000 trucks is a
good example. They had to integrate the transporting function due to uncertainties such as
infrastructural defficiencies and abscence of specialized markets.
Characterized by long term cooperation agreements where transactions are planned instead
of being conducted on an ad hoc basis.
Do managers focus only on furthering product differentiation and increasing b,"?ers. to
entry with the objetive of achieving monopolistic rents, or do they focus on hindenng
inefficiencies and uncertainty through non-market organizations and long term agreements?
In the latter case monopolistic rents could appear as a by-product of more fundamental
objectives.
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1.1. Summary and Conclusions
The literature review presented in this chapter is an effort to summarize
economic and managerial theories of the industry and firm. The objective is to set an
enriched framework to analyse management behaviour and corporate strategy
decision regarding the designing and control of distribution channels. The approaches
could be summarized as follows:
a) The neoclassical view which focuses on the monopoly model and
how monopolistic structures can increase efficiency. Vertical integration is
thus explained as a better structural option for maximizing profits through
input cost reduction (Arrow, 1975). The theory of bilateral monopoly
represents an important theoretical breakthrough in this approach (Bowley,
1928), (Morgan, 1949).
b) The functional theory for vertical integration developed by Joseph
Stigler (1951) concentrates on both, the size of the market and on the firms
functions for explaining vertical integration. In small markets, firms would
not have other alternatives but to integrate, whereas larger markets would
offer incentives to functional spin-offs (Mallen,1973) due to the development
of independent specialists searching for economies of scale.
c) The transaction cost framework (Coase,1937) (Williamson,1971)
has been developed with the specific objective of understanding
organisational structures and their boundaries with markets. The centre of
analysis is not the cost of inputs, but transaction costs. In other words, firms
would optimize by reducing the cost associated with the transaction itself and
not with the product and services which are the object of the transaction.
Firms would vertically integrate when transaction costs can be reduced by
substituting markets with hierarchical organisations; and when these gains are
not outweighed by losses in economies of scale and/or scope.
d) The agency theory of the firm is based on the idea that the
delegation of responsability under asymmetric information induces high
control costs. The "principal" delegates the responsability to the "agent" who
may not agree with the principal's objectives. The alternative is to design self-
enforcing contracts where the agent complies with the principal's objectives
while seeking self-interest. Vertical control is seen as an alternative for
reducing monitoring costs (Alchian and Demsetz,1972).
9e) Strategic view of the firm is based on the idea that firms can make
strategic moves in order to influence other firms conduct to their benefit
(Schelling,1960). Explanations of vertical integration from the industry point
of view are represented by the barriers to entry and the Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm (Bain, 1968) (Caves, 1967) (Scherer, 1980). Their
followers maintain that market structure is responsible for industry
performance. Vertical integration is seen as an element of market structure
which may deter competition.
f) Marketing and managerial theories stress that mainly product
variables and consumer buying patterns determine the likelihood of firms to
integrate forward into distribution channels. (Alderson,1957) (Aspinwall,
1958).
Different theoretical approaches explaining vertical integration are reviewed
in this chapter. Those coming from economic theory have been applied mostly to
issues of vertical integration of input and output markets in production processes.
Even though some theoretical extrapolations for distribution functions are found,
these usually do no take account of the complex nature of distribution tasks.
Homogeneity of distribution functions is usually assumed whereas diversity tends to
be a common attribute. For example, distribution functions like financing, storage,
sales and transportation require totally different skills. Furthermore, the suppliers of
such functions are usually immersed in radically different markets. In spite of it, the
distribution function is usually mentioned in the literature as a monolithic task. In
consequence the different market imperfections for channel functions are ignored in
the analysis, hampering the understanding of management decisions on channel
design (e.g. lack of specialists or imperfections in the financial, transportation and
service markets)
On the other hand, the theories are usually industry specific or product
specific. In consequence, there are few theoretical instruments to explain the
differences in channel strategy and design among companies within one industry, or
among close competitors. Neither can they explain the differences in strategy
followed by the same company, with the same product, along a specified period of
time. This theoretical gap impedes the analysis and understanding of managerial
discretion in designing and managing distribution channels.
As a result of the literature review, thirty elements impacting forward vertical
integration into distribution were identified (See section 3) from the six theoretical
approaches mentioned above. Applications of these approaches to distribution
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channel design were found in all but one of these approaches, the exception being
agency theory6. In Chapter 3, where we develop our theoretical framework,
elements from this theory are widely used.
1.2. Vertical Integration and Vertical Control: Theoretical
Approaches
Six theoretical approaches will be presented in the following sections with the
intention of identifying the determinants of vertical integration according to different
theoretical bodies. Some of them make explicit reference to distribution channels,
(e.g. transaction cots economics, structure-conduct-performance and marketing
theories). In others, like in the neo-classical view and the functional theories of the
firm, we have made an effort to find examples which apply to channel structure
decisions. As far as the agency theories of the firm are concerned, the theoretical
applications to channel design are developed in Chapter 3.
1.2.1. Vertical Integration, Efficiency and Input Cost Reduction: The Neo-
Classical View
It could be argued that cost reduction, efficiency and optimization goals are
part of any theory which intends to explain why firms integrate vertically.
Nevertheless, one can distinguish the arguments which centre efficiency on price
conditions for essential inputs, called by some authors "traditional" (Hay &
Morris,1979) from those which take costs of transacting as the key element for
optimizing frrm-market relationships. In this section we will present a review of the
traditional or neo-classical explanations for vertical integration, leaving the
transaction cost approach for section 2.3.
The efficiency argument in turn, needs to be analysed from two different
standpoints. First, from the view of the firm or what has been called private
6 Theoretical applications of agency theory to the capital structure of the firm can be found in
Brander, and Spencer (1989) and Kiholm., J.(1987).
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efficiency, where profit maximization is the ultimate goal? Second, from the society
as a whole, since profit maximization of the firm does not automatically imply social
efficiency. This wider concept of efficiency implies an increase in consumer's
welfare through lower prices, better quality and wider product choice. Both
interpretations have important impact in the way theories view vertical integration.
Neo-classical views, for example, tend to deny the possibility of successful
strategic behaviour by firms and thus believe that monopolistic power8 is always
temporary, and in the long run private efficiency leads to social efficiency. Since
vertical integration could result in reducing or restricting competition, its welfare
implications have been widely debated and have been the reason for competition
policy. It is generally accepted that firms may integrate to reduce costs but it is also
recognized that this may hamper competition and social efficiency. If it does,
competition policy steps in9.
i) Technological Interdependency or Complementarity
Transport and other cost savings due to physical proximity when two
technological processes are complementary have been traditionally considered a
reason for vertical integration (Bain,1968). The classical example has been thermal
economies. They result in the steel industry when all the production process is




Profit maximization, an important assumption about the objectives of firms has been
challenged by the so-called behavioural theories of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and
Principal and Agents theory (Ross,1973).
The term "monopolistic" does not refer to the classic unique supplier of a homogenous
product. It is here used for markets with many suppliers and many differentiated products
(monopolistic competition). The distinctive feature of a monopolist is that its output
decisions have a perceptible influence on price. When this is the case, firms are said to enjoy
monopolistic power.
In the V.K., competition policy has been more flexible than countries in like the V.S..The
Monopolies and Mergers Comission analysis, in a case by case fashion has permitted the
absolution of companies from anti-monopoly charges of increased profits and high market
shares. In these cases, companies have been able to prove that increases in productivity and
in consumer's choice were also achieved and therefore, market concentration did not work
against the public interest. The Kellog's case is famous for the company being absolved by
the Monopoly and Mergers Commission in the V.K. in Feb. 1973 but being charged in the
V.S..
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not necessary due to proximity of the successive production stages. Also, taking the
argument a little further, in the development of new technologies, new
interdependencies may surface encouraging vertical integration.
This theory, widely accepted, raises little controversy. Unfortunately, it is not
very useful in understanding forward integration into distribution channels.
ii) Backward Integration to Secure Price
When inputs are monopolized and prices reflect abnormal profits, there is an
incentive to integrate backwards as long as the fum can produce the input at a lower
cost than the monopoly price. This has been the traditional explanation for vertical
integration in industries like copper, steel and aluminum. Also, according to this
theory, vertical integration is induced when bottlenecks in supply, or any other
uncertainty regarding price, are expected to be exploited through monopolistic
behaviour (Arrow, 1975).
The main criticism has come from those who argue that these objectives
could also be achieved through other forms of coordinating arrangements less costly
than vertical integration.
iii) Bilateral Monopoly.
The bilateral monopoly argument has been widely used to defend vertical
integration against anti-trust legislation l Oand is a very powerful theory to understand
bilateral dependency in general. The gist of the analysis is that in the case of bilateral
monopoly between a monopolist supplier who sells an input to a monopsonist buyer,
who in turn uses it in the production of a different good, the price of the input is
indeterminate within a fairly wide range. Thus, even if collaboration exists among
seller and buyer, bargaining may be difficult and could also give rise to an inefficient
solution: less output at a higher price11 (Morgan, 1949). In these circumstances,
10 Recently the same argument was used by the British Brewers Association to defend vertical
integration in the industry, against a negative report from the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission.
11 For the original description of bilateral monopolysee Bowley (1928).
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vertical integration could make everyone better off and therefore improve economic
welfare.
Let us take as an example a bilateral monopoly between a brewer (b) and a
retailer12, say a public house (p). The brewer faces a monopsonist buyer (the pub)
who uses beer as an input in the production of a different good: a drink13. The
brewer faces a derived demand curve (0) (Figure 1) which is the marginal revenue
product of the pub (MR ). Being a monopolist, the brewer recognizes that he canp
influence the price at which he sells by changing the quantity. If he expands output
by a given amount, he will have to reduce the price not only on these marginal sales
but on all sales (assuming he cannot discriminate). This is captured by his marginal
revenue curve ~) which is below the demand curve (0) and steeper. As any
monopolist, he maximizes profits by fixing the quantity supplied at a point where the
marginal revenue curve~) crosses his marginal cost curve (MCb). This occurs at
point F, determining an output equal to qb. He will sell this output at a price
determined by the demand curve (Pb).
By contrast, the pub faces a supply curve of beer (S) which is determined, as
we have seen, by the marginal cost of the brewer (MCb). Being a monopsonist, he
realizes that he can influence the price at which he can buy by altering the quantities
demanded. This effect is captured by the marginal cost curve MC . His optimalp
solution is to purchase a quantity that will equate his marginal cost to his marginal
revenue curve (0). This happens at point B, determining quantity ~. He will then
offer price Pb located on the supply curve.
As shown in the figure, the result is a very wide bargaining area (Pb-Pp)
which may be costly to settle causing potential welfare losses.
Contrast this solution with the equilibrium which would be obtained if the two
firms would integrate. The integrated firm would equate marginal revenue (defmed
by curve D) to marginal cost (determined by curve S) .and would produce a q~antity
qi at an implicit price Pr Notice that ~ is greater than either qp or qb· The solution for
12 All retail outlets enjoy spacial monopoly power. In other words, the monopoly of covering a
specific geographic area.
13 The beer supplied by the brewer plus the amenities.
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the integrated firm is just the competitive equilibrium and will hence imply a welfare
improvement over the other two solutions.
FIGURE 1.








Thus according to this neoclassical analysis, vertical integration enhances
efficiency by dissolving bilateral monopolies bargaining problems, eliminating
double marginalization by vertical chain monopolies, and minimizing input
substitution distortions.
The efficiency argument of vertical integration in the case of bilateral
monopoly can be compared with interesting results from simple duopoly models with
highly competitive products. They show that vertical "separation" can help
manufacturers to achieve marketing channel profits close or equal to the cooperative
profit level. (Coughlan,1985) (Bonanno & Vickers,1988). According to this analysis,
the use of middlemen with price autonomy, would represent a less autonomous
alternative than vertical integration to respond to price competition. It also induces
more friendly behaviour from rival manufactures. Having less degrees of freedom to
enter in a price war, the use of independent retailers would represent a more
fi al . 14pro table ternatrve .
14 Coughlan (1985) supports this view with survey data from the international semiconductor
industry.
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1.2.2. The Functional Approach
Adam Smith, more than two hundred years ago, said that the division of
labour within firms was limited by the extent of the market. In other words, firms
would grow as markets developed, because they would allow new technologies to
benefit from increasing returns to scale caused by further division of labor.
Smith's theory, though useful to understand some growth patterns, does not
explain why in growing and expanding markets like the United States, vertical
integration is no longer a popular strategy and seems to have stabilized after the
1930's. According to a study made by Liveslay and Porter (1969), 11% of their
sample companies had integrated into retailing by 1899. This proportion rose to 36%
in 1929, but has not changed significantly since.
George Stigler (1951) developed a functional theory to explain the boundaries
of firms which seems to offer a better explanation. According to the functional
approach, it is the division of labour among firms, as opposed to within firms, that is
limited by the extent of the market.
For Stigler, the total average cost of firms can be divided according to
different functions: e.g., production, promotion, information, risk bearing. Firms will
not perform or integrate those functions which can enjoy economies of scale when
left to the market. Therefore, one explanation for the case of the U.S. mentioned
above could be that firms chose to integrate forward into distribution channels while
specialist markets for wholesaling and retailing activities had not sufficiently
developed.
This theory attempts to demonstrate that the degree of integration depends on
the size of the industry and that division of labour among firms is limited by market
size. When industries are small, many production services are required on a small
scale and no markets would develop for them, causing firms to produce them
internally. As the industry grows, the increasing demand for these production services
would sustain a market for specialists. As a consequence, we would expect to find
that firms tend to integrate more when markets are smaller.
According to this theory, firms should be viewed as performing a series of
functions (e.g. purchasing, storing, transforming and selling) besides the purchase of
inputs to sell a product according to a production function. (Stigler, 1951). In other
words, Stigler breaks down the total average cost curve of the firm (TAC) into
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functions instead of factors. The result is an interesting theoretical scheme which
helps to understand vertical integration and disintegration of functions.
The firm's total average cost curve would be the sum of the functional average
cost curves: some falling, some rising, and some U-shaped (see figure 3). Finns
would expand or contract according to the marginal cost of each function. Some
functions would enjoy increasing returns yl (downward-sloping curves,), others
would present decreasing returns y3 (upward-sloping curves), while the TAC
FIGURE 2











presents its conventional U-shape.
When functions present increasing returns, firms would leave them to the
. 15 . f
market where specialists can take advantage of economies of scale or economies 0
15 Increasing returns with higher volumes of the same product or service.
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scope16. If the function has decreasing returns, or if the specialists markets are not
big enough, firms integrate and assume all the functions.
For example, a manufacturer would tend to spin-off, or leave to the market,
those distribution functions which face downward sloping cost curves because
somebody else with higher volumes could do the same function cheaper
(Mallen,1973). This opens the door for the development of specialists. For example,
market research functions tend to be left to specialists when the demand for it is high
enough to support a specialized company. Wholesalers and retailers facing the same
cost curve as the producers, can combine volumes of the same product from different
manufacturers and, by benefiting from economies of scale, offer the same service
cheaper. Also, channel members could combine different products and services, thus
benefiting from economies of scope and thus improve the efficiency of the channel
system.
The problem beyond the issue of economic efficiency is that manufacturers
usually demand exclusivity commitments for their products in order to deter
competition. This implies that distributors may often be searching for economies of
scope, instead of scale, so as not to create rivalries between their costumers.
Stigler's functional view ties the life cycle of industries to the structural
evolution of firms, New industries would have vertically integrated firms while the
same firms would tend to separate or spin-off functions when the industry matures.
Furthermore, this theory has important implications for the behavior of firms in small
markets. What happens if the markets are structurally small and specialist markets do
not develop? What are the real choices facing the firm? Thus, if the firm decides not
to "make" but to "buy" and the market is just not there, what are the structure and
performance implications?
Along these lines, Stigler pointed out the implications of this theory for
smaller and less developed markets:
"The vast network of auxiliary industries which we can take
for granted here, will not be available in small economies.
Their educational institutions will be unable to supply
narrowly specialized personnel; they will lack the specialists
who can improve raw materials and products." Stigler (1951,
p.193).
16 Increasing returns with higher volumes of different goods or services.
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The functional approach, though very helpful to understand organisational
choices, does not offer a method for measuring functions the same way production
factors are operationalized in production theory. Any attempt to test the functional
theory would face this shortcoming. Stigler also fails to mention intermediate types
of inter-ftnn relationships and vertical control (Vassilakis,1988).
Williamson (1971) has also criticized Stigler's view arguing that economies of
scale could also be developed by other manufacturers and not necessarily by
independent wholesalers or retailers. The explanation, he thinks, is to be found in
transaction costs.
1.2.3 The Transaction Cost Approach
Even though hierarchical structures may differ in form i.e. functional or
multi-divisional, some degree of vertical integration may be expected in all firms
(Davis, 1987). Furthermore, fmished goods and services are usually the result of
multistage production processes which could be separated into successive
independent technological segments. Vertical integration occurs when two or more of
these segments operate under the same administrative hierarchy (Koch,1980).
Therefore, to understand why these separable technological processes and
functions17 end up linked together under one single organisational structure, a more
general question must be raised. Why do firms exist at all? Why is some degree of
coordination often preferred over market transactions?
According to early theories of the firm which can be traced back to the
prominent work of Adam Smith (1776) and Alfred Marshall (1890) the economic
system works almost automatically. Through the price mechanism, resource
allocation follows an efftcient path towards long run equilibrium. Therefore,
allocative efftciency can only be reached when equilibrium prices are set in the
market place through open bidding among suppliers and consumers. These
assumptions, though excellent for explaining proftt maximization goals, do not offer
any insights about the size or number of firms which are to be found in a particular
economy. Furthermore, if its rationale is closely followed, markets would always be
better optimizing alternatives than intra-fmn transactions. Classical microeconomic
17 Which the case of distribution channels some of them are purchasing, storage, sorting,
transportation and financing.
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theory does not offer a full explanation of why firms develop and grow. (Marris &
Mueller, 1980)
Explanations for the existence of firms and for the determination of their
boundaries are to be found in more recent theories, such as Coase (1937), Bain
(1956), Caves (1967), Arrow (1975), Williamson (1975) and Chandler (1977).
The choice facing the firm is not a dichotomic one between doing the function
internally or leaving it to the market. There is an array of options between both
alternatives which can be called quasi-integration. Brown (1984) calls them firm-like
behaviour of markets.
The efficiency argument is the basis of the transaction cost approach. If
markets fail to provide efficient solutions there must be costs associated with the
price mechanism (transaction costs), which tend to be minimized through
organisational hierarchies (Coase, 1937, Williamson 1971,1975).
More than fifty years ago, Ronald Coase raised these issues in his seminal
work "The Nature of the Firm" which according to him has been "much cited and
little used"18. It was the start of a whole new line of economic thought and research,
which has evolved in a theory of market failure through the transaction cost
approach. "If a workman moves from department Y to department X" said Coase in
1937, "he does it not because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered
to do so". The underlying rationale in this phrase is that two coordinating
mechanisms affect the production process: prices and the entrepreneur. The question
is to evaluate when one is preferred over the other.
What transaction cost theory holds is that markets are sub-optimal solutions
when the price mechanism exhibits high costs. Therefore, optimization is only
reached when those costs are minimized by internalization, i.e. by having the
entrepreneur, instead of price system, as the coordinating factor. In consequence,
firms would grow until the marginal cost of internalizing the next process equals that
of the market.
Although Coase did not go very far in specifying when and why transaction
costs would be more likely to be high, he mentioned that the most important costs
which would make markets fail were: costs related to finding the relevant prices
18 Cited by Williamson (1983, p. 3).
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(searching costs) and costs related to writing, negotiating and enforcing long term
contracts. The enforcement element would have a higher impact in countries with
weak. judicial systems like Venezuela, since large amounts of time and resources
would have to be spent in order to resolve conflicts derived from contract violations
(Nairn, 1980). This could explain why, in such environments, companies tend to put
such a high value on loyalty, especially by other channel members.
It must be noticed that uncertainty is the common underlying element in both
cases. The future is a big and unknown place with costs surrounding future events
which cannot be anticipated. Therefore, information turns out to be one of the most
precious commodities and high information costs, is one the main reasons for market
failure.
For example, lower information costs can make organisations more efficient
than markets when uncertainty about future prices can be reduced through
internalization (Arrow, 1975). Along the same lines, uncertainty makes the writing of
complete contracts19 impossible (Williamson, 1971,1975). All contracts are
incomplete and therefore unanticipated outcomes may occur.
Williamson criticizes Coase's article as tautological due to its failure to
operationalize transaction costs. He develops a theoretical framework with the
objective of filling this gap. Whether Willamson has, or has not been successful in
operationali zing transaction costs is still a matter of controversy, but it is fair to admit
that his theoretical contribution has given much more weight to the transaction cost
approach.
Williamson takes Coase's argument further by developing a theory about the
circumstances under which transaction costs would tend to be high and therefore
hierarchies more likely to develop. Without pretending to summarize Williamson's
vast work, the following elements seem to be conditions for high transaction costs.
There are two inherent characteristics of human behavior which have to be
incorporated into the analysis of transactions: bounded rationality and opportunism.
1) Bounded rationality appears when costs of reaching an optimal decision are
high given the fact that human beings are only capable of processing limited
information, or as Herbert Simon put it:
19 Contracts which anticipate every possible future outcome.
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"The capacity of human minds for formulating and solving
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational
behaviour in the real world." (Simon,1957).
2) Opportunism according to Williamson is:
"lack of candor or honesty in transactions to include self-
interest seeking with guile." (Williamson, 1975)
Williamson gives much importance to the consequences of bounded
rationality in human behavior and its impact on the costs of writing and enforcing
contracts. He also introduces the concept of opportunism and how opportunistic
behaviour influences, and is influenced by, economic organizations.
It has been argued that opportunistic behaviour may not always be present
since it depends on the "attitudes" among channel members and on perceptions
towards certain "bureaucratic structures". According to this view, perceptions of
coercive power between channel members, leads to a less favorable "attitudinal
orientation" and more degrees of opportunism, whereas non-contingent power leads
to a more "favorable attitudinal" orientation and less opportunism (John,G 1984).
Williamson stresses that together with opportunistic behaviour and bounded
rationality, uncertainty and asset specijicity20 give rise to market failure and
exchange difficulties (Williamson, 1975). In general, vertical integration is 111 0 "
likely to happen when there are high degrees of uncertainty, highly specific
and high frequency of the transaction.
1) High degrees of market uncertainty21 have been generally
situation in which it is very costly or impossible to describe the cor
tree. More specifically, for the case of forward vertical intes-
referred to as uncertainty about:
a) Future prices for input and output products






When transactions require specific assets (human or capital) with little alternative use.
For a full discussion on uncertainty and the differences between diversity and volatility see
Spekman and Stem (1979) and Achrol, Reve and Stem (1983).
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c) Availability of price/quality combinations22(Blair and Kaserman 1983).
Market uncertainty increases transaction costs. In fact, the greater the
uncertainty, the greater the protection the parties involved would require from
possible outcomes. This in turn increases the costs of negotiating and enforcing the
contracts
23
while stimulating vertical integration.
One of the strongest criticisms that transaction cost economics has faced is the
difficulty in measuring and testing transaction costs. The treatment of uncertainty in
the literature is an excellent example to illustrate this shortcoming. Researchers have
faced problems opcrationahzing uncertainty and conflicting results have been
reported depending on different definitions of uncertainty.
For example, Dwyer and Welsh (1985) found in 10 industries in the United
States that "variability" (the variance of the existing demand i.e. availability of
resources and intensity of competition) fosters vertical integration to retailers. On the
other hand, in the same sample, "heterogeneity" (extent to which the environmental
entities facing the channel are dissimilar to one another) had no significant impact on
integration.
Saul Klein and Victor Roth (1988) report similar conflicting results under
different types of uncertainties faced by multinationals when establishing distribution
channels in host countries:
"An unbundling of uncertainty-construct is essential for an
understanding of the opposing desires for flexibility an
efficiency. As was shown, the different components of
uncertainty have conflicting implications for optimal structure,
and thus must be distinguished. Environmental volatility,
reflecting transaction cost incentives, has a positive effect on
forward integration, while environmental diversity reflecting
the need for flexibility and adaptation, has a negative effect on
forward integration." (Klein & Roth, 1988 p.28).
22
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Rationing and its price/quality impacts is an important source of uncertainty. This is an
important variable for less developed countries where rationing derived from lack of foreign
exchange is a common characteristic of markets.
Contractual incompleteness problems develop when there is ex-ante but not necessarily ex-
post uncertainty. The advantages of hierarchies over markets in this case reside on the fact
that the firm's ex-post access to relevant data is much greater. (Williamson, 1971)
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Variability, heterogeneity, volatility and diversity, are different ways of
defining uncertainty. Measuring and comparing is a difficult task.
2) Asset specificity is the other element which according to Williamson
encourages vertical integration. It has to do with the level of transaction-specialized
human and capital assets. When a transaction is made with items that are
unspecialized there is no hazard for the user since alternative sources of supply are
easily found. Similarly, no danger is perceived by the supplier when assets are not
specific to the transaction, since new clients can be reached if the original deal fails.
However, when specific assets are required for a transaction and the
alternative use of human and capital assets are very limited, or nonexistent, the
failure of the transaction due to opportunistic behavior bears an important cost for at
least one of the parties involved. In this case, and if the frequency of such transactions
is high, there would be an incentive to reach transactional efficiency by internalizing
the function through vertical integration.
For example, other things being equal, hi-tech products which require
specialized sales personnel (human asset specificity) would tend to be distributed in
integrated channels. The same would apply for highly perishable goods which would
require special transportation facilities (capital specificity). Erin Anderson (1985)
found support for the human asset specificity element in a study made with data from
13 electronic component manufacturers in U.S.A. Among other findings, more
controlled, direct sales-force were more frequent in hard-to-learn product lines,
which required more specifically trained personnel. Also Anderson & Coughlan's
(1987) findings support the asset specificity argument from data that showed
multinationals preferring integrated channels when product distribution required
highly trained personnel.
The concept of opportunistic behaviour has been used in different theoretical
research works to explain the organisation of economic activity. (Williamson, 1975),
(Teece, 1976). To prove how opportunism is exacerbated by asset specificity has also
been the objective of important empirical research (Anderson, 1985) (Anderson &
Coughlan, 1987) (Klein, 1990). Nevertheless, the concept is sometimes difficult to
separate from the rational behaviour of self-interest seeking individuals, which is the
basis of economic theory.
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) have defined opportunistic behaviour in
a way which can be better separated from rational economic behaviour. According to
them, as assets become more specific, more appropriable quasi-rents are created. This
24
gives rise to the tem, to reinterpret contracts in one's favour. Hence, the costs of
contracting will generally increase and may exceed the cost of vertical integration.
Hence, ceteris paribus, we are more likely to see vertical integration in these
circumstances. In other words, according to their view, vertical integration should be
examined as a means of economizing on the costs ofavoiding risks ofappropiation of
quasi rents, in specialized assets, by opportunistic individuals.
Until now we have talked about variables which transaction cost economics
sees as incentives for vertical integration, the elements which impose the limits for
organisational expansion will be discussed below.
The limits to the firm's growth, according to Williamson, are imposed by the
governance or bureaucratic costs which represent all the costs related to
organisational size, i.e. distortion in communication and finite span of control. Also,
to "make" internally what could be bought in the market, could mean to sacrifice on
economies of scope and scale. The limits to growth are mainly placed on governance
cost disabilities of internal organisation where asset specificity is not substantial and
also when integrating moves bring high losses in economies of scale and scope24
(Williamson, 1985).
Williamson has developed the following model to analyse vertical integration
decisions. In more recent works he has put more emphasis on the importance of asset
specificity, by considering it the principal factor which explains vertical integration in
transaction cost economy tenus:
"Without it, market contracting between successive production
stages ordinarily has good economizing properties. Not only
can production economies be realized by an outside supplier
who aggregates orders, but the governance costs of market
procurement are negligible since neither party has a
transaction-specific interest in the continuity of the trade. As
asset specificity increases, however, the balance shifts in favor
of internal organization." (Williamson, 1985, p. 90)
As asset specificity increases, vertical integration becomes a more efficient
solution, but governance costs and losses in economies of scale and scope have to be
weighed.
24 To benefit from the economies generated by aggregating demands is one of the advantages
of markets over hierarchical organisations.
_:~
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Using Williamson's model (Fig.3), we will show how these variables would
impact the decision of integrating forward into distribution.
FIGURE 3
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION AND GOVERNANCE COSTS:











SOURCE: Williamson O. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free
Press paper back edition. 1987. p.93.
Consider a producer of dairy products that has to decide whether to integrate
into distribution. Let us analyse rust governance costs and consider that economies of
scope and scale are negligible. The determinant factors are production cost control
and flexibility (e.g. the number of alternatives available) to respond to environmental
changes. According to Williamson, both elements are better accomplished through
market transactions. Nevertheless, as asset specificity deepens, bilateral dependency
relations between parties build up. This diminishes the advantage of markets over
hierarchies since the variety of choices offered by the market narrows down
considerably. In our example, the distribution of dairy products requires special assets
(e.g. refrigerated transportation units and storage capacity), reducing the alternatives
offered by the market to the manufacturer.
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Thus, let B(k) be the governance costs of hierarchies, and M(k) the
governance costs of markets where k is an index for asset specificity (Figure 3).
Assume, that dM/dk>dB/dk evaluated at every (k) since markets have a comparative
disadvantage in adaptability when compared with hierarchies as asset specificity
increases. Letting AG=B(k)-M(k), the curve shown in figure 3 indicates that markets
(M) are preferred when asset specificity is low (Ok')and hierarchies (H) when asset
specificity is high (i.e., any value over k').
But, on the other hand, markets can aggregate demands and benefit from
economies of scale and scope. In our example, independent wholesalers and retailers
could benefit form distributing other refrigerated products (economies of scope) or
other dairy products (economies of scale). If the impact of distribution costs and
economies of scale and scope are included, the following model results.
Let AC be the difference in cost between "making" the distribution function
internally and "buying" in the market AC decreases as asset specificity increases25
because the cost penalty for using hierarchies is lower when asset specificity is
higher, since transactions become less standardized and fewer economies in market
aggregation take place. Thus, the AC schedule is drawn as always positive and
downward sloping. The sum of production and governance costs is shown by
(AG+AC) and the value for which the sum (AG+AC) which crosses the x-axis at
k*>k'. This indicates that the levels of asset specificity in which the market is
preferred is enhanced when considering the production costs of internalizing the
function.
Thus, according to Williamson's model:
a) Markets are more efficient than hierarchies in the presence of low asset
specificity (less than k*), while hierarchies are more efficient when
asset specificity is high (greater than k*).
c) Economies of scope and scale favour the market over a wider range of
asset specificity values (values between k' and k*).
Mistaken vertical integration decisions are usually made in the area between
k' and k* when the losses in economies of scale and scope are not well assessed by
the firm.
25 Also, as the firm increses in size, curve AC drops since higher economies of scale can be
achieved internally.
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When referring to vertical integration into distribution channels, Oliver
Williamson introduces the extemality26 issue as stimulating vertical integration
together with asset specificity:
"Externality concerns arise in conjunction with a branded good
or service that is subject to quality debasement. Whereas a
manufacturer can inspect thereby better to control, the quality
of components and materials it purchases from earlier stage
and lateral suppliers, it is less easy to exercise continuing
quality controls over items sold to distributors". (Williamson,
1985, p.112)
According to this argument, negative externalities arise when the
manufacturer cannot extend quality controls over distribution and therefore
"internalizing the externality" will require the hierarchical control of distribution
functions.
In synthesis, three elements would induce vertical integration into distribution
channels according to this model:
1) High asset specificity in distribution functions.
2) High externalities.
3) Low losses in economies of scope.
Williamson's approach has been criticized for emphasizing the markets and
hierarchies dilemma in which markets and firms are alternative instruments for
completing transactions, without offering a satisfactory explanation for the existence
of other types of inter-frrm relationships. (Brown,1984) (Casson,1986).
As we have seen, one of the most important shortcomings of this theory is the
fact that although it goes much further than Coase in specifying under which set of
circumstances transaction costs tend to be high, it fails to determine how transaction
costs can be measured and thus how can the theory be tested. The problem arises with
key concepts within the theory such as "uncertainty" and "asset specificity".
Willamson's theory seems to be more suitable for explanatory purposes than for the
development of tools for measuring and predicting phenomena.
Whether the goal of science is explaining or predicting has been a long
philosophical debate between realists and instrumentalists'i". Nevertheless, a fair
26 Externalites arise when in a transaction there are costs which are not paid (negative
externalities) or benefits which are not charged for (positive externalities).
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assessment of the theory is that transaction cost economics is a powerful paradigm
which, departing from classical theories of the firm, explains the circumstances in
which hierarchical organizations are preferred over markets and vice-versa.
Nevertheless, we should not expect the theory to determine which mix of transaction
cost and governance cost would make a specific firm go for vertical integration.
1.2.4. Agency Theory
The agency theory of the firm, or the principal and agent problem, relate to a
number of situations where there is a delegation of responsibility from one person
(the principal) to another person (the agent) for selecting and implementing an action.
The principal is supposed to reward the agent in the presence of asymmetric
information and knowing that their interests are not in complete harmony. In other
words, due to informational asymmetries, the principal can only see the outcome of
the action without being able to asses the real effort (hidden action) of the agent in
achieving the final objective. Both parties know that they do not share the same
information after a certain point in time, and also that they do not share the same
objectives.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) have defined the agency relationship as:
"a contract under which one or more persons (the principalts)
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making
authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are
utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent
will not always act in the best interest of the principal." (in
Putterman, Ed. (1988, p. 212).
Thus, we can expect principal and agent to differ in their objectives. The
principal can limit divergences from his interest by defming appropriate incentives or
27 Realists and instrumentalists defend different views for the goals of science. The former
sustain that science should not only develop tools in order to make reliable predictions as the
instrumentalists believe, but explain phenomena and discover new truths. (Hausman,1985).
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by incurring monitoring or metering costs28 (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). This will
induce the agent to take advantage of the fact that, for the principal, to measure the
agents efforts can be very costly. Since perfect and costless monitoring is impossible,
the transaction should be structured in a way that the agent has an incentive to act in
the way preferred by the principal (Kreps, 1990). This is what has been called
incentive compatibility.
As far as vertical control is concerned, incentive compatibility may sometimes
be achieved through hierarchical structures. Nevertheless, solving the agency
problem may also imply the selection of looser organisational forms or market
exchange.
Thus, the principal's problem is to negotiate a contract specifying all the
contingencies which would help to reconcile objectives by designing a remuneration
scheme for the agent For example, owner-drivers may have better incentives to
operate transportation equipment with care than company employees. Independent
sales persons may be more willing to push sales than corporate wage-earners.
However, both would shirk if given the responsibility to rotate products on display to
improve their appearance.
The problem of "delegation of responsibility in the presence of informational
asymmetries" is one of the key issues facing manufacturers when defining a
distribution strategy. Nevertheless, little work has been done linking agency theory
with channel design.
1.2.5. The Structure-Conduct-Performance View
Vertical integration can also be viewed as a strategic move of an incumbent
firm to narrow an entrant's option to the industry, by increasing barriers to entry.
Thus a firm's relationships with its competitive environment can also stimulate
28 According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), one of the key problems facing economic
organisations is the payment of rewards according to productivity. "If rewards were ran~om
and without regard to productive effort, no incentive to productive effort would be provided
by the organisation". Thus, two key demands are placed on an eco~o~c. org~ati?n:
metering input productivity and metering rewards. One way of economizmg in momtormg
costs is by developing self-inforcing contracts by which the agent maximizes the principal's
objectives by following a self-interest behaviour.
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vertical integration. The structure-conduct-perfonnance paradigm (s-c-p), one of the
most popular approaches to industrial economics, offers a strategic explanation for
vertical integration.
According to this view, the key to understand and predict the performance of
an industry in terms of output, growth, profitability and technological advance, is to
be found in the structure of the industry. Vertical integration is one of the factors
included in the structure, together with degree of concentration, (number and size of
sellers), barriers to entry, economies of scale and government participation
(Scherer,1980), (Koch,1980). The conduct of firms covers: pricing and product
strategies, innovation, responsiveness to change, advertising and attitudes towards
rivals. The conduct (or behaviour) of firms, which is expected to be heavily
conditioned by the structure of the industry, is in turn responsible for the performance
outcome of the industry.
The core of the theory is deterministic, Market structure determines market
performance. For example, high industry concentration induces monopolistic
behaviour which in turn brings higher profits. Much of the market structure and
conduct is analysed on the basis of barriers to entry. In this manner, vertical
integration into distribution channels is a barrier to entry which could make the
industry more concentrated and thus more profitable. The same type of analysis is
given for product differentiation, advertising and research & development policies.
Vertical integration is also considered as affecting the conduct of firms in ways that
have feedback effects on structure, e.g. market foreclosure.
Competition policy and especially anti-trust legislation in the U.S. has heavily
relied on the structure-conduct-performance framework for anti-monopoly
recommendations. In effect, if structure determines performance, i.e. monopolistic
profits, the problem could be solved by changing the structure i.e. breaking up a
vertically integrated firm,
Neo-classical economists have argued, in response to those arguments, that in
the long run all barriers to entry are transitory. The only lasting ones are imposed by
a higher authority, such as the government. In their view, government regulation is
the primary source of market power. Any strategic move made by one firm can
sooner or later be made by another. In the long run, equilibrium is characterized by
perfect competition.
The s-c-p paradigm represents a departure from the theories which accept
perfect competition as the most appropriate lens through which to view industrial
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behaviour, and prefers to center on both, imperfect competition and market structure
to explain industry performance (Bain,1956), (Caves,1967), (Scherer,1980). These
differences have had important implications in the methodology and the research
work which both approaches have stimulated and developed. The s-c-p followers
have focused on the inductive method through case studies and empirical work. The
neoclassical economists, sometimes called the Chicago School (Martin, 1988), have
centered on the deductive method which is characterized by economic analysis in
traditional price theory.
Both approaches have greatly enriched the theory of industrial economics.
Nevertheless, the debate continues in assessing which approach has been more
successful in predicting the behaviour of firms. Generally, the s-c-p framework has
been characterized as better for explaining than predicting.
Nevertheless, the s-c-p paradigm has been criticized as a short-run, static
approach, good to provide a snapshot picture of the forces at work but not to predict
the evolution of structure and how future conduct could influence it (Sawyer,1985). It
also fails to give an overall theory of industry activity. It is more a framework to
analyse what is happening in a certain industry in a specific moment. It is industry
centered and not firm centered. This has also raised some criticism because it ignores
firm's internal organisation and its impact on performance. (Williamson, 1975, p.8).
Surprisingly enough, the financial sector is not mentioned as part of the
structure in which firms operate. The underlying assumption is that fmancial markets
are perfect The opposite has been argued by Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) who proved
that in the presence of informational asymmetries, equilibrium in the loan market is
characterized by credit rationing. How this affects industrial structure has not been
adequateIy addressed.
Besides the barrier to entry argument , there is another strategic explanation
for vertical integration: the need to avoid government controls by internalizing
transactions which would be regulated if left to the market. Examples of such




In marketing theory, distribution channels are defmed as open systems of
interdependent organisations involved in the process of making products, services
and ideas available for use or consumption. (Stem & El Ansary, 1988). Through their
ample array of functions they not only satisfy, but stimulate demand. To accomplish
these objectives, a system with an efficient combination of wholesalers, retailers,
dealers, sales representatives and promotion offices, has to be organized.
Due to their variety of functions, channel structure and design offer an
excellent opportunity to analyze the firm's choice between intra and inter-frrm
relationships29, and between the different alternatives for channel levels (e.g.,depth
of the channel), (Frazier, 1991).
The essence of channel structure is its complexity. A wide network of intra-
firm and inter-firm relationships which may cooperate or conflict in the process of
making goods and services available for use or consumption. The alternatives open to
channel design are wide. It is a fertile area in which to test vertical control theories.
The importance of distribution channel control on corporate strategy is often
mentioned in the literature (Alderson,1957) (porter,1980) (Frazier,1987). Companies
like ffiM, Caterpillar and NIKKON are successful examples of firms following
strategies with high emphasis in distribution design, control and management.
Nevertheless, research on the specific issues which impact the development and
maintenance of a competitive advantage have been neglected by researchers. Very
little is found in the literature about the nature of the control needed by manufacturers
and the reasons for controlling specific functions.
i) Distribution Functions and Channel Structure
It is important to understand the nature of distribution functions to evaluate
how they impact the design of the organisational structure which makes them
possible.
29 Choosing if the firm should have direct or indirect control over its distribution channels. And
if the firms chooses the indirect alternative, what type of interfirm relation would be more
efficient (e.g. contractual, leadership).
33
The list of distribution channel functions seems to be ever increasing. It is
often found that the number of functions mentioned in marketing textbooks, gets
larger and larger through a combination of remarks and footnotes.
Nevertheless, the following seem to represent an approximate summary of
them:
1) Sales.
2) Transportation or delivery.
3) Storage.
4) Collection.
5) Sorting activities to provide variety.
6) Promotion and point of purchase advertising.
7) Provision of credit or financing.
8) Maintenance of product quality.
9) Information: to the user and from the user.
10) Risk bearing.
11) Post sale service.
Even though the number of channel functions is long and complex, there is a
tendency in the literature (specially in the economic literature) to consider
distribution as a homogenous task. This approach dangerously ignores the variety of
skills needed to perform each channel function (e.g. sales, storage, customer service,
transportation and financing). The individual evaluation of functions and tasks helps
to establish a more efficient division of responsibilities among channel members
which in turn impacts corporate competitive advantage. These issues are not
sufficiently discussed in the literature and little empirical and theoretical research has
been done in this area.
These functions need to be performed within the distribution channel and the
task for the manufacturer lies in finding the most efficient way of organising
transactions. This has been called in the literature the shifting principle: while it is
indeed possible to eliminate or change the parties involved, the functions can not be
eliminated. When institutions or specific agents are eliminated, the functions are
shifted either backwards or forwards in the channel.
Going back to the functional approach to vertical integration (Stigler, 1951)
some insights emerge to explain channel structure and design.
The gist of the functional theory is that firms would tend to integrate forward
in the absence of specialized markets for channel functions. On the other hand,
according to the shifting principle, those channel functions have to be carried out by
someone, and they are shifted along alternative parties. Thus, when market
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alternatives are scarce, there will be a tendency, by those channel members who have
more at stake, to vertically integrate the function. For example, if a high technology
manufacturer is designing the channel for a new product, and qualified personnel are
not available in the market to provide the appropriate service, internal personnel
training would take place and tight controls over the service functions would be
necessary. The same would apply for all channel functions listed above, raising many
interesting questions regarding firm-market relationships.
A particularly interesting question relates to the provision of credit within the
distribution channel. In the literature, this channel function is usually regarded as
credit to the consumer. Intra-channel fmancing, or fmancing given among channel
members, is usually ignored. We believe that this is an important theoretical gap
which hampers the understanding of specific channel relations and structures.
In Chapter 3, a theoretical framework will be presented with the objective of
understanding some aspects of the way the fmancing function is organised along the
distribution channel. One issue which will be discussed is how the structural
disequilibria in the loan market and credit rationing (Jaffee and Russel, 1976)
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) impact channel structure and why does a channel member
take over commercial lending functions?
ii) Variables that Affect Channel Structure
According to the marketing theory, different variables impact channel
structure inducing managers to use longer or shorter channels. Though variables
which have to do with the size of the firm and market size are mentioned in the
literature, marketing approaches generally place the emphasis on product
characteristics and consumer buying patterns.
There are four groups of variables that are usually mentioned in the literature:
1) Market Variables and Consumer's Buying Patterns.
2) Product Variables.
3) Finn Variables.
4) Environmental Variables. (Rosenbloom, 1987)
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We will assume that, ceteris paribus, structurally shorter channels are easier
to control than longer ones30, and therefore more susceptible to be vertically
integrated.
i) Market Variables and Consumer's Buying Patterns.
a) Market size is the number of customers and potential clients. It is usually
positively related to the length of the channel. The larger the market, the longer the
channel, since more channel members can benefit from economies of scale on
specialized markets.
b) Market Density is the number of buying units in a given area. This relates
to the geographic dispersion of costumers. A rule of thumb sustains that it is
negatively related to the length of the market: the wider the coverage area and the
less the market density, the longer the channel. In this situation market specialists can
benefit from economies of scope.
c) Size and frequency of purchase. When buying patterns are in small
quantities and frequent, channels tend to be longer, since consumers would not travel
long distances to buy. Smaller retailers reaching the consumer would be necessary.
(Aspinwall,1958)
ii) Product Variables. Aspinwall Approach.
Characteristics of goods and services are elements of the marketing mix
which have direct impact on channel decisions. Distribution channels exist because of
the separation of product or service providers from consumers. Therefore, the nature
of the product or service should influence the nature of the distribution channel
(Frazier, 1991).
Aspinwall makes an important contribution linking the characteristics of
products to the direct-indirect control decision. According to his approach there are
five characteristics which impact the way products are distributed:
30 Less governance costs and lower losses in economies of scope and/or scale.
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a) Replacement rate31, which is the rate at which a good is purchased and
consumed by users in order to provide the satisfaction a consumer expects from the
product
b) Gross margin, being the difference between total unit cost and the final
realized sales price.
c) Level of adjustment, which are the services applied to goods in order to
meet the exact needs of the consumer. These services may be performed as the goods
are being produced or at some other intermediate point in the distribution channel.
d) Time of consumption is the measured time of consumption during which
the good gives up the utility desired.
e) Searching time can be defined as the measure of average time needed by
the consumer to find and purchase the desired product or service.
Aspinwall (1958) then classifies goods by colours according to the way they
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Following this approach some consumer goods (e.g. food, drinks and
toiletries) with high replacement rates, low growth margins, low levels of adjustment,
low time of consumption and low searching time, will have long channels. By
contrast, the transaction between a costumer and his tailor would be an example of a
31 The way the five characteristics follow almost identically Aspinwall's definitions given in
Mallen 1967, pp.82-93.
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red good. Many products lie in the middle range which have been designated as
orange goods. According to Aspinwall:
"They have been produced to standard specifications but with
the knowledge that they will have to be adapted in greater or
les~r d~gree in each individual installation. The replacement
rate IS high enough to offer moderate opportunity for
s~dardizatio~ and specialization. At least one intermediary is
likely to enter m the picture". (Aspinwall, 1958, p. 89).
Durable goods in general belong to this category. They may be produced by
standard procedures, but in different models and colours to meet specific segments of
the market.
Aspinwall does not explain the reasons for choosing these five characteristics;
he fails to explain the reasons and rationale for his approach. Though useful as a
check list, it lacks theoretical weight and explanatory value.
Other product characteristics are also mentioned in the literature as impacting
channel structure. The following is a representative list of them.
a) Bulk & weight. Due to transportation costs, the bigger and heavier the
product, the shorter the channel.
b) Perishability. Goods can deteriorate over time and fashion can change.
Both characteristics determine the perishability of the product. When products are
highly perishable, e.g. milk, faster and shorter channels would be more efficient.
Highly specific assets like refrigerated trucks would be required, and according to
Williamson this would make the channel more likely to be integrated.
c) Price Marketing theory holds that the lower the unit value of a product, the
lower the product's profit margin, which in turn would require larger channels where
independent distributors can benefit from economies of scope.(Rosenbloom, 1987).
However, considering the demand side, the price-income ratio (price of the
good and income of the purchaser) is a good rule of thumb measure to assess the
amount of time and information that would be required for a buying decision. The
higher the ratio, the higher the searching cost the consumer is willing to pay before
purchase. Therefore specialized information and service are more valuable than for
low price-income ratio products. Thus, products with high price-income ratios tend to
have shorter and more controlled channels than less expensive goods (Aspinwall,
1958). For example, in general, durable goods like cars, appliances, computers would
have shorter and more controlled channels than consumer goods like cereals. Also
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highly specific human capital (Williamson, 1987) will be required in the former in
order to provide the information and service needed (Lilien,1979).
d) Standardization. Custom-made and highly differentiated products and
services would tend to have shorter channels than standard, undifferentiated ones.
Higher margins would be a characteristic of the former while stronger competition
would be the case of the later. A manufacturer of highly competitive (homogeneous)
goods would be better off by leaving the distribution function to the market
(Coughlan,1985).
e) Degree of technical development. The more technically sophisticated the
product, the shorter the channel. Highly trained personnel will be required and thus
higher transactions costs may be saved. (Williamson, 1987). For example, the sales-
force of an electronic component manufacturer would be more likely to be vertically
integrated than the sales force of a brewing manufacturer. (Anderson, 1985).
f) Product Life Cycle. During early life cycle stages some products are
launched by aggressive promotional campaigns. This would generate incentives for
more direct channel structures. (Lilien,1979).
iii) Firm Variables.
a)Size. Smaller firms would benefit from the use of intermediaries, who in
turn would be able to benefit from economies of scale and scope. Bigger firms with
increasing returns to scale in production would tend to integrate into mass
distribution channels. (Chandler, 1980). Direct channels tend to be used when firms
are larger in size. (Lilien,1979). Growing firms will also have shorter channels, since
it is easier to push products and to control promotional policies.
b) Financial strength. The better the firm's access to the fmancial market and
the bigger its own fmancial resources the wider the choices between alternative
channels. Financial strength can be the key variable to defme channel design and
inter-firm relationships.
This is especially true when fmancial markets are highly imperfect. Bigger
firms would tend to substitute banks and capital markets in fmancing channel
members. The result could be either vertical integration or high channel control
through coercive power. Although no specific literature linking financial market
imperfections and marketing channels seems to be available, we will show the
importance of this effect in the cases.
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iv) Environmental variables
Under this topic an array of factors are mentioned in the literature. They
include: technological, economic, competitive, socio-cultural, legal variables and
those related to the country's infrastructure. For example, Chandler (1977) argues that
large companies developed the U.S. in the second half of the XIX century because of
the development of railroads, telegraph and other communication systems and
technological changes that allowed mass production.
1.3 Distribution Channels. When is Forward integration more likely?
A Summary
1.3.1. According to the Neo-Classical Theory
1) When there are variable coefficients of production which allow the
monopolist of one input to benefit from forward vertical integration by reaching the
input mix which extracts maximum profits.
2) When in the case of bilateral monopoly, bargaining is difficult. Also in the
case of duopoly when products are not highly differentiated.
3)When there are low degrees of competition in the final consumer market,
which permits the forward extension of monopoly profits.
1.3.2. According to the Functional Theory
4) When industries are new.
5) When firms are faced with upward sloping curves for some or all
distribution functions.
6) When, even though economies of scale in distribution are available, there is
al d · . 32a lack of specialized markets due to structur an SOCIOeCOnOlll1C reasons .
32 Some evidence of this kind of problems can be found in the literature regarding
multinationals setting distribution channels in host countries. It is also the case for some
product specific services. ( Blair and Kaserman, 1983, p. 36)
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1.3.3. According to the Transaction Cost Approach
7) When there are high degrees of some types of uncertainty/volatility.
8) When costs of writing, negotiating and enforcing contracts are high.
9) When law enforcement and judicial systems are weak, which increases the
net present cost of contracts.
10) When high asset specificity is required.
11) When externalities are high.
12) When markets have few participants
13) When transactions are recurrent and frequent.
14) When the losses in economies of scale and scope do not overweigh the
benefits of integration.
1.3.4. According to the Structure-Conduct-Perjonnance Paradigm
15) To increase barriers to entry.
16) To avoid market rationing regulations.
17) To avoid price and tax regulations.
1.3.5. According to Marketing Theory
18) When markets are small.
19 When markets are dense.
20) When rums are big.
21) When purchases are more frequent.
22) When products are custom made.
23) When products are highly perishable.
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24) When products are new.
25) When the importance of sophisticated service is high.
According to Aspinwall the following five conditions have to be achieved
together:
26) When replacement rate is low.
27) When gross margin is high.
28) When the level of adjustment is high.
29) When the time of consumption is high.
30) When searching time is high.
We will come back to these theoretical approaches in Chapter 3. In the next
Chapter we will present a discussion of the choice of method and the reasons for





This chapter will evaluate the alternative research methods used in
organisational research and identify the reasons for selecting the case study design 1.
First, a quick defmition and description of the different approaches will be presented
together with the explanation and evaluation of techniques of data collection.
Arguments in favour of, and against, qualitative or quantitative research,
though fashionable2, will not be presented (Downey, K. & Ireland D., 1979). Such
discussions tend to be sterile if the points of view are stressed out of the context of a
specific research problem. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to explain how, after
defming a research problem, both survey and case study design were evaluated as
possible alternative research methods; and how and why it was decided in favour of
the latter.
2.1. Types of Research Methods3
Each research strategy represents a different way of collecting and analysing
empirical evidence. The research designs mentioned here are those often used for
social sciences and in particular for organisational studies. These research methods
should be looked at as real alternatives for all the phases of the investigation: the
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. This must be specified because there is a




Research design is sometimes differentiated from "research method". The former is the
general orientation and strategy of the investigation, whereas the methods are considered the
techniques of data collection. (Bryman,1989).
For an extensive discussion on qualitative and quantitative research see the special issue of
Administrative Science Quarterly Vol 24 No.4, 1979.
The term "methods" is used in this research even though it was found that in some research
works the term is confused with "methodology". Methodology is "widely misused as a more
pretentious equivalent for methods. What the term properly denotes is the system of
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SOURCE: copied from Yin, R. "Case Study Research", Revised Edition. SAGE
Publications, Inc. 19890.17
different stages of research. In other words, it is argued that case studies are good for
the exploratory phase, surveys and histories are useful for the descriptive phase, and
experiments are the only way of finding new causal links.
According to Robert Yin(1989) this hierarchical view is incorrect4 in that the
following conditions really distinguish one approach from the other:
a) The type of research question posed,
b) The extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events,
and
c) The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.
Based on these three characteristics a distinction between experiments,
surveys, history and case studies is made (See Table 1).
2.1.1. Experimental Research
Experiment-based research is mainly used when the objective of the research
is to determine the specific impact of a small number of independent variables on the
dependent variable. Its most important characteristic is that there is a controlled
environment in order to evaluate the impact of the variables. As far as organisational
4 At the same time he stresses that these strategies are not mutually exclusive.
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research is concerned this means that real life conditions have to be reproduced5 but
concentrating on the variables that are to be tested. The other important
characteristics are that it responds to "how" and "why" questions and focuses on
contemporary events.
2.1.2. Survey Research
The survey is a type of research strategy which usually entails the collection
of data through self administered questionnaires or structured interviews. Such data
collection is made on a number of units and usually at a single point in time. The
objective is to systematically collect a body of quantifiable data and to examine
patterns of relationship for a wide range of variables.
The appropriate research goal is to measure the predictive value of specific
theories by defining well structured and measurable hypothesis. The research
questions for which a survey can be usefully designed are "who", "what", "where",
"how many" and "how much". The survey designer usually tries to limit the number
of variables to be analysed and the number of questions to be asked. The
questionnaires are usually self-administered, thus the questions have to be limited in
number, clear and easy to answer. Also, special techniques are often used in order to
eliminate biased answers.
2.1.3. Case Study
"...is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and
in which multiple sources of evidence are used." (Yin,1989
page. 23).
The case study method focuses on understanding the dynamics within a
specific setting. It is a useful strategy when the objective of the research is to
understand particular causal links in situations in which existing theories have
"suspicious" applications. Also, they are particularly helpful when one of the
5 This has been a source of criticisms from those who stress that "rea1life conditions" can not
be reproduced.
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objectives of the research is to evaluate the impact of time and the evolution of
variables within specific periods.
This strategy is better for research questions which are more explanatory such
as "why" and "how". These questions deal with operational links which usually have
to be traced over time. They are different from survey questions which are more
oriented to measure frequencies or incidences.
The main difference with the historical approach is that case studies focus on
contemporary events (Table 1) and, therefore, the methods for data collection differ.
2.1.4. Action Research
The main characteristic of action research is that the researcher is involved, in
conjunction with the members of an organisation in dealing with a problem which is
recognized as such (Bryman, 1989). It is usually used in applied social science and it
is oriented to "solve a problem" in the organisation. Members of the research team
and people from the organisation work together in developing a diagnosis and a
solution for the problem.
The main criticism is that it is too close to consultancy and the researcher
looses the detachment, by getting too involved in the organisational environment.
This has created concern about the ethical implications. Nevertheless, action research
has been recognized as explicitly concerned with developing findings which can be
applied to organisations. They are "practical" and organisational members like them.
2.2. The Research Design: Building Theory
The most important contribution of this work has been to develop a
theoretical framework, presented in Chapter 3, which attempts to provide original
insights in order to analyse the determinants of vertical control into distribution
channels. The process by which new theory emerged from the process is closely
related to the research method which was used.
In this section an explanation of the steps followed to build theory will be
given. In doing so, a chronological description of the different phases of the research
will also be presented with the objective of identifying when and why different
methodological decisions were made (See Fig. 1).
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The components for case research design and the steps for theory building,
explained below, are the result of personal experience. Theoretical elements from the
work of Yin (1989) and Eisenhardt (1988) have been used to explain certain phases
and iterative processes.
FIGURE 1
STEPS FOLLOWED TO DEVELOP THE PROPOSED THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH LITERATURE
OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVIEW
PROBLEM (1) (2) (3)
I
SELECTION STUDY (5) METHODOLOGICAL
~OF COMPANIES (6) PROPOSITIONS CHOICE (4)
CONVERTING STUDY
PROPOSITIONS INTO INTERVIEWS TRANSCRIPTIONS
SEMI-STRUCTURED (8) (9)
QUESTIONAIRE (7)
THEORETICAL ITERATIVE WITHIN CASE
FRAMEWORK PROCESS BETWEEN ANALYSIS (10)(11) (3) (10) (11)
THEORY BUILDING:
CROSS CASE ITERATIVE PROCESS
ANALYSIS (12) BETWEEN
(3) (5) (10) (11) (12)
2.2.1. Identification of the Research Problem and Research Questions.
Steps (1) and (2)
Some authors argue that, when using the case study method, it is very
important to first identify the research problem in order to have a well defmed focus
and not to become "overwhelmed" by the volume of data.
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"C?n?"ary to popular thinking, one of the key features in theory
building research (from case study) is initial defmition of the
research problem at least in broad terms." (Eisenhardt,op.cit
p.4)
This is probably true for situations in which decisions about the methodology
have been made before identifying the research interest. In this study, the process was
different, the method was selected after defming specific research questions for a
research problem; and the case design was chosen because it was seen as the best
instrument to collect and analyse the data needed to answer the research questions.
The research problem emerged as a combination of the following issues.
Marketing and managerial theories usually present distribution decisions as "a la
carte" menu where all elements are readily available to manufacturers in the desired
combination6. The task for managers is then to choose the best alternative according
to consumer's buying patterns and specific product characteristics7.
Nevertheless, it was found in previous interviews that managers in Venezuela
thought that "designing" a distribution channel was a very difficult task. Sometimes
such a "menu" with market alternatives did not exist, and manufacturers ended up
investing important resources either developing channel functions or internalizing
them. Furthermore, in such conversations, the growing tension between the
marketing and sales departments was always mentioned. Marketing people were
trying to convince the rest of the organisation how "old fashioned" it was to place a
high strategic significance on distribution. According to them, the most important
elements of the marketing mix8 were product development to meet consumer needs,
and advertising. Products had to be made so that consumers looked for them and
distribution was a complementary element in the marketing mix. On the other hand,





E.g. intensive, extensive, exclusive, selective, direct or indirect distribution.
As it was explained in Chapter 1, marketing and managerial approaches place high emphasis
on product characteristics and consumer's buying patterns as impacting channel structure.
Product design, price decisions, promotion and distribution of the product or service.
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"you know these kids from marketing... they do not know what
they are doing, they come here to repeat what the books say
and it just does not work that way"
There may well be much truth in both positions but it was not easy to identify
where and how to close the gap. One of the problems which surfaced is the normative
application and extrapolation of theories and strategies built for other realities and
from other experiences. As a consequence, there is a lack of understanding about the
way distribution functions are perceived by managers.
Another element of research interest was that companies with high market
share and important leadership power usually maintain tight control over distribution
and have devoted important resources to achieve this goal. Some of them have
integrated vertically. This raises important questions: if a company has a leading
product, why would it find it so important to integrate or control channels?
Furthermore, according to popular thinking, integration into distribution has been one
of the most important causes for oligopolistic and monopolistic structures. Was there
a relationship between the search for market power and channel control?
These conflicting elements inspired the objective of this research: a better
understanding of how distribution channels were perceived by managers and why and
how they exert control over them.
The following questions were defined as research questions.
1) How are distribution channels perceived by management? (Rl)
2) Why do managers choose more complicated forms of transactions when
designing distribution channels (e.g. vertical integration and contracts), instead of
keeping to the classic market exchange? (R2)
After defining the research questions, a review of the literature concerning the
theoretical issues and the empirical research in the area was conducted.
2.2.2. The Literature Review. Step (3)
Looking for theories that would offer alternative explanations of management
behaviour, we went beyond marketing and managerial theories and incorporated
views from industrial organisation theories and new theories of the firm.
49
The literature review permitted the identification of different determinants of
vertical integration and control from various theoretical approaches. From the six
theoretical bodies analysed, thirty elements were distinguished as specifically
impacting vertical integration and control into distrituion channels (Chapter 1). Also
some interpretations of the strategic importance of distribution channels were found.
Thus, the first idea regarding method was to conduct a survey by which the predictive
value of these theories could be tested.
Nevertheless, there were other plausible explanations gathered from personal
experience which were not reflected in the theories. One of them was the perceived
importance of intra-channel financing and its impact on channel strategy and
structure. This element, totally absent from the literature, was evaluated, and a
proposed theoretical explanation developed and presented in Chapter 3. Furthermore,
since theories are generally industry or product specific, they have little power to
explain strategic differences among close competitors. In other words, these
approaches leave little room for managerial discretion and, in consequence, have
limited value for explaning the development of a firm's competitive advantage.
Thus, since some important aspects of the issues we wanted to analyse were
not present in the literature, some doubts began to emerge about the usefulness of a
survey approach.
2.2.3. Methodological Choice. Step (4)
It was not clear whether the theoretical frameworks found in the literature
were adequate for the Venezuelan context. Doubts about the veracity of their implied
cause-effect relationships and the conviction that important elements were missing,
paved the road for the search of a research method different from surveys.
The fear was that by using a survey, there was a chance of arriving at the
"right" conclusions (e.g. the validity of certain theories), but because of the "wrong"
reasons, since the particular causal links were different for each the companies
studied. For example, a manufacturer of a perishable product may have integrated
forward, not because of the characteristics of the product as some theories predict,
but because there was no alternative due to lack of suppliers for channel functions.
In other words there was a risk of getting trapped in "The Name of the Rose"
effect, after the famous book by Umberto Eco (1989). In the novel, a series of crimes
are solved by William of Baskerville, a Benedictine monk acting as detective, who
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finds out that the succession of murders followed the sequence of the seven trumpets
of the Apocalypse. Carefully unveiling the pattern, he successfully discovers the
assassin: Jorge, a blind monk responsible for the custody of the monastery's library.
Nevertheless, an interesting surprise was in store: though the identification of the
murderer was correct, the reasoning and cause-effect logic followed by the detective
to arrive to that conclusion were totally wrong:
William:" So then I conceived a false pattern to interpret the
moves of the guilty man, and the guilty man fell in with it.
And it was this same pattern that put me on your trail"
Jorge: "I cannot follow you, you are proud to show me how,
following the dictates of your reason, you arrived at me, and
yet, you have shown me, you arrived here by following a false
reasoning" (p.470-471)
Since discovering the assassin was not enough, and evidence was needed to
accuse him, the correct explanation had to be found. In other words "what" happened
(who was the murderer) was easier to discover than "why" and "how".
It was the objective of the present research to understand the logic behind
management decisions about distribution channels and find an explanation for their
behaviour within their unique circumstances.
Robert Yin's approach to choosing research methods according to the type of
research questions, also raised doubts about surveys:
"Similarly, like this second type of "what" question, "who" and
"where" questions (or their derivatives-"how many" and "how
much") are likely to favor survey strategies...these strategies
are advantageous when the research goal is to describe the
incidence or prevalence of a phenomenon...In contrasts, "how"
and "why" questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to
the use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the
preferred research strategies. This is because such questions
deal with operational links needing to be traced over time,
rather than mere frequencies or incidence." (Yin, R. op.cit. p.
18)
While deciding on the research method, attempts to develop a questionnaire
were made, but always ended up too long and complicated. It was difficult to
abbreviate historical elements, management perceptions, and the different
determinants which could possibly influence management decision in a specific
period of time. A survey could not cover adequatedly all the specific elements which
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were needed to understand each case in its specific context and with its own
complexity.
In spite of the fact that he was referring to a totally different subject, the
paleontologist, Stephen Jay Gould, expresses his view on narrative and on the power
of case description:
"This book, using the terminology of one of my least favorite
sports, attempts to tackle one of the broadest issues that science
can address -the nature of history itself- not by a direct assault
upon the center, but by an end run through the details of a truly
wondrous case study. Detail by itself can go no further; at its
best, presented with a poetry that I cannot muster, it emerges as
admirable "nature writing". But frontal attacks upon
generalities inevitably lapse into tedium or tendentiousness.
The beauty of nature lies in detail; the message in generality.
Optimal appreciation demands both, and I know no better
tactic than the illustration ofexciting principles by well chosen
particulars." (Gould, 1991, p.13. ).
This is an excellent interpretation of the intrinsic characteristics of case study
and one of its major advantages: to permit the illustration of certain patterns and
theories by well chosen particulars.
Thus, the alternatives were two: either to use the survey method and develop a
questionnaire to test among different companies the incidence or prevalence of some
of the patterns predicted by existing theories, or to find out the specific causal links
for management decisions in a few cases studied in greater detail.
Given the reasons expressed above, the case study method was chosen. In
particular, we opted for a multiple-case study in various industries, with two
companies in each industry, to eliminate industry specific characteristics and give
room for explaining differences in firm's strategies. The logic for choosing the
companies and the cases will be explained in Section 2.5.
One of the most common criticisms of case studies is that small samples
cannot be used to make generalizations. However, the point is precisely that cases are
not samples and thus generalizations are not to populations but to theoretical
propositions. Within the case method, the units of analysis are not chosen at random
as in surveys, but according to the theoretical categories which are to be studied.
Generalizations are then made to those theoretical categories and not to populations.
This is what has been called analytical generalization (Yin, 1989).
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This criticism has been used to shed some doubts about the scientific power of
theories derived from case studies. The erroneous logic behind this belief is that
scientific theories can only be built by methods which insure a high probability of
getting the same result by consecutive testings.
The counter argument can be found in Popper's (1990) view of the scientific
method:
"Tests cannot be carried on ad infinitum: sooner or later we
have to stop (p.47)"
"I propose to adopt rules such as will ensure the testability of
scientific statements; which is to say their falsifiability (p.49)."
In other words, according to Popper, empirical generalizations are falsifiable
instead of verifiable. This means that scientific laws can be testable in spite of being
unprovable. Scientific laws can be tested by systematic attempts to refute them.
(Magee, 1990)
"According to the traditional, inductivist view, what scientists
are looking for are statements about the world which have the
maximum degree ofprobability, given the evidence. Popper
denies this. Any fool he points out, can produce an indefinite
number of predictions with a probability almost equal to one...
The probability of such statements is maximal because the
informative content is minimal. "(Magee, 1990, p.35)
"What we are interested in, then, are statements with a high
informative content, this consisting of all the non tautological
propositions which can be deduced from them. But the higher
the informative content the lower the probability, according to
probability calculus; for the more information a statement
contains, the greater the number of ways which it may tum out
to be false ... What we want are statements ofa high
informative content, and therefore low probability, which
nevertheless come close to the truth. The fact that they are
highly falsifible makes them also highly testable: informative
content which is in inverse proportion to probability, is in
direct proportion to testability." (Magee, 1990 op.cit. p.36).
In other words the method by which theories are developed is not the
crucial issue; it is the resulting theory which must meet a specific
requirement: it should have enough informative content in order to be
falsifible.
The purpose of this work is to test theories by attempting to falsify them, and
in doing so, new theoretical frameworks, also falsifiable, are developed.
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2.2.4. Study Propositions. Step (5)
The study propositions are the equivalent of the hypothesis in the survey
research. They represent plausible explanations for the research questions and they
direct the attention to elements which should be studied and analysed within the
scope of the research.
After choosing the case study method, the study propositions were taken from
the literature review and from insights which had been originated during past
research experiences. The study propositions have to be selected for each study
question, and they are as follows.
i) Study Propositions for Research Question (R1 )
How are distribution channels perceived by management in Venezuela? (Rl)
Study propositions:
-Distribution channels are viewed by management as a particularly important
competitive tool. (S1)
-The length and width of the channel is not the issue but who performs which
functions and why.(S2)
ii) Study Propositions for Research Question (R2 )
Why do managers choose more complicated forms of transactions when
designing distribution channels (e.g. vertical integration and contracts), instead of
keeping to the classic market exchange? (R2)
According to the literature manufacturers would tend to vertically integrate
into distribution when in the presence of the following elements.
From neoclassic economics in the presence of:
Bilateral monopoly relationship with retailers.(S1)
From the functional theory (Stigler,1951) when:
Industries are new. (S2)
There are diseconomies of scale in distribution.Ci.)
54
From the transaction costs theory when:
There are high degrees of uncertainty. (volatility). (S )
4
High asset specificity is required for channel functions.(Ss)
Externalities are high. (S6)
Transaction markets are small and opportunistic behaviour is exacerbated.
(S7)
Transactions are recurrent and frequent. (S8)
To avoid post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. (S~
Losses in economies of scope and scale do not outweigh the benefits of
integration. (SI~
From strategic aproaches with the purpose of:
Increasing barriers to entry. (S11)
To avoid market rationing regulations. (S12)
To avoid price and tax regulations.(S13)
The following study propositions were found from the managerial and
marketing literature:
Channels will tend to be more direct according to Aspinwall's approach
(based on product characteristics) when:
Replacement rate is low. (SI4)
Gross margins are high.(S15)
Level of adjustment is high.(SI6)
Time of consumption is high.(SI7)
From other marketing frameworks when:




Products are complex and custom made.(S22)
Products are perishable.(S23)
From past research experience:
Imperfections in the loan market. (S24)
Absence of suppliers markets for channel functions.(S25)
Infrastructural deficiencies. (S26)
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Study propositions for the research questions were then used as a guide for the
semi-structured questionnaire.
2.2.5. The Selection of the Companies
Twenty three companies were interviewed: twenty manufacturers and three
independent wholesalers (Table 2). With the information gathered from the
companies, six cases are presented. The criterion used was to have the industries as
the case unit of analysis and compare the strategy followed by different companies
within each industry. Only in Case 1 two apparently different industries (fruit juices
and dairy products) were analysed within a case. Due to the diversification strategies
by companies in both industries, they are all producing and distributing similar
product lines. In the cases, flfteen9 of the 23 companies were analysed plus two
other'? which were introduced later, to give a better understanding of the competitive
forces involved in particular industries. The information given by the other six
companies, even though incomplete, was very useful for the development of the
theoretical framework and in understanding the cases.
9
10
The companies could not be used to write the cases if the detailed information needed to
make comparisons among firms was not available.
INSANOVA in the electrical appliance sector is a non-brand producer (Case 5) and
FARVENCA in the pharmaceutical sector is a wholesaler that has integrated into retailing
Case 6).
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The guidelines for selecting the industries and companies were a combination
of five criteria:
a) Companies that pioneered distribution functions (e.g.INDULAC and
SAYOY). The objective was to evaluate how industry cycles could
impact channel structure and how changes in environmental and
market variables affected channel structure over time.
b) Companies whose distribution networks are considered a symbol of
efficiency and viewed by competitors as important barriers to entry
(e.g. POLAR and SAYOY). The purpose was to understand how a
"successful" channel was built and how it was viewed strategically by
fmns.
c) Companies which have adopted important strategic changes in
distribution, integrating vertically forward (e.g. MONTECRISTO,
RORI, YUKERY and FRICA). These were considered important cases
to evaluate the reasons which triggered those changes and how they
were perceived by managers. In particular, we were interested in
MONTECRISTO where intra-channel financing problems were one of
the main difficulties facing management.
TABLE 2
THE COMPANIES AND INDUSTRIES CHOSEN.
INDUSTRY COMPANIES CASE
l)Fruit Juices .
2)Milk and Dairy .
3)Apparel(Men's Wear) .
4)B~r .

















































d) Companies which had recently entered industries where well
established firms had important control over distribution. (e.g.
PERUGINA and FRIGILUX). The objective was to evaluate the
entrants strategy and how they viewed distribution networks.
e) The other criteria was product characteristics and consumer buying
patterns. An effort was made to combine the variables defined above,
with a variety of products, to evaluate the impact of product attributes
on distribution design. (e.g. perishability, post-sale service, level of
adjustment, margins and time of consumption).
2.2.6. Converting Study Propositions into a Semi-Structured Questionnaire.
Step (7)
The objective of a semi-structure questionnaire is to guide the interviews and
make sure that all the issues are properly and equally discussed in each encounter.
This improves the quality of intra-case analysis and makes cross-case comparisons
easier. The study propositions must be covered in the questionaire and an effort
should be made to avoid asking questions which would bias the responses (e.g. have
you made any decisions with the objective of keeping new competitors from entering
the market?)
The questionnaire is described in the appendix.
2.2.7. Interviews and Transcriptions. Steps (8) and (9)
Two or three people were interviewed in each company. Usually they were
the general manager and the marketing and sales managers. In some companies,
former managers were also interviewed when important decisions in distribution had
been taken in the past. This was the case for Savoy, Polar, Indulac and General
Electric.
The interviews were recorded and usually managers felt very comfortable
with the procedure. Only in one company did they refuse to have the interview
recorded, and even then, since they gave advance notice, two people (instead of just
the researcher) went to that interview. One person could concentrate on the
questionnaire and the other could devote all the attention to taking notes. This also
helped to make the conversation more fluent. The interviews were transcribed and
sent to the companies so they could be approved by the interviewees.
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Later in the process, when the analysis of the cases was being developed,
some new interviews were organised to get information which was lacking.
2.2.8. Within Case Analysis. Step (10)
"One cannot ordinarily follow how a researcher got from 3600
pages of field notes to the final conclusions, sprinkled with
vivid quotes though they may be."11
Analysing data is one of the most difficult tasks in case studies. Since there is
no statistical package forcing the researcher to conduct a specific data analysis, the
process requires a constant effort in keeping rigorous thinking and strict logic.
Information unrelated to the study propositions, though always interesting, should be
left aside. A conscious effort should be made to define the study propositions, define
the questionnaire accordingly and begin to analyse the data early in the process.
"Analysing data is the heart of building theory from case
studies. It is both the most difficult and the least codified part
of the process. Since published studies generally describe
research sites and data collection methods, but give little space
to discussion of analysis, a huge chasm often separates data
from conclusions." (Miles and Huberman 1984:16).
One of the key issues to avoid this problem is to begin by analysing data in
each case: the description of the site and those issues which would be relevant for the
analysis. Then, also, an effort should be made to begin the analysis in each case by
defining categories. They are usually derived from an iterative process which
involves the literature review (3), the study propositions (5) and the interviews (8). In
this research, this iterative process made possible the defmition of the theoretical
framework presented in Chapter 3. In this framework, issues from the existing
theories and new elements were combined in a scheme which was used to develop the
categories for the analysis within cases.
2.2.9. The Theoretical Framework. Step (11)
The shaping of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, was a long
and intense iterative process since the elements of each case had an impact on the
11 Taken from Eisenhardt (1988, p.ll).
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framework; but at the same time, every change in the theoretical framework had an
impact on the analysis of the cases. The most important lesson derived from building
the framework in this manner was that it gave the cases a direction, a structure and a
purpose from an early stage. This worked very well for developing subsequent
analysis.
2.2.10. Cross Case Analysis. Step (12)
Together with the within-case analysis, there is the cross-case search for
patterns.
"The tactics here are driven by the reality that the opportunity
for bias is immense. People are notoriously poor processors of
information." (Eisenhardt, op. cit. p.12)
The theoretical framework developed to organise the analysis within the cases
helped to construct the main conclusions of the study. Nevertheless, cross-case
analysis and comparison among groups of cases, together with the search for patterns
is needed at this stage. It is also helpful to identify common grounds, surprises12 and
general conclusions.
One of the tactics to enrich the analysis is to look for similarities and then
differences within the similarities. At the same time, the inverse process is also
important to avoid biases, i.e., to also look for differences and then similarities within
the differences. This forces the researcher to search for complexity and feel
comfortable with it. It also helps to [rod more sophisticated explanations and new
questions for further research. The best feeling comes when the researcher is
surprised by what emerges from the cross-case analysis.
The idea is to force the researcher to go beyond the initial impressions and try
to derive new explanations which are novel and accurate rather than his own initial
presumptions.
Theory building is a high iterative process by which the emergent framework
is systematically compared with the evidence, the literature review, and the cross case
analysis. The strategy is to constantly compare theory and data, and then go back to
12 Surprises are always pleasant; and in case studies they are also welcome as proofs that the
process has not been biased by the researcher.
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theory. Together with this iteration there is a constant process of parallel thinking by
which explanations tend to converge into the framework but at the same time, the
evidence is looked at in new ways in order to avoid the bias of old thinking patterns
and allow for the emergence of new ideas (Eisenhardt,1988).
Even though the cases studied come from a developing country, we are
certain that the lead to a much more general application and that the theoretical
framework proposed will be helpful in underdstanding management decisions and
channel structure in different contexts. However, the proof of the pudding remains in
the eating.
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2.3. Appendix: The Semi-Structured Questionnaire
The questions included in the questionnaire were the following:
1) When did you start operations?
2) What is your volume of sales?
3) From whom do you buy inputs or services? To whom do you sell products
or services? How has this changed over time? Why? (limits of the firm).
4) How many products or lines of products did you have at the beginning?
How many do you have now? What are they? How old are they? (product and
industry life cycles)
5) What are the characteristics of your product(s). The following list must be
used as a guide:
Perishability
Degree of adjustment to customer needs/degree of standardization.
Price and margins.
Rate of replacement How often consumers buy them.
Time of consumption.
Searching time.
Services required along the channel including sales and post sale services.
6) What is your market share? What are the market shares of your
competitors? (market structure)
7) How is your distribution channel structured today? (A brief history of the
channel) How has it changed since it started operations", Why? How has the
competition reacted to those changes?
8) Who, where and how many are the wholesalers and retailers which deal
with your products. How was it in the past?
9) Mention the functions performed along the channel. The following list














10) Who performs each function today. How was it in the past? Why? (An
explanation for the division of responsibilities among agents must be given. The idea
is to evaluate which elements are important in the assignation of tasks).
11) (If it is the case) explain the reasons for the company to be performing
functions directly. How was it in the past? How does the competition do it?
(identification of specific competitive advantages)
12) What kind of contracts have you developed with other channel members?
(franchises, concessions, specific written contracts, verbal agreements, other?)
13) Can you identify the leader(s) in the channel? Why do you perceive him
(them) as the leader (s)? (It is important to identify the reasons for their perceptions
of relative power)
14) Are there any conflicts in the channel. If yes, what are they? Who are
involved? ( the idea is to identify bargaining problems, opportunistic and/or
monopolistic behaviours, principal-agent incentive incompatibility)
15) How are those conflicts solved? (The objective is to understand how
contracts evolve, what are their incentive structure and how enforceable they are).
16) Have government policies affected your distribution strategy. How?
17) Which have been the most important decisions the company has faced





Determinants of Vertical Integration and Control
into Distribution Channels
Introduction
The review of the literature offered many scattered concepts and ideas which
may be useful in shedding light to issues of channel structure, but showed no unified
approach. Moreover, most theories emphasize industry and product characteristics
and thus leave little room for managerial discretion and strategic behaviour in
responding to the forces of competition and the problems of effective cooperation.
The purpose of this Chapter is to develop an integrated theoretical framework where
the determinants of vertical integration and control into distribution channel functions
can be analysed in a manner that yields a deeper comprehension of existing practices.
This is important in the field of business studies, where much of the literature has
been nonnative and has not showed much understanding of the current structures
used by firms, the constraints to which they are geared to respond and the managerial
intent behind them.
We will illustrate our conceptual framework with examples taken from
various manufacturing and wholesaling companies in Venezuela. Nevertheless, we
believe that the concepts are applicable in general and the dynamics identified are not
specific to that managerial environment
The Chapter is structured in six sections, where each brings out a different
factor affecting vertical integration and control into distribution channels (See Figure
1). In Section 3.1 the issue of lack of competitive markets for channel functions will
be discussed. It deals with market structure problems and how they affect channel
design. Positive and negative impacts on vertical control for five elements are
evaluated. In Section 3.2, the strategic issue of barriers to entry is defined and its
application in the context of distribution functions is assessed. In Section 3.3,
elements from the transaction cost theory are discussed, using a more restricted
approach for the popular concept of opportunistic behaviour. In Section 3.4 agency
problems and their impact on vertical control or vertical spin-off are be presented.
Sections 3.5 and 3.6 will deal with some cost elements to be assessed by management
and which usually hold back vertical integration decisions.
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The theoretical framework presented here has been used to structure the
analysis of the six cases presented from Chapter 4 through Chapter 9.
3.1. Lack of Competitive Markets for Channel Functions.
Usually firms benefit from vertical control into distribution channels when
there is a lack of competitive markets for distribution functions. In other words, when
either the manufacturer faces a total absence of specialized markets, or when it faces
monopoly power from suppliers of distribution functions. In this context, the
manufacturer may be less efficient from the social perspective but can perform the
function cheaper. Nevertheless, in other situations the same imperfections may induce
vertical spin-off.
Under this situation we can identify five cases with different implications for
management decision making:
a) Absolute absence of specialized markets for channel functions.
b) Monopolistic power enjoyed by existing suppliers of channel functions.
c) Retailers' markets and spatial monopolies.
d) Bilateral monopoly and
e) Financial market imperfections.
3.1.1. Absolute Absence 0/Specialized Markets/orChannel Functions.
In this section we will examine how management faces the situation of total
absence of specialized markets, an extreme case of lack of competitive markets. This
may happen in the case of new industries and of products in early stages of their life
cycle. In the case of new products in mature industries, there might be some functions
like servicing, information, special handling or even aggressive promotion for which
there is no developed market (Lilien, 1979).
Seen from the perspective of the industry life cycle, new industries would
have more vertically integrated firms which later, as they mature, will tend to spin-
off their functions since there would be enough demand to support specialized
markets (Stigler, 1951) (Mallen, 1971).
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FIGURE 1
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OF SCALE AND SCOPE
{SpeciaUzed Quasi-Rents (+)Contract Re-interpretation (+)
{Externalities (+)Moral Hazard (+/-)
{Administrative Costs (-)Scattered Distribution Networks (-)
(-)
(+) Elements which stimulate vertical integration.
(-) Elements which induce more flexible forms of organisation.
In other words the corporate strategy decision of "making" or "buying" a
channel function can be a very easy one if there are no suppliers available. If, for
example, there are no transportation or storage facilities which can be bought in the
market, or if there is a lack of the appropriate customer service when retailers are not
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well developed, management will have to dedicate important resources in order to
develop these functions.
The absence of specialized markets applies to each of the different functions
expected to be performed along the distribution channel: transportation, storage,
financing, information, promotion, merchandising, maintenance of product quality,
and other retailing-specific functions such as sale and after-sale costumer service. The
literature (Aspinwall, 1958) has stressed the dimension of the length and the width of
the channel (intensity of distribution) as the key strategic issue. However, this does
not address the crucial question of who along the channel should perform which
function and why1. In other words, vertical integration and control into distribution
channels is not to be viewed only as a decision of using, or not, wholesalers and
retailers, (length and width of the channel) but also as deciding which of the
functions should be left to the market and why.
In six of the companies studied, the executives interviewed argued that lack of
specialized markets forced them to internalize some of the functions and/or dedicate
important amounts of time and financial support in order to promote a market of
suppliers for the functions.
Savoy (Case 4) and Nestle, (Indulac today, Case 1) both established in the
1940's, did not find enough specialists in transportation to move their products.
Hence, they had to develop a hierarchically organised distribution network.
Nevertheless, Indulac found, later on, alternative contractual agreements to spin-off
the transportation function. Nacional Breweries, one of the oldest Venezuelan
companies, which started operations in 1890, had to face the same problem.
Carabobo (ceramics), General Electric (Case 5) and Polar breweries (Case 3)
had to face the absence of specialized retailers2. Polar, which now controls 85% of
the Venezuelan market, found out after starting operations in 1940, that in order to
grow they had to aggressively develop the market The problem they faced was that
there were not enough bars in the country and there were not enough refrigerators in
retail outlets to sell cold beer. Thus, they developed a strategy which consisted in
1
2
Study proposition No.2 for research question No.1: "How are distribution channels perceived
by management in Venezuela?". See Chapter 2.
Sale and post-sale service are specific channel functions for retail outlets.
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giving away refrigerators, ice boxes, furniture for bars (small tables and chairs), paint
and the sign with the name of the bar for the facade and up to six month (sometimes
more) financing on beer sales. They even paid for the liquor licenses which they
negotiated by the dozen with government agencies.
General Electric also had the problem of lack of specialized markets in sales
and post-sales service. In this case, due to the high degree of information and
consumer service required, specially trained personnel was needed (high human asset
specificity) and management decided to integrate vertically into retailing. General
Electric's (Madosa) retail stores have been very well known for over 30 years in
Venezuela, but now management has decided to sell them out since they believe that
it is now cheaper to "buy" the function in the market.
Carabobo (ceramics), also had to dedicate important resources to the
development of retailers. Even though they never decided to integrate vertically
forward, they demanded exclusivity from outlet owners in a sector where you would
usually expect them to profit from economies of scope by improving their
assortment
These characteristics take us to the next section in which we will analyse
some cases of monopoly power in suppliers of channel functions.
3.1.2. Monopolistic Power Enjoyed by Existing Suppliers ofChannel
Functions.
The other situation in which it might be beneficial for the firm to integrate
forward is when the supplier markets for channel functions are subject to
monopolistic behaviour, threatening manufacturer's profitsf. Firms could benefit by
internal] zing channel functions when suppliers are capable of increasing prices and
extracting monopoly profits up to a point where it is cheaper (though socially less
efficient) to internalize the function.
3 There is a difference between opportunistic and monopolistic behaviour. Opportunistic
behaviour (Williamson, 1975) arises when individuals seek self-interset in a deceitful manner.
This must be clearly differentiated from the rational economic behaviour of self interest
seeking agents while maximizing profits in imperfect competition. Here, we will refer only to
the latter, leaving opportunistic behaviour to be analysed below as agency problems.
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The decision taken by Yukery (Case 1), a fruit juice manufacturer, illustrates
this situation. They used to sell almost 80% of their canned products through an
exclusive independent wholesaler4. According to management, they had to cancel the
agreement since the wholesaler constantly increased prices to a point where it could
be done cheaper by internalizing the function. The wholesaler charged 15% of sales
while Yukery could do it for 8% of sales. Also Savoy, the leader of the chocolate
industry, claims that it costs them less (12% of sales) to get directly to the retailers
than by using independent distributors.
The possibility of internalizing functions supplied by monopolistic markets
will depend on the degree of contestabE~ty5 (Baumol, 1982) of those markets. For
example, wholesaling-specific functions such as transportation, sales to retailers and
collecting, may show higher degrees of contestability than retail specific functions
(e.g. sales and post-sale consumers' service).
In fact, Yukery and Frica (Case 1) achieved very quickly the objective of
designing and setting up their own network to serve retailers directly (highly
contestable) after independent distributors increased their prices. Nevertheless, the
spatial monopoly enjoyed by some retailers do not show such a degree of
contestability. Furthermore, the spatial monopoly enjoyed by retailers can be so
powerful that manufacturers may end up spending considerable resources trying to
please them. We will talk about this issue in the next section.
3.1.3. Retailers' Markets and Spatial Monopolies.
Retailers are spatial monopolies which sometimes enjoy important degrees of
market power. In these circumstances, manufacturers develop competitive tools
which do not reach or benefit the consumer, but which please retailers. We will call
this situation retailers' markets since for all practical purposes, in this context, the
retailer is the relevant client, not the consumer.
4
5
In Venezuela there are five large independent distributors for consumer goods that may have
difficulties achieving economies of scale since all manufacturers demand that competing
products not be distributed simultaneously (exclusive distribution).
Markets with low entryand exit barriers which are vulnerable to occasional entrances of new
competitors.
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Some examples of manufacturer's practices when in the presence of retailers
markets are the following: EFE, an ice cream manufacturer, gives away freezers to
retailers in exchange for space. Perugina (Chocolates, Case 4) gives higher margins
to penetrate the market dominated by the leader Savoy. Dairy product companies
(Case 1) bear all the risk of perishability in order to fill the retailer's refrigerators with
their products. Yukery (fruit juices, Case 1) buys milk from another company in
order to offer retailers the variety of products they want In the ceramic industry,
Carabobo pays for 50% of retailers advertising. In the apparel industry, (Case 2)
financing retailers up to 360 days without interest payments became a normal
practice.
It must be added that the retailers' power is enhanced under the following
situations:
a) When they can influence consumer decisions. This is particularly true
in over-the-counter stores where self service is not permitted and
consumers have to ask the sales person for a particular product or
brand. The salesperson has in this case the opportunity of influencing
consumer choice. Pharmacies, small supermarkets, bakeries, photo
shops, electrical appliances stores, and specialty stores tend to have
these characteristics.
b) When products have low degrees ofbrand loyalty, since the consumer
is indifferent between the brands available in the store.
c) In situations where buying patterns or habits induce consumers to visit
cifi 6spe IC stores .
d) When specific assets are required to perform sales and post sales
services. The more specific the assets, the higher the retailer's
monopoly power (e.g. refrigerated space and highly trained sales
personnel).
Manufacturers facing a retailer's market might benefit by vertically
integrating when the losses in economies of scale and/or scope are not outweighed by
the power gains. Some manufacturers may decide that those losses can be fully
compensated by the benefits of integration. In the apparel industry (Case 2),
Montecristo decided to integrate vertically and sell directly to consumers only
6 For example bakeries are shops with high monopoly power in Venezuela since consumers
visit them daily to buy fresh bread, milk and to have breakfast.
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through totally owned stores. Though it implied reducing the number of outlets from
over 100 to 36, management claims that profits have increased dramatically.
The situation for manufacturers of dairy products and fruit juices has been
different (Case 1). They have to face important monopoly power from bakeries
(which represent 80% of their sales) but forward vertical integration is not an
efficient solution for them, since it would imply high losses in economies of scope
and scale.
3.1.4. Bilateral Monopoly.
Bilateral monopolies (Bowley, 1928) (Morgan, 1949) are characterized by
situations in which a monopolist sells to a monopsonist Since each agent has market
power over the other, bargaining costs tend to be very high, transactions very costly
and vertical integration socially (and sometimes privately) desirable.
This is a powerful theoretical tool to understand relationships among firms
which show some type of monopoly power. In distribution channels, depending on
the characteristics of each market, different members can engage in bilateral
monopoly relationships. The three elements which are usually present are:
a) Some kind of monopoly power by the manufacturer, either because of
high degrees of market concentration or brand loyalty,
b) Spatial monopoly enjoyed by retailers, and
c) High asset SPecificity7 required by distribution functions (i.e. specially
trained sales personnel and specific transportation or storage
conditions.)
In the oil industry for example, independent petrol transportation companies
(vehicles are highly specific) can engage in bilateral monopoly situations with
refineries since they can only do business with each other. In the U.K., bilateral
monopoly has been argued to exist between the breweries and pubs in order to defend
the high degree of vertical integration shown by the industry.
In the industries analysed in Venezuela, one of the clearest cases of bilateral
monopoly was found in the pharmaceutical sector between the drug distributors and
7 When human or physical assets required to perform the function have low alternative uses.
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the pharmacies (Case 6). The pharmaceutical sector is a very atomized industry with
75 laboratories where each has no more than a 3% market share. Nevertheless, the
drug distributors and chemist shops show a different picture. There are over 50 drug
distributors but 50% of the market is controlled by only two of them. They are able to
offer the chemists the variety of products they need by dealing with the 75
laboratories. The number of chemist shops are highly regulated by the government
and only a certain number are allowed by geographic area This gives them a clear
spatial monopoly power. The drug distributor (high market power) and the chemist
shop (spatial monopoly) engage in a bilateral monopoly situation which has evolved
into vertical integration.
It has been argued that the reason for vertical integration lays in the margin
differential set by government price regulations according to which, chemist shops
are allowed to have higher margins (30%) than drug distributors (14.5%). However,
this would explain forward integration from drug distributors buying chemist shops.
Nevertheless, backward vertical integration is the most common case where chemist
shops buy drug distributors. This behaviour can be better understood within the
bilateral monopoly framework.
3.1.5. Financial Market Imperfections: Financing as the Forgotten
Function in Distribution
Imperfections in the loan market can impact channel structure and make
vertical integration a more efficient solution. The financing function is usually
regarded as a problem of financing consumers in the purchase of durable or semi-
durable goods. According to this view, the decision involved only consists in who
should give the financing and how much credit should be extended to the consumer
(Stem & El Ansary, 1988). What we would like to bring out here is something
different: the issue of how financing is given between channel members when access
to financial resources is restricted.
The objective of this section is to present a theoretical framework which
would help to understand some aspects of the way the financing function is organised
along the distribution channel. In particular, we want to determine why and when the
financing is given by non-financing agents along the distribution channel. Also, what
type of relationships are more likely to develop among its members and how it
impacts the degree of integration found in channel structure.
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The first question that arises is why does the manufacturer or any other
member of the channel carry out the financing function? In other words, why do they
decide to "make" instead of "buy" through the loan market? It will be argued that it is
due to imperfections in the credit market that the financing function ends up being
performed inside the channel.
The simplest answer to the question of why "make" instead of "buy", is to
suppose that there must be some advantage for somebody along the channel-chain in
performing the financial function; compared with the alternatives given in the credit
market In other words, due to some imperfections in the loan market, the distribution
system generates the financing it needs through an internal credit market Now, what
are those imperfections? And more specifically, why would the distribution channel
be able to offer a more efficient solution? As we will see, the answer is to be found
in the nature of the financial transaction and its departure from a neo-classical world
of perfect and complete information.
Differences in the amount and structure of information available to the bank
regarding potential borrowers, and the difficulty of exerting control after they are
granted, are some of the issues that will be discussed as affecting the interaction
between channelmembers and the fmancial market.
Recent theories on the economics of imperfect information8 have developed
importantconcepts which explain why, in equilibrium, loan markets are characterized
by credit rationing. In other words, why is it that, as opposed to other markets where
everybody can buy as many goods and services as they want at their current price, in
the loan market it is not possible to get all the desired credit at the current interest
rate. This comparison is important because it implies that in the case of loan markets,
rationing is not the result of fixed prices". In fact, even with fully flexible. interest
rates, borrowers would still face credit rationing in equilibrium (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). Furthermore, the situation of rationing also persists even when borrowers are
charged with different risk premiums.
8
9
For a thorough discussion of these theories see Phlips (1988).
The traditional economicexplanation of rationing suggests that it is the consequence of fixed









Rationing in the loan market has to do with other elements different from
price rigidity. One such element is asymmetryl0 of the information structure. When a
bank gives a loan, what it obtains in exchange is a promise of repayment of the
principal plus a fixed amount of interest The banker has no way of evaluating with
certainty the quality of the promise and neither has he the way to monitor and control
costlessly the behaviour of the borrower. Furthermore, if the bank decides to charge
higher interest rates in order to compensate for the amount of perceived risk, it could
have a contradictory effect: higher interest rates attract riskier projects11. This brings
into the picture a second element which has been called the adverse selection effect
In other words, above a certain level, the higher the interest rate, the lower the
expected return for the bank (see Figure 1).
The third element, the moral hazard effect, is a consequence of the difficulties
in controlling the behaviour of the borrower after he gets the loan. This concept also
helps to understand why the probability of recuperating the loan could be negatively
related to the risk premium. Moral hazard arises when the buyer of a good or a
service can influence an outcome against which he is somehow insured or protected,
10
11
Asymetric information exists when there is complete information in one side of the market
whereas incomplete information characterizes the other side. In the case we are analysing,
the borrower knows more about the risks and problems of the specific project being financed
than the banker.
Borrowers are willing to take high interest rates because they perceive the probability of
repaying the loan to be low.
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while the seller cannot monitor or detect his action12. In the case of bank loans,
moral hazard arises because borrowers might want to use funds in ways that increase
their expected return by increasing the risk faced by the bank13.
Summarizing, imperfect information and lack of control bring up asymmetric
information, moral hazard problems, and adverse selection which in turn induce
banks to develop screening devices to discourage riskier borrowers. In this manner,
banks reach equilibrium14 while in situations of credit rationing.
Thus, going back to our first question regarding why do non-financial agents
in the distribution channel 15 perform the financing function, we can now answer that
it is a result of a financial market, imperfect in its nature and characterized by credit
rationing. If financial markets were perfect, the distribution channel would not
perform any credit operation since by doing so, nobody would be better off.
When the distribution channel interacts with these imperfections in the loan
market, two general situations may emerge. First, the channel may perform a
profitable financing function when cost advantages are present Second, in the
absence of cost advantage, some kind of non-profitable or "forced" financing may
develop depending on the power structure.
The first case would be characterized by a situation in which non-financial
agents in the distribution channel consider profitable certain loans which banks do
not Thus, there must be a cost advantage for the channel member when compared to
the bank. This advantage resides in either better information regarding the borrower





This concept has been very useful in understanding the insurance market where the
behaviour of the insured changes immediatly after acquiring an insurance policy (i,e. people
may drive less carefully after taking out insurance against accidents). This is why insurance
companies include a deductible in most policies and develop incentives for "good behaviour"
through their pricing policy.
One extreme case would be for example if the borrower decides to gamble the total amount
of the loan. If he wins, he makes juicy profits. If he does not, the bank is the main loser.
Set equilibrium prices (interest rates) for their loans.
It could be any financing arrangement in any direction between the manufacturer, the
wholesaler and the retailer.
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diminishing the moral hazard effect In other words, the non-fmanciallender sees the
same financial operation with less risk than the bankerI6.
Looked at this way, the cost advantage for the channel member could be
compared with one of financial monopoly since everybody else would have much
higher costs.
What is to be expected is that this cost advantage or fmancial monopoly will
interact with different power relationships along the distribution channel originating a
diversity of financial arrangements. One of the most interesting relationships could be
that of bilateral monopoly, which according to the theory, due to the bargaining
problems that it creates, vertical integration seems to be the most efficient sc.ution.
This would mean that if, for example, the seller has the cost advantage (financial
monopoly) and the retailer the spatial monopoly, one of the efficient solutions could
be either tied-loans or vertical integration.
If cost advantage is not present because neither the asymmetry of information
nor the moral hazard problem can be improved by internalizing the financial
function, channel members would still have to face a situation of credit rationing.
This may induce, as we have said before, some type of "forced" (non-profitable)
financing among the channel members. The interesting element here will be that
since the financing function is not profitable, members with less power will be forced
to perform it This is the typical case of large retail chains being financed by small
producers.
Thus, due to structural imperfections in the loan market, the distribution
system generates the financing it needs through an internal credit market In this
manner, the market reaches equilibrium while in a situation of credit rationing. Such
rationing may induce channel members to provide fmancing. The degree of this intra
channel financing and its impact on channel structure will vary depending on:
a) The possibility of channel members to extend credit to others by
internally generated cash.
b) The degree to which they have an informational advantage.
c) Their relative access to loan markets.
In the latter case, channel members may work as financial intermediaries
because of their better relative access to funds. The basic issue here is that the non-
16 In Oliver Williamson's terms, this is a transaction cost advantage.
76
financial agent might have a cost advantage compared to banks in providing credit to
other channel member. This implies that, ceteris paribus, lower interest rates could be
used as a competitive tool without damaging corporate profits.
It was found in the interviews that out of twenty companies, nineteen were
giving financing at apparently below market rates (from 6 to 360 days).
How financial market imperfections can make vertical integration a more
efficient solution is illustrated by Montecristo (Case 2: men's wear). They decided to
integrate vertically forward into retailing since the credit they had to extend to
retailers ended up being too costly. Manufacturers failed to charge interest rates to
shops after using financing as a competitive tool. The finance function became so
expensive that it was cheaper for them to integrate.
Financial market imperfections can also impact channel structure inducing
looser forms of organisation. This is the case when, for example, manufacturers
finance at cheaper rates17 the spin-off of specific functions. For example, POLAR
(Case 3) has leased vehicles to owner drivers in order to spin-off the transportation
and sales function.
3.2. Development of Barriers to Entry: Deterring Competition
Another way of enhancing profits through vertical integration is by increasing
monopoly power through barriers to entry against future competitors. Access to
distribution channels has been stressed in the literature as an obstacle to entry
together with economies of scale, product differentiation, customer switching costs,
capital requirements18 and government policies (Bain,1956)(porter, 1980).
Nevertheless the concept of barriers to entry has been mistreated in some of
the corporate strategy literature as it has been confused with the impact of market
17
18
Due to less moral hazard and ex-post control problems.
It could be argued that the concept of capital requirements as a separate barrier to entry is
difficult to isolate. All barriers to entry imply capital requirements since, at the end of the
day, they are a problem of matching the incumbent's sunk costs.
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imperfections in the distribution of profits among channel members 19. Barriers to
entry will depend, among other things, on market contestability and capital market
imperfections. There is no clear theoretical framework, as far as distribution channels
are concerned, to differentiate between companies that are responding to market
imperfections and those that are pro-actively building barriers to entry in search of
monopoly profits. This implies that the barriers to entry argument may have been
abused when describing strategic decisions regarding distribution channels (See
Cases 3 and 4).
Under situations of lack of competitive markets or agency problems,
designing an efficient distribution network can become so costly that once built they
are perceived as barriers by future entrants.
Furthermore, a research study for the U.S. (Karakaya & Stahl, 1990) shows
that managers view access to distribution channels as a less important strategic issue
than other sources of entry barriers: economies of scale, product differentiation,
capital requirements and customer switching costs. Only government policies were
rated by managers as less important than distribution channels.
In Venezuela, due to the highly protectionist development strategy followed
by the country since the 1950's, government policies have been one of the most
important sources of barriers to entry. We have also discussed how lack of specialists
in the context of young industries has been one of the most common reasons
mentioned by management to devote important resources for channel development.
Companies have had different reasons for building channels but building barriers was
never stated as an important element. Only one company in the ceramic tile industry
argued that in order to keep competition out, it strengthened the exclusivity
agreements with its distributors.
3.3. Avoiding Post-Contractual Opportunistic Behaviour.
Opportunism relates to situations where manufacturers may decide to
integrate forward, in order to avoid contract reinterpretation and other forms of
19 Michael Porter, for example, has emphasized that barriers to entry exist when a "new entrant
must persuade the channels to accept its product through price breaks and cooperative
advertising, and the like, which reduce profits" (Porter, 1980 p.10). This resembles more a
situation of market imperfection where firms interact strategically in order to guarantee for
themselves a share of appropriable rents.
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deceitful behaviour from channel members, when highly specific assets are required
to perform the channel functions.
The transaction cost literature has incorporated the concept of opportunism
into the analysis of economic organisations, as an intrinsic characteristic of human
behaviour
20 (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Often this concept has been misused by
misinterpreting the competitive behaviour of firms in imperfect markets. For
example, a retailer asking for higher margins to keep specific products on his shelves,
would be called opportunistic instead of profiting from spatial monopoly. It has also
been confused with other concepts like moral hazard, an agency problem that will be
discussed below.
To avoid such confusions we will narrow the concept down to two specific
situations:
3.1) Post-contractual opportunistic behaviour in the presence of specialised
quasi rents and
3.2) Contract reinterpretation.
3.3.1. Appropriable Specialized Quasi-rents.
As assets become more specific, quasi rents are created21 and opportunistic
behaviour is more likely to arise in order to take advantage of those quasi-rents
(Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978). The potential of their appropriation affects
organisational structure, since highly specific contracts or vertical integration may be
the alternative to avoid post-contractual opportunistic threat.
The problems faced by distribution channels in the oil industry is a good
example, since highly specialized transportation units for petrol have very little
alternative use, inducing truck owners to act opportunistically and appropriate quasi-
rents from oil refineries. In Venezuela, oil companies have integrated forward into
the transportation function after a long period of costly negotiations and union strikes
by truck owners. It is interesting to mention that Polar (Case 3), the leader in the
brewing industry, sells specially designed trucks to drivers through leasing contracts.
20
21
Opportunism has been understood as a devious kind of self-interested behaviour. As Oliver
Williamson defines it: "Self-interest seeking with guile".
The quasi-rent of the asset is the excess of its current value over its value in its next best use.
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In this case opportunistic behaviour is not feared by management who argue that
owner drivers, not being unionized and tied down by financial obligations, are very
unlikely to develop such post-contractual opportunistic behaviour.
3.3.2. Contract Reinterpretation
On the other hand, post-contractual opportunistic behaviour can also be the
result of favorable re-interpretation of explicit or implicit22 contract provisions. This
reinterpretation is opportunistic when deceit is guiding the logic of such
reinterpretation.
For example, in the apparel industry, both manufacturers studied here,
Montecristo and Ron, tried to agree with their clients (retailers) on credit terms of
30/60/90 days. Instead, by the end of the third month clients would "pay" with post-
dated cheques. In other words they reinterpreted the agreement by "paying" with an
instrument which was not valid within the maximum 90 days credit extended to them.
The cheques were usually dated for one or two months later.
3.4. Agency Problems.
Distribution channels are open systems of interdependent organisations which
may cooperate or conflict in the process of making products and services available to
the consumer (Stem & EI Ansary, 1988). This organisational complexity raises an
important strategic issue regarding channel design: how to define individual contracts
in order to induce every channel member to act according to a global strategy. In
other words, what are the different contractual and organisational alternatives open to
management in order to achieve cooperation along the channel and meet corporate
standards. This has obviously become increasingly important to manufacturers with
high brand loyalty.
22 Some environments are characterised by lack of written contracts. In such situations
management usually hold doubts about the effectiveness of written words, and business
relationships rely more on "loyalty", "implicit contracts" or "power relations". Loyalty can
become one of the more precious qualities by which members of the organisation can
achieve increased rewards. In other words, opportunism through contract re-interpretation
can induce management to search for alternative solutions; and praising loyaltycan be one of
them.
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This type of problems has been formalized by principal and agent theory23.
Agency problems arise when in the presence of asymmetric information, a Person
(the principal) delegates to another Person (the agent) the responsibility of selecting
and implementing an action (delegated choice). Due to the informational asymmetry,
the principal can only see the outcome of the action but is unable to know the amount
of effort (hidden action) which was put in by the agent in achieving the result.
Therefore the two individuals will have different optimizing behaviours: the agent
will try to get the most out of the fact that for the principal, to measure the agents
effort, can be very costly. Since perfect and costless monitoring is impossible, the
transaction should be structured in a way that the agent has an incentive to act in the
way preferred by the principal. (Kreps, 1990)
Thus, agency problems emerge in a situation of delegated choice among two
self-interest seeking individuals and the solution rests in fmding the optimal contract
which would induce the agent to complete successfully the delegated action
according to the principal's best interest.
From a different perspective Alchian and Demsetz (1972) Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) argue that firms should be viewed as a set of
contracts among factors of production with each factor motivated by its own self
interest Agency problems are solved by designing implicit or explicit contracts
which would make their incentives compatible. It is interesting to note, due to its
implication in channel structure, that this incentive compatibility may sometimes be
achieved by vertical integration, through the control which can be achieved through
hierarchies, or may also take place through looser organisational forms or through
market exchange.
When managing distribution channels, to achieve self-enforcing contracts
among the diverse channel members, may be of important strategic significance. It
may be in the manufacturer's best interest to maintain the optimal quality standards
for his products, but that interest may not, and usually does not, coincide with the
other channel members. This is why an optimal organisational or contractual form
can be very difficult to achieve.
23 Some authors make no difference between principal and agents or agency theory and moral
hazard problems (Kreps, 1990) (phlips, 1988).
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In Venezuela, industries are usually highly concentrated. The power
implications of such oligopolistic structures may help to solve agency problems since
a high percentage of sales and profits are contributed by only a few sources. It is in
the best interest of independent channel members to achieve a viable contract with
the manufacturer.
In distribution channel management, it will be particularly difficult to achieve
a self-enforcing contract in the presence of:
1) Externalities and
2) Moral hazard problems.
We will discuss them in the following sections.
3.4.1. Externalities.
Externalities anse when there are costs which are not paid, (negative
externalities) or benefits which are not charged for (positive externalities). For
example, we are in the presence of negative externalities when a channel member
sells a spoiled Perishable product or gives poor service to the customer, thus
damaging the reputation of the brand name. Prices do not suffer any change in the
short run but the manufacturer's future sales and brand name has been negatively
affected. In this case, the problem for the manufacturer (principal), is to design an
explicit or implicit contract to induce the channel member (agent) to avoid free riding
on the brand's good name. This contract should internalize the externality by making
the channel member's remuneration reflect the effort of avoiding the externality.
When managing distribution channels, externalities are more likely to appear
in those cases when products or services are more easily subject to quality
debasement For example, in the case of highly perishable brand products, special
care should be taken in order to guarantee that they arrive in a good condition to the
consumer. Polar (Case 3) and Savoy (Case 4), two of the companies interviewed,
have devoted great time and effort in avoiding such externalities. Their purpose has
been to control the channel by increasing the number of visits to retailers and often
rotating the products on shelves. In their case, the presence of externalities and the
need to solve agency problems has impacted channel structure either by integrating
vertically in order to keep direct contact with retailers, or by company hired
supervisors who monitor points of purchase.
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Product quality debasement can also be present in products where sale and
after-sale support and service are important parts of the expanded product Negative
externalities in this case are the result of client dissatisfaction with the actual service
received when compared with the service expected or promised by the manufacturer.
Estee Lauder and Clinique, in the cosmetic industry, are very good examples. They
select and train the sales-force who are to be in the retail outlets selling their
products. By the form of a "boutique in the store" they are totally in control of the
sale, and post sale service, and they make sure that the consumer gets the
information, the service and the guarantee they consider appropriate to their high
quality brand.
In the electrical appliances industry, both companies interviewed considered
that post-sale service was an important factor for their product image (Case 5). In
effect, it has been the fear of negative externalities that has made Madosa maintain its
own retail stores, and has induced Frigilux to develop control mechanisms through
supervision in independent retail outlets.
In more general terms, an interesting case of agency cost avoidance is tight
franchise agreement By extensively specifying the standards which should be kept
for products and services and the penalties incurred in case of non-compliance, the
franchisor seeks to guarantee brand recognition, consumer's satisfaction and high
quality standards.
3.4.2. Moral Hazard.
When designing distribution channels, risk bearing is one of the strategic
issues which has to be decided, negotiated or imposed. Risk bearing by channel
agents brings moral hazard problems since self interested behaviour by some channel
members may mean increased risk for others (risk bearers). There are many types of
risks involved in distribution e.g. perishability, technical obsolescence, fashion and
product damage. The moral hazard problem arises when one channel member can
influence the occurrence of an event for his own benefit (in this case product failure
or decay) against which he is insured, since some other channel member is bearing
the risk.
For example, to reduce negative externalities, manufacturers of juices and
milk products bear the risk of product damage. Unfortunately for management,
getting the externality problem solved by bearing the risk of product spoilage, brings
up another agency problem: retail store owners turn off refrigerators and freezers
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during the night in order to save electricity with its obvious negative consequences to
product quality. In this case, optimal behaviour for the retailer does not work in the
manufacturers best interest due to moral hazard.
Similar agency problems have been reported by managers when referring to
the undesirable behaviour of drivers in company owned trucks. Their poor effort
towards keeping them in good condition is evident when looking at the results: less
operating life and high maintenance costs24. This moral hazard problem has been
solved by some companies, like Indulac in the milk industry, by spinning-off the
transportation function. Others, like Perugina and Polar, have solved the problem by
leasing the trucks to drivers. Thus, in these cases, looser and less vertical forms of
organisation have been preferred by management to solve agency problems.
The merchandising function also seems to pose serious moral hazard
problems when an independent distributor is performing the function. It is in the best
interest of the manufacturer to display well his products on the shelf. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to think of a type of contract which would make the independent
distributor willing to perform that function well. Again the agency problem arises
because the optimal behaviour of the agent (the independent distributor) is not
necessarily compatible with the optimal behaviour desired by the manufacturer (the
principal).
3.5. Governance Costs.
The cost of integration into distribution channels can be mainly found in two
different elements: governance costs and losses in economies of scale and scope.
They are the elements pushing manufacturers away form hierarchical control since
they represent the costs of integration. They have to be constantly weighed against
the gains in control and power which vertical integration would bring.
3.5.1. Administrative and Informational Costs.
Administrative and informational governance costs arise as firms grow,
making it more difficult to maintain administrative coordination. As distribution
24 As stated by an interviewee: "they park anywhere, they leave them open and therefore
sometimes get robbed, they take them home and use them for personal purposes; they even
cheat on petrol expenses".
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channel functions become more centrally coordinated by the manufacturer, the costs
of efficiently managing such structures increase. As the firm increases in size, it loses
its comparative advantages relative to the market (e.g. incentive controls and
economies in information exchange) making internal optimal contracts more difficult
to achieve. This has been called "managerial diseconomies" and have a negative
impact on organisational performance.
Yukery and Frica (Case 1) have total control over their distribution network
for the hot pack lines through which they sell directly to retailers over 80% of their
total sales. However, they rely on independent distributors to reach the small shops in
lower income areas, because they consider it too costly.
3.5.2. Distribution Networks with Scattered; Low Capital, Family Owned
Retail Shops.
Transportation can become an important strategic issue in societies with low
GNP per capita and low population density. (Table 1). In this case, the distribution
network is dominated by a large number of small, family owned and low capital
retail outlets. This makes the structural separation25 of the channel more difficult
than in economies in which retail chains dominate the distribution network, since
they permit the process of negotiation and sale to be totally separated from the
transportation function. In effect, taking orders, billing, collecting, merchandis
and transportation can be performed by different people. In the case of p
economies, there is very little centralized purchasing power and storage c. j
from retailers. This makes visits more numerous (to each retail outlet) and more
frequent (small inventories). Also, the low possibility of structurally separating the
channel has an important impact on the function played by truck drivers in the selling
process, since all the functions fall under their responsibility; transportation implies
sales, invoicing and collecting.
One possible indicator of the relative importance of transportation as a
strategic issue for manufacturers is the relative number of retail outlets compared to
the size of the population. The fewer people per retail outlet, the higher the
transportation effort made by manufacturers. As shown in the chart below, the
25 When channel functions can be divided and performed by alternative agents, e.g, the
salesman visits the retailer with a catalog, closes the sale and the transportation is done by a
separate process with different personnel
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number of people per outlet is directly related to the relative number of inhabitants
per square mile, to the GNP per capita, and to the percentage of households with
cars
26. Countries with low GNP per capita, and poor transportation means, require
more outlets to reach the consumer.
Furthermore, inadequate transportation systems and low number of
households with cars makes it difficult for consumers to travel long distances to shop,
hence making retailers enjoy important spatial monopolies.
Also, lower income implies that less capital is invested in stores making small
family owned shops very common. For example in the United Kingdom large grocers
represent 8.9% of food retailers while in Greece they only constitute 0.98% and in
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monopolies which show three characteristics with important implications for channel
functions and power relations:
a) They give financing to consumers.
b) Due to the small storage capacity of the store, they pre-select the
brands available for the consumer.
c) Compared to the big supermarket chains, they atomize the purchase of
goods.
26 Japan with $13.135 income per head is an important exception since th: average number of
people per food retail outlet is only 224. One of the reasons mentioned has been the
traditional Japanese diet which consists mainly of fresh produce and raw fish. (Maeda, 1990)
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This has important implications for channel design and increases the
monopoly power as it was discussed in Section 1.3.
3.6. Losses in Economies of Scope and Scale
Economies of scope are achieved when distribution channels are used to carry
out various types of products simultaneously. Classical examples are supermarkets
and hardware stores. On the other hand, economies of scale are accomplished when
similar , usually competing, products are distributed through the same channel
structure: for example in speciality stores where different brands of similar products
are sold and channel members specialize in the required functions.
By integrating vertically, manufacturers often give up the economies of scale
and scope which can be achieved by independent distributors. When Montecristo
(Case 2) integrated forward, it not only reduced the number of retail outlets from
over 100 to 35 but the new stores had a much reduced assortment of goods. In order
to diminish their losses in economies of scope, formerly achieved by independent
retailers, they had to increase the variety of products they offered. They decided to
start manufacturing some products like men's shirts and to buy from other
manufacturers underwears, belts and shoes.
Rori decided to follow a different strategy. They integrated only partially by
opening five totally owned retail stores, which represent 30% of total sales, while
using independent retailers for the rest In order to achieve this without facing price
conflict with independent outlets owners, they have had to guarantee that their prices
to the public will not undercut that of other retailers.
3.7. Final comments
We have presented a theoretical framework with the determinants of
integration and control over distribution channel functions. In doing so, different
theoretical approaches were applied in order to explain the rationale behind
management decisions. Also, experiences from several Venezuelan companies were
used to highlight key elements of the framework.
It is important to stress that this framework is especially suited to the study of
the distribution channels by function. It will allow to bring about the many specific
aspects which generate a legitimate space for managerial discretion. In particular, the
the analysis by function will allow us to understand how competitive dynamics and
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market development are key elements in the strategic choices of f1fID.S. The six cases
studied in the following chapters will hopefully constitute well chosen particulars
which bring to life hidden determinants of managerial intent, often little understood
by many existing approaches to channel design.
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INTRODUCTION TO CASES
Chapters 4 through 9 present six extensive and in-depth cases studies of
selected industries. In them, the distribution strategy of twenty three companies from
seven different industries is analysed and used to test existing theories and our
proposed theoretical framework. We study at least two companies in each industry in
order to see beyond sector and product determinants, into individual firm strategies.
The industries and companies were chosen to cover the different theoretical
categories defined in the research. In each chapter an extensive analysis is done.
However, in the title we highlight the specific theoretical category which the case
helps to demonstrate.
Case 1 deserves a special mention since it includes the evaluation and
comparison of two industries, fruit juices and dairy products, in contrast with others
where only companies within a specific industry are analysed. The reasons for
studying the two industries together are a consequence of the close competition for
the scarce refrigerated space in retail shops and which have tended to force them into
a diversification strategy which makes them now almost indistinguishable.
Case 2 (men's wear apparel) shows how imperfections in the credit markets
may generate vertical integration into retailing. In Case 3 we show how the process
of building a distribution network in the beer industry may in itself result in barriers
to entry. Case 4 indicates how externalities and product debasement in the chocolate
and sweets industry has required a highly integrated channel that directly sells to
100,000 retailers on a weekly basis. In Case 5 we show how post-sale service and
consumer financing have had strong and opposite effects on integration. Finally, Case
6 shows a classic case of bilateral monopoly between wholesalers and retailers in the
pharmaceutical sector, a process that, as predicted by the classical works in this area,
is showing tendencies towards more integration.
The cases will be presented in two sections. The first, mainly descriptive,
emphasizes the industry and company characteristics which are relevant for the case.
The second, mostly analytical, relates management decisions about channel structure
to the existing approaches and the theoretical framework proposed. A cross case
analysis is carried out in Chapter 10 where the overall lessons are extracted.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE 1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF DAIRY PRODUCTS AND
FRUIT JUICES:
Facing Moral Hazard Problems and Retailer's Markets
Introduction
When analysing the evolution of management decisions regarding distribution
channel strategy and design for dairy products and for fruit juices, remarkable
similarities stand out in spite of their differences in product attributes and
characteristics. Both industries offer a wide variety of product lines, some of which
are highly perishable and require refrigeration such as pasteurized goods, which are
called cold line products, while others can be preserved for longer periods at normal
temperatures and are referred to as hot line products.
These transactional requirements have determined that in both industries, a
specific channel structure has been designed for highly perishable cold-pack products
with totally separated operations from other less perishable lines. Second, since both
industries have to compete for the scarce refrigerated space available in retail
outlets1, all firms have tried to keep other suppliers of cold line products out by
offering a wider variety of goods (i.e, dairy companies offer fruit juices and firms in
the juice industry offer dairy products, either by producing them directly or by
purchase agreements with other manufacturers). In other words, the possibility of
rapid product decay and the need to have access to the scarce refrigerates space in
outlets, generates a peculiar type of competition that sets an interesting dynamic for
product diversification strategy and channel control. It also gives retailers an unusual
degree of market power. The objective of this case is to analyse, in this context, the
reasons for choosing alternative organisational structures for channel functions in
both industries in Venezuela.
In this case, five companies will be analysed. From the dairy industry we will
study Industria Lactea Venezolana, C.A. (INDULAC), Industrias Lacteas del Perija,
1 This has enhanced retailers spatial monopoly power which makes manufacturers spend
considerable resources with the only purpose of pleasing the retailers. This will be discussed
in Section 2.
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C.A. (lLAPECA) and Industrias Lacteas Lara-Carabobo (INLACA) and from the
fruit juice industry two firms were interviewed: YUKERY C.A. and Frutera
Industrial C.A. (FRICA). Each company has designed two totally independent
channels structures (Table 1), one for the pasteurized products (cold line) and the
other for non-pasteurized (hot line) products with completely different organisational
structures, managers, functions and personnel. It is the purpose of this chapter to
analyse the intrinsic characteristics of the transactions involved in both product lines _
hot and cold- and to understand the reasons which have induced management to
define two separate distribution networks within the same corporate structure.
TABLE 1
COMPANIES INTERVIEWED AND PRODUCT LINES












































* Products from other manufacturers which are distributed by YUKERY
** Products from SABANA C.A. a pasteurizing company recently acquired by
FRlCA as part of its diversification strategy. Also FRICA has distribution agreements
with another 5 pasteurizing companies:UPACA, LOS ANDES, IDEAL, TACHIRA
and SANTA BARBARA.
The case will be presented in two sections: the first, mainly descriptive, will
highlight the industry issues and firm characteristics which will be relevant for the
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analysis. The second section analyses the channel structure using the theoretical
framework presented in Chapter 3.
4.1. The Description
4.1.1. The Industries:
The dairy industry began to develop in Venezuela at the beginning of the
1940's when Nestle established the rust milk powderizing company in the western
state of Zulia in 1945. Now, there are over one hundred companies in the industry of
which twenty operate in the pasteurizing business. For the past 30 years the
government has followed a highly interventionist policy in the industry since the
supply of milk has been considered a "strategic" issue in economic and social
programs. Indirect subsidies to pasteurizers and tight price controls have been the
main policy tools applied.
As it is shown in Table 2, in spite of the fast increase in production units, the
dairy industry is highly concentrated. INDULAC, and ILAPECA control 100% of the
powdered milk market and with INLACA, 75% of the pasteurized milk market.
TABLE 2
MARKET SHARE FOR SOME DAIRY PRODUCTS
POWDERED PASTEurnazED CONDENSED BU'rfER
MILK MILK MaK
INDULAC 70% 25% 75% 60%
ILAPECA 30% 20% 25% 25%
INLACA 30%
OTHERS 25% 15%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100%
A unique characteristic of the Venezuelan market is the high proportion of
powdered milk sales when compared with the other dairy products (Table 3). The
evolution of this consumption pattern was due to a combination of two factors, a low
percentage of households with refrigerators and a high concentration of milk
production in the western region of the country.
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF SALES BY PRODUCT LINE







The fruit juice industry, on the other hand, started in Venezuela during the
1950's, the domestic demand was satisfied before that time through imports from the
United States. Currently there are around 20 manufacturers competing in the
industry, nevertheless the structure of the market, as for dairy products, presents high
degrees of concentration. When comparing market shares for both lines, the hot (non-
pasteurized) and the cold (pasteurized), the latter shows less degrees of concentration
within a more competitive business due to less brand loyalty from consumers, and to
specific characteristics in the distribution network structure. These two conditions
place high market power on retailers for cold products.
TABLE 4
MARKET SHARE IN THE FRUIT JUICE INDUSTRY



















4.1.2. The Companies Interviewed
The dairy sector has three leading companies: Industria Lactea Venezolana
C.A. (lNDULAC), Industrias Lacteas de Perija C.A. (aAPECA) and Industrias
Lacteas Lara-Carabobo (INLACA). In 1977 Nestle, which had started operations in
1945 was nationalized through a friendly agreement with the Venezuelan government
and converted into a joint venture company (lNDULAC) with government (20%),
workers (20%) and local farmers (60%) ownership. INDULAC is the leader in the
industry followed by ILAPECA, a much younger company founded in 1960, which is
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perceived by INDULAC as its closest competitor since they have almost identical
product lines.
INLACA on the other hand is the leader for pasteurized milk with 30% of the
market share and second in the market for pasteurized juices, with 28% market share.
This company, in contrast to INDULAC and ILAPECA, was created with the
objective of serving only the pasteurized market
In the fruit juice industry two companies were interviewed, the leader, Frutera
Industrial C.A. (FRICA) which was founded in 1957, and YUKERY C.A. which
started operations in 1963. Both belong now to larger highly diversified corporate
groups, CORIMON and Organizacion Diego Cisneros (OOC), respectively.
FRICA, in its early days, sold fruit pulp and concentrates to fruit juice
manufacturers. Later, management reoriented the company's objectives by initiating a
vertical integration and diversification strategy into fruit juices, milk, yoghurt,
chocolate drinks and rice drinks or "chicha"2. This strategy has been designed with
the objective of benefiting from economies of scale and scope in the distribution
network for pasteurized, cold products3. In 1985, FRICA decided to cease the
contract it had with an independent distributor and assumed hierarchical control of
the distribution functions for hot line products.
The trade mark YUKERY was launched in 1959 by Venezuelan Trading Co.,
which had been founded in 1939 and used to import LmBY's fruit juices from the
United States of America In 1963, Venezuelan Trading Co. stopped operations while
YUKERY C.A. was born as a corporation, its objective was to manufacture and
distribute fruit juices by processing local fruit and importing pulp. YUKERY also
introduced the trade mark TODDY, a highly successful pulverized chocolate drink
for children, which has become traditional among Venezuelan consumers. In 1981,
Industrias YUKERY C.A. acquired a food manufacturer, Venezolana de Alimentos
C.A. (canned and baby food) and in July 1986, after a long deterioration process
2 "Chicha" is a rice based cold drink which has a long tradition in Venezuela, it was
domestically produced until recently when manufacturers started to produce it and sell it in
pure-pack containers.
3 The low brand loyalty which characterizes this market and the insufficient refrigerated
capacity in wholesale and retail outlets has induced highly aggressive behaviour among tho~e
firms who participate in the distribution of cold drinks. Sales managers call the daily
competition process in the distribution channel a "refrigerator war".
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caused by administrative problems and distribution inefficiencies4, YUKERY was
acquired by the Organizaci6n Diego Cisneros (OOC), a powerful and internationally
diversified Venezuelan corporation.
4.1.3. Channel Structure
Two typical channel designs have been identified: one for hot-line5 products,
which is very short and reaches directly larger retailers with over 80% of sales, and
the other, for pasteurized cold-line products, in which exclusive wholesalers and
owner drivers are used for 100% of company sales. In other words, for cold line
products, manufacturers do not reach retailers directly.
i) Channel Structure for the Hot Line
For their hot line products, INDULAC, ILAPECA, YUKERY and FRICA
have designed a very similar, highly controlled distribution structure which reaches
directly between 5000 and 7000 retail outlets representing 85% of sales (Figure 1). In
order to achieve this, INDULAC and ILAPECA have hierarchically controlled sales
companies: Companfa Distribuidora de Alimentos (CODALIM) and Compania
Anonima Distribuidora de Productos (CADIPRO) respectively. Each sales company
performs different marketing functions like market research, product development,
promotion, storage and delivery. Nevertheless, according to management, the real
reason for these companies to exist is for tax reduction purposes. YUKERY and
FRICA perform the same functions with similar control through a sales and a
marketing department
4 According to management, the independent wholesalers used by YUKERY for the
distribution of their products were highly responsible for the important market share losses
experienced between 1982-1986. They say the wholesalers were "careless", "negligent",
expensive and unwilling to assume any credit risk.
5 All goods which do not need refrigeration.
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FIGURE 1
CHANNEL STRUCTURE FOR THE HOT LINE





*Very small retail outlets called "bodegas".
The type of retail outlets used for this line are supermarket chains,
independent supermarketsl', medium and small grocery shops (bodegas) and chemist
shops for baby milk formulas. The manufacturers very seldom reach directly the
small retailers (abastos y bodegas) who though they only account for 15% of sales,
represent 78.14% of total food shops (Table 5). They are usually visited by small
independent wholesalers. YUKERY estimates that while they visit periodically 5,000
retailers, the small distributors reach over 30,000 small retailers, which in their case
amount for 18% of sales. Management appraisal of these small wholesalers is very
high, since they represent the only alternative to selling to the very small, low capital
and family owned stores. According to manufacturers, it would be impossible for
them to assume directly the distribution to the small retailers due to the high risk7
involved in the transaction. In the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 the
relative importance of these outlets is evaluated in the context of less developed
economies.
6 Medium sized stores which offer the same product variety without belonging to a chain. They
are usually family owned enterprises.























ii) Channel Structure for Pasteurized Products: the Cold Line
In this product line the five companies interviewed have almost identical
structures: less controlled and more flexible than the hot line. Manufacturers sell to
the wholesalers who in turn either sell or give products on consignment to owner
drivers who make daily visits to over 12,000 retail outlets. The distribution cycle
from the manufacturer to the retailer (Figure 2) is achieved in less than 24 hours. It
starts at 10:00 P.M. when trucks leave the plants, reaching the wholesalers deposits
by 1:00 A.M.. There, owner drivers start loading between 1:00 A.M. and 4:00 A.M.
to begin their daily visits to over 12,000 retailers. The wholesalers perform reception
and storage functions, nevertheless, according to the sales and marketing managers
from INLACA, INDULAC, ILAPECA, YUKERY and FRICA, the most important
function performed by these wholesalers is the daily bargaining with owner drivers.
These are very tough people who have been in the business for over 40 years and
belong to a very powerful union. INLACA and INDULAC for example, had to spin-
off the function and leave it to be performed by the market since it became
impossible to control with company employees. A quote from INLACA's marketing
manager illustrates this point:
"Forty years ago we did not have independent wholesalers and
it was a disaster because we had to negotiate every day with
owner drivers. No matter how good our employees were, we
always ended up loosing money, paying more margins and
accepting returns for damaged products for higher percentages
than expected. "
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The retailers in the pasteurized line are mainly supermarket chains,
independent supermarkets and "panaderias'f or bakeries. The bakeries are by far the
most important retailers since 80% of pasteurized products are sold through these
outlets.
FIGURE 2
CHANNEL STRUCTURE FOR PASTEURIZED PRODUCTS.
RETAILERS:
MANUFACfURER WHOLESALERS10--.-1 OWNER DRIVERS Supermarkets
Bakeries: 80%
4.1.4. Channel Functions: Who Performs What?
It is important to stress that one of the study propositions presented in Chapter
2 was that distribution channels are seen by management as a set of functions with
different strategic values which have to be assigned to the most efficient parties. In
other words, the number of agents along the channel (length and width) is decided by
junction and not by product: a manufacturer may decide to leave transportation,
financing and storage to be performed by independent agents and keep the service
and merchandising function hierarchically controlled. Or, as for pasteurized products,
manufacturers may decide to spin-off sales, transportation, storage and collection, but
to keep for strategic reasons the risk-bearing and the promotion functions. The
analysis provided in the second part of the case will be based upon the information
given here.
8 Even though "panaderia" is the exact translation of bakery, it is in fact a combination of a
bakery, a small coffee shop and a small food store. The service is over-the-counter and they
are usually family owned. They are very densely distributed and people go there for
breakfast, to buy the daily bread and milk and to drink the mid-morning and afternoon
coffee. Due to this consumer buying pattern, these points of sale are becoming increasingly
important for food products.
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i) Channel Functions in the "Hot Line"
In the distribution of non-pasteurized products the number of functions which
are hierarchically controlled by the manufacturer is very high (Table 6). In effect
only the transportation and collection functions have been totally left to be performed
by the market i.e. independent transportation companies. The people responsible for
sales are company employees called "brief-case salesmen" who visit retailers usually
once a week and take the orders. These orders are processed and the products
delivered by independent transportation companies to the stores. The manufacturers
also have supervisors who check the relationship with the clients and merchandisers
who are in charge of the display and rotation of the products on shelves.
TABLE 6
WHO PERFORMS THE CHANNEL FUNCTIONS IN THE DISTRIBUTION
*OF NON-PASTEURIZED PRODUCTS.
FUNCTION INDULAC ILAPECA YUKERY
FRICA
before after before after
SALES TO:
a)Retailers MAN. MAN. MAN. I.D. MAN.
b)Consumers RET. RET. RET. RET. RET.
COLLECTION MAN. T.CIMAN. T.C. I.D. T.C.
TRANSPORTATIONMAN. T.C. T.C. I.D. T.C.
STORAGE MAN. MAN. MAN. I.D. MAN.
FINANCING TO:
a)Retailers MAN. MAN. MAN. I.D MAN.
b)Wholesalers MAN. MAN. MAN. MAN. MAN.
l\1ERCHANDISING MAN. MAN. MAN. I.D. MAN.
RISK BEARING MAN. MAN. MAN. MAN. MAN.
PROMOTION MAN. MAN. MAN. I.D. MAN.
INFORMATION MAN. MAN. MAN. I.D. MAN.
MAN.=Manufacturer (Hierarchically controlled personnel)
T.C.= Independent Transportation Company
I.D.= Independent Distributors
* This is true for 85% of sales, the rest is done through small wholesalers who
perform all functions except MERCHANDISING and PROMOTION.
It is important to stress that, as shown in Table 6, INDULAC spun-off the
transportation function in 1965 since, according to management, it had become very
costly and logistically very difficult to carry out Also, the changes in YUKERY and
FRICA are worthwhile mentioning since between 1984-1986 both companies decided
to cancel the contract each of them had maintained for many years with exclusive and
large independent distributors who used to perform all the distribution functions for
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both companies. Both companies stress that by integrating vertically, not only have
they achieved a better service for their clients, but that they can do it cheaper.
According to YUKERY, while independent distributors used to charge them 15% of
sales, they spend now only 8% of sales for all distribution functions.
As it has been said, for the remaining 15% of sales, all companies use small
wholesalers
9
which take care totally of the distribution functions to serve smaller
retailers.
ii) Channel Functions in the Cold Line
For the distribution of pasteurized products the situation is radically different,
as it can be seen in Table 7 manufacturers have been more inclined to use market
suppliers of functions instead of performing them internally. Even in the case of
INDULAC who decided at the beginning to reach retailers with company owned
trucks and company personnel, management changed its strategy and decided to spin-
off those functions. Also INLACA decided to spin-off the storage function to
wholesalers. The storage function is usually made by wholesalers, only ILAPECA
sells directly to owner drivers.
It is interesting to note that also in this line, the companies involved have
ended up with very similar allocation of responsibilities among agents.
It is also worthwhile stressing that even though manufacturers exert very little
control over channel members, they have all kept the risk bearing and promotion
functions. In other words, going back to the argument of management seeing
channels as a set of functions with different strategic values which must be performed
by the best qualified, all manufacturers in this case, have reached the conclusion that
they should keep those two functions to be performed by company employees. We
shall see the reasons for this in Section 2.
9 Totally different in organization and size from the big independent distributors mentioned
before who used to work for YUKERY and FRICA
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TABLE 7








































MAN.= Manufacturer (Hierarchically controlled personnel)
0.0.= Owner Driver
w.s.= Wholesaler
(1) Very seldom are promotions launched
(2) INLACA is the only manufacturer of pasteurized products which has internalized
milk transportation from farms to plants and from there to wholesalers.
Channel design has been very similar among manufacturers, nevertheless,
some important differences should be pointed out and we will discuss these in the
following section.
4.2. The Analysis
In this section we will analyse the rationale behind management decisions
regarding channel design. We will start by studying the predictions of existing
theories in order to identify the areas where they do not give an adequate account of
the data. We will then use our theoretical framework in order to propose an
alternative view.
4.2.1. Existing Approaches:
According to traditional marketing theory, (Aspinwall, 1958,
Rosenbloom,1987) distribution channels for dairy products and juices should be long
and indirect since as shown in the chart below their characteristics correspond exactly
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to those of red products. This classification has been proposed by and discussed in
the literature review. It defines the type of distribution channel and promotion
according to the five categories specified in the first column in table 8.
TABLES

















LONG AND LONG AND LONG AND
INDIRECT INDIRECT INDIRECT
* Number of services applied to goods in order to meet the exact needs of the
consumer.
According to Aspinwall's approach, products are red when the replacement
rate is high and the other four characteristics are low. Red products should have long
channels and broadcast promotion. On the other hand, products are yellow, when they
show low replacement rates, high gross margins, high levels of adjustment, high time
of consumption and high searching time (Table 8). Hence, they call for short
channels and highly focussed promotion.
Other authors have stressed the fact that highly perishable products will tend
to have shorter, more controlled channels due to the externalities involved and
specific asset requirements (Williamson, 1971). Manufacturers would prefer to
maintain hierarchical supervision along the channel in order to avoid product decay
and insure the quality of the goods until they reach the consumer. This implies that,
contrary to what has been found, the cold line should be more hierarchically
controlled than the hot line.
In fact, even when a transaction cost analysis is made by functions, less
vertical integration is to be expected for non-pasteurized products due to high
economies of scope together with negligible externalities and asset specific
requirements for most functions (Table 9).
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TABLE 9
VARIABLES WHICH IMPACT VERTICAL INTEGRATION INTO
DISTRIBUTION FOR NON-PASTEURIZED PRODUCTS: A TRANSACTION
COST APPROACH BY FUNCTIONS.
FUNcnONS ECONOMIES EXTERNALITIES ASSET VERTICAL
OF SCOPE· SPECIFICITY INTEGRATION
SALES TO
a)Retailers + 0 0 Unfavourable
b)Consumers ++ 0 0 Unfavourable
COLLECTION 0 0 0 Unfavourable
TRANSPORT. + 0 0 Unfavourable
STORAGE 0 0 0 Unfavourable
FINANCING ? ? ? ?
MERCHAN. + + 0 Unclear
PROMOTION 0 + 0 Unclear
INFORMATION 0 ? 0 ?





SOURCE: based on the model presented by Oliver Williamson in "Economic
Institutions of Capitalism", (1985) page 113.
For the pasteurized line a different picture emerges, under the same ar
more controlled channel is expected. In other words, higher specific ass'
risk of negative externalities "should", according to Williamson, indu .ner
control from manufacturers. Even though that is not exactly the case, , aation
by functions helps to understand why some of them are kept ..rol for
pasteurized or cold products (Tables 9 and 10).
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TABLE 10
VARIABLES WHICH IMPACT VERTICAL INTEGRATION INTO
DISTRIBUTION FOR PASTEURIZED PRODUCTS:A TRANSACTION COST
APPROACH BY FUNCTIONS.
FUNCTIONS ECONOMIES EXTERNALITIES ASSET VERTICAL
OF SCOPE· SPECIFICITY INTEGRATION
SALES TO
a)retailers 0(1) + + Favourable
b)consumers ++ + + Unclear
COLLECTION 0 0 0 Unclear
TRANSPORT. 0(1) + ++ Favourable
STORAGE + + ++ Favourable
FINANCING ? ? ? ?
MERCHANDISING 0(1) + + Unclear
RISK BEARING 0 ++ ++ Favourable
PROMOTION ? ? + ?
INFORMATION 0 ? 0 ?





(1) Due to the diversification strategy followed by the five companies.
SOURCE: based on the model presented by Oliver Williamson in "Economic
Institutions of Capitalism", (1985) page 113.
In fact as it can be seen in Table 10, according to the three variables used by
Williamson, the risk bearing and the storage function which have been controlled by
management, show a "favourable" tendency towards vertical integration.
Nevertheless, it does not explain why sales to retailers have been left to be performed
by the market and furthermore, why has the storage function been spun-off.
Other theories are needed to fully explain management choices in channel
design. In the successive sections a separate analysis for each line will be proposed,
given the intrinsic differences in product characteristics and in the nature of
transactions. In particular, we would like to address the following questions which
are left unanswered by existing approaches:
* What are the elements which determine management choice between
"making" or "buying" a specific channel function?
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* Why, even though channel structures have evolved in a very similar way for
the five companies analysed, some key differences are found?
* Why have the cold and hot lines evolved in a totally different manner and,
furthermore, why do their evolutions conflict with the predictions of transaction cost
theory (Williamson, 1970)?
* Why, if according to marketing theory (Aspinwall,1958), these products
should have long and loose channels with traditional market transactions, the opposite
is true for the hot line?
* Why does the hot line present a double structure where a portion of sales is
still canalized through small independent wholesalers in spite of management
decision of achieving total forward vertical integration?
* Why does the cold line generate a complicated and dynamic behaviour
between wholesalers and retailers, which is largely out of the control of the
manufacturer, but tolerated by him?
* In the cold line, where most functions are out of manufacturers control, v
have all companies kept the risk bearing and promotion functions to be perfor
internally?
* Why did the large independent distributors fail to give gooc
manufacturers?
Ice to
In the following sections these, and other questions, will be answered by
using the concepts presented in the literature review and the theoretical framework
proposed in Chapter 3.
4.2.2. A Proposed Approach: The Hot Line
One alternative explanation for the high control of the distribution for hot line
products could be a strategic behaviour by firms which are building barriers to entry.
In fact, due to the high levels of concentration displayed in both industries, this is an
attractive interpretation for some policy makers which rapidly call for competition
law. We shall discuss this below and while doing the analysis, different
interpretations to management behaviour will be presented.
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I) Development of Barriers to Entry
A reason for this high control in the hot product line could be a strategic move
with the objective of setting up a distribution network as a barrier to entry for new
competitors and to enjoy monopoly rents. New entrants would have to incur the same
sunk costs by buying trucks and storage centers in order to set up a similar
distribution network and compete with INDULAC, ILAPECA, YUKERY and
FRICA. The imperfections in the capital market, the argument follows, also
contributes to the enhancement of the deterrent effect since the potential entrants
would have to face increased difficulties in financing sunk costs. Judging by the
results it could be said that the strategy has been successfully implemented, since
INDULAC controls 75% of the powdered milk market, 75% of the condensed milk
market and 25% of pasteurized milk market ILAPECA, being its only competitor,
controls the rest of the powder and condensed milk markets. In fruit juices the
situation is similar, YUKERY and FRICA control 90% of the market
Nevertheless, these arguments fail to explain why YUKERY and FRICA had
historically used the market to perform channel functions by using independent
distributors until five years ago, when they both decided to integrate vertically
forward. Neither does it explain the reasons behind INDULAC's decision to spin-off
the transportation function after having controlled it for over twenty years.
An alternative explanation to the barriers to entry argument could be that
management had little alternative but to control functions if efficiency was to be
achieved. Going back to the analysis presented in the theoretical framework, four
situations are identified in which firms usually benefit from vertical integration,
building barriers to entry is one of them, the other three are when:
There is a lack of competitive markets for distribution functions.
Avoiding post-contractual opportunistic behaviour.
Solving agency problems.
These elements and others are discussed below.
ii) Lack of Competitive Markets for Channel Functions: Absolute
Absence
Fifty years ago in Venezuela, the choice between "buying" or "making"
channel functions was a very simple decision, since manufacturers could not find any
suppliers in the market they had to "make" the functions internally. Hence, the
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explanation for Nestle's decision back in 1945, to integrate vertically into distribution
was that they did not find in the market the suppliers for transportation services to
move their products from the plant to retailers. This was an obvious case of what has
been described as the lack of specialists, which characterized the early stages of the
industry life cycle period in which firms are expected to be more vertically integrated
since there is not yet enough demand to support specialized markets. (Stigler, 1951).
In other words, lack of specialists are the consequence of diseconomies of scale in
certain firm's functions when markets are too small or when industries are still young.
The following quote is a good example:
" We used to do everything, all the transportation and selling
was done by our employees. Distributing was a big problem
and we needed people to do just that ... The roads were in
terrible shape, and sometimes there even weren't any roads,
thus we used everything we could: our own trucks but also
mules, canoes, anything."
Nevertheless, later in 1965, INDULAC decided to spin-off that function and
leave it to be performed by specialists who had developed as independent
transportation companies. ILAPECA has also chosen the same alternative and sub-
contracts the transportation in the market The reasons for having decided to hive-off
only the transportation function remains unanswered. We will discuss this below.
iii) Avoiding Monopoly Power from Suppliers of Channel
Functions
The industry life cycle argument proposed by Stigler (1951), helps to
understand management preferences for vertical integration during the early stages of
industry evolution. Nevertheless it fails to explain why 45 years later, in a mature
dairy industry, INDULAC and ILAPECA still keep control over a high number of
functions. The same argument applies for YUKERY and FRICA in the fruit juice
industry (Table 6). Furthermore, they fail to use more wholesalers which is a way of
spinning-off other functions like selling, collecting, servicing, merchandising,
information and financing.
One of the reasons why management does not use more wholesalers is
because it has a low opinion of independent distributors. They have been showing
monopolistic behaviour by increasing margins at higher levels than it would cost
manufacturers to perform the functions themselves. For example, FRICA and
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YUKERY decided to integrate vertically forward and stop using independent
wholesalers as a response to their increased monopolistic behaviour:
"They were always threatening that they would stop the
delivery of products if we did not accept an increase in their
margins. We tried to negotiate with them until we got fed up
because their service was getting worse and worse".
According to management the service was deficient and getting increasingly
bad reviews from manufacturers, because:
"They have taken too many products which have very little in
common, requiring different channels and different services.
Besides, they never pushed sales, they only took orders, they
neither do the merchandising function. OurPeople spend
between one hour and four hours organising the shelves, this is
very important now that competition is tougher."
A FRICA manager defined channel control as follows:
"In other words, to control the channel means to be there on
time, to rotate the products when it is needed and to take care
of shelves. The clients (retailers) were very upset and they did
not want to carry FRICA products because the distributors
would not accept back the products that had expired"
Large independent distributors charge manufacturers around 15% of sales
while on average the same functions are performed by manufacturers at a cots not
higher than 8%. YUKERY claims that now it costs them almost 50% less to perform
internally the wholesaling functions.
The sales manager from ILAPECA summarizes management perception:
"We have our own distributor (Sales Company) because
nobody does it better than you. Besides if you depend on
others, they can get organised, as has happened to others in the
past and ask for more and more margins. What can you do
then?"
Management even expresses fear of the monopoly power from transportation
compames:
"We have had serious problems with them because they want
to increase the prices too much and if we don't agree they just
stop the service... that is why we have some trucks of our own,
to use them when we face problems with them ... you know,
just to show them that we do not depend totally on their
service."
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iv) Facing Agency Costs: Moral Hazard Problems
There are a few questions which are still unanswered. If there is such a fear of
monopolistic behaviour from transportation companies, why do they not follow the
same behaviour as with independent distributors by integrating vertically?
Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 4 the only function which has been left to the
market by the four manufacturers of non-pasteurized products is transportation. The
explanation for this apparently incongruous behaviour lies in management assessment
of relative risks when comparing the monopoly power from transportation companies
with the agency costs due to drivers careless behaviour when using company owned
cars. In other words, manufacturers face moral hazard problems with drivers, since it
is the manufacturer who is bearing the risk of any damage to the transportation units.
Thus, agency problems can make vertical integration into transportation a very
expensive organisational design. In the case of INDULAC, according to the words of
the sales manager for non-pasteurized products:
"INDULAC does not have its own transportation units, we had
them once but it turned out to be too expensive. Drivers did not
take care of the trucks, they altered the receipts to get more
payments, and so, gradually we started to use third parties.
Now, we contract it all".
Or as an ILAPECA manager puts it:
"It is a matter of what is worse, in our case we believe it is
worse to deal with truck drivers and their problems than with
transportation companies."
v) Facing Agency Costs: Externalities
Another agency problem reflected in the evaluation of independent
distributors performance by manufacturers as it was highlighted by a YUKERY
manager is their lack of effort in assuming the merchandising function which
management feels is highly important in marketing consumer goods.
"They want to charge us as if they took good care of the
products, but they just throw the products in storage rooms and
leave. "
Hence, due to agency costs, it can be very expensive for the manufacturer to
leave the merchandising function to be performed by the market In other words,
manufacturer's frustration comes from the difficulty of solving the agency problem of
making the independent distributor worry, as much as he does, about keeping product
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quality standards until they reach the consumer. There is obviously an agency
problem of deftning a self-enforcing contract, since it is in the manufacturer's best
interest to give a high quality service and product to the consumer while not in the
distributor's, who finds an incentive to shirk. Distributors get paid by units delivered
and they claim not to be paid enough:
"They pay us too little, the cost of trucks and repairs have gone
up, petrol has gone up, salaries have gone up, we try to do our
work the best we can."
Since supervision of the independent distributor implies high monitoring
costs, the manufacturer finds it more efficient to pay its own personnel to Perform the
required control. Even though it is not very clear whether independent distributors are
inefficient or are simply unwilling to squeeze profit margins, after interviewing
independent distributors, we are more inclined to believe in the former.
Thus, currently, given the theoretical elements above, the optimal channel
design for 85% of company sales in the hot line is to buy the transportation function
in the market in order to solve the risk bearing agency cost, and to hierarchically
control the other channel functions in order to achieve two objectives: to avoid the
monopolistic behaviour from independent distributors and to solve the agency
problem for the merchandising function.
vi) Governance Costs: the Case of Scattered, Low Capital, and
Family Owned Retail Shops
As analysed in the section above, the possibility of structurally separating the
channel functions is an important element which splits physical transportation from
other channel functions such as sales, merchandising, servicing and financing. It
allows the manufacturer to abandon the transportation function while maintaining
hierarchical control over the others with more strategic significance. But, what
happens when such separation is not possible? In fact, if the functions cannot be split
so as to be performed by different agents, the options are obvious; the manufacturer
keeps them all under hierarchical control or leaves them all to be performed by the
market, in this case the wholesaler.
The possibility of a structural separation of the channel will depend on the
nature of the transaction. The greater the storage capacity and the more centralized
purchasing power of the buyer, the higher the chances of separating the channel. As
can be seen in Table 4, small food stores called "bodegas" represent 78.14% of food
110
outlets. For manufacturers it would be too costly to maintain frequent visits to these
small retailers which are very numerous and where sales are also very small. In other
words, governance costs or administration costs will be very high if they try to
centralize all the functions.
"We use the independent distributors for the smaller retailers
since it would be highly expensive for us to sell directly to
them. You see, they do not have space to carry inventories and
they do not have money to pay, thus, you have to sell them in
small quantities more often".
Each of the manufacturers estimate that between 30,000 to 40,000 small retail
outlets are reached by 1500 assume wholesalers. This information would seem to be
accurate since, according to the data presented in Table 4, the total number of these
small retailers is 45,710.
vii) Losses in Economies of Scope
Also high losses in economies of scope would be another cost to pay if
manufacturers assumed the distribution to small retail outlets. These wholesalers do
not work under exclusivity contracts with any of the manufacturers, since they are
aware of the fact that increasing economies of scope by offering different products
and brands is what makes this small scale wholesaling economically viable. they
benefit from economies of scope by carrying different brands. This would obviously
be difficult to achieve for any individual manufacturer.
Another reason to use wholesalers is that they have a cost advantage
compared to manufacturers in financing small retailers. Since they usually know
them personally, this solves the problem of informational asymmetry or moral hazard
which would arise if the manufacturer extended credit to them. In the words of the
ILAPECA management:
"The wholesalers are the only ones who can finance those
small retailers, they know them very well personally and know
how much credit they can give."
4.2.3. A Proposed Approach: The Cold Line
"This market is in the hands of the retailer, not in the hands of
the manufacturer. It is controlled by the baker who can tell
you: if you do not give me so and so margin I do not receive
the milk today, and what are you going to do about it?"
111
"The company does not have any control of the business, we
are in the hands of the distribution network, we cannot decide
either our margins or our prices, not even our sales volume ...
Our volume of sales depends on how the owner driver pushes
and convinces the retailers -who are 80% bakeries- to buy our
product ... Some times we loose the bakery, other times we
loose the owner driver because competition offers them better
deals. I tell you we are ki1Jing ourselves in order to please the
distribution network."
These quotations illustrate the way manufacturers feel about the distribution
of pasteurized products. They consider it a subworld of strange deals and unclear
negotiations from which they prefer to stay away even at the high cost of loosing
control of the business.
When comparing the pasteurized line with the increasingly controlled hot-
line, all companies interviewed have been experiencing the opposite process, they
have been spinning-off functions for which they have been unable to define a self-
enforcing contract within a hierarchical structure. In other words, the agency problem
of delegating some of the distribution functions has only been possible through
traditional market relationships1O• Hence, the manufacturer does not reach the
retailer directly as it does in the hot line, on the contrary, the channel has two
intermediaries, the wholesaler and the owner driver, before reaching the retailer
(Figure 1 and 2).
Nevertheless, as can be seen in Table 6, two functions are kept under
hierarchical control the risk-bearing and the promotion functions, we shall discuss the
reasons for this apparently contradictory behaviour.
i) Facing Agency Costs: Moral Hazard Problems
As it was described at the beginning of the case, products travel from the
manufacturer to the retailer in an average period of 24 hours. In order to accomplish
this demanding schedule, wholesalers have to begin their operations as early as 2:00
A.M. dealing with owner drivers who in turn start visiting their clients from 3:30
A.M. until 2:00 P.M.. According to INDULAC and INLACA, when they used to
control those functions internally, employees were not sufficiently motivated to
10 In this case solving agency problems implies disintegration of functions instead of vertical
integration.
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perform their tasks efficiently. INDULAC, in its early days, even tried to get directly
to the retailers through a hierarchically controlled salesforce. That experience was a
failure and they had to spin-off the functions due to high agency costs in two
different situations. First, the salesmen very quickly realised that it was the organised
baker who had the relative power-incentivating agreements among them, against the
manufacturer. Secondly, since the transportation units were company property, the
drivers took terrible care of them, developing a typical moral hazard behaviour which
turned the operation into a highly expensive affair to the manufacturer:
"They used to say that they gave more margins to the retailers
but in fact they were splitting between them the difference.
Even though we had an agreement of exclusivity, they used to
sell products from competition, on top of that, they never had
the money to pay us. As far as the way they treated the trucks,
that was another problem, the batteries got lost, the spare tyres
got lost and accidents were an every day event We decided to
get rid of them, and of the wholesalers, now they negotiate
among themselves and with the retailer, fine, that is not our
problem and we do not want to know about it"
Why does management feel so unable to exert any control over the channel
when the opposite is true for the case of the hot, non-pasteurized line? Why should
such striking differences be found? Why, if according to some theories (Williamson,
1985), the distribution for the pasteurized line,-due to its high externalities11 and its
specific asset12 requirements- should be more controlled than the hot lir
opposite is true?
ii) Lack of Competitive Markets for Distribution F'
Retailer's Market
Around 80% of pasteurized products are sold in bakeries which, due to their
characteristics, enjoy high monopoly power and have become the relevant client to
dairy manufacturers. In other words, the manufacturers develop competitive tools
which do not reach the consumer and are only aimed to please the retailer. Retail
outlets are by defmition spatial monopolies which can be used to extract rents from
manufacturers or other channel members. This monopoly power can be enhanced by
11 Danger of rapid product decay.
12 Refrigerated storing capacity.
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the following conditions which are all met by the transactions between the bakery and
the dairy manufacturers:
1) Consumer buying patterns. The more inclined the consumer is to visit a
particular store the higher the retailer's power. This is true for bakeries
where consumers go almost every day for fresh bread and breakfast.
2) The degree of brand loyalty for products. The lower the brand loyalty
the higher the monopoly power since the consumer would buy any
brand in the store which is nearer and more convenient13.
3) The possibilities for the consumer to self-serve. The less the chances for
the customer to choose its own brand the higher the monopoly power
enjoyed by the retailer. The over the counter design of bakery shops
makes it difficult for consumers to make their own choices.
4) The availability of specific assets required to perform the sales and post
sale service. The less availability the higher the monopoly power since
there would be more competition from different products to use the
assets. The importance of the refrigerated space will be discussed
below.
Hence, the existence of a retailer's market explains why, for the distribution of
pasteurized products the promotion function is kept under manufacturer's hierarchical
control. (Table 7)
iii) The Impact of Perishability
The basic attribute which differentiates cold from hot line products is their
high perishability and thus their higher chances of spoilage before reaching the
consumer. Thus, it is important to stress how it affects the transaction and how it
alters channel functions. Among others, the following characteristics of perishability
are determinant for channel design when, as in the case of Venezuela, the percentage
of independent family owned food retailers is very high and their purchasing patterns
highly decentralized:
1) Sales are made in smaller quantities which means higher transaction
costs per unit.
2) Sales are made more frequently, thus a larger salesforce is needed.
13 In a survey conducted by INDUlAC, only 1% of consumers said that they would go to a
different bakery if they did not find INDUlACs products.
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3) There are specific physical asset requirements for retailers. Their
cooling facilities are usually very limited. This increases their
monopoly power.
4) If there are long ~tances ~volv~d, the negotiating terms may lean
towards the retailer, especially if the transportation units are not
refrigerated.
These characteristics make it very difficult to accomplish a structural
separation of the channel and therefore impossible to split the transportation function
from the others. The difficulty lies in the fact that it would be highly inefficient to
have salesmen and drivers visiting the retailers every day when the driver alone can
do it l 4.
iv) Opportunistic Behaviour and Appropriation of Specialized
Quasi-Rents
The refrigerated space is such an important strategic issue and its supply in
retail outlets so scarce, that management from the five companies have agreed that
competition in this business can be narrowed down to a "war for refrigerators". To
secure and sometimes to "seize" them has become the key competitive tool since a
pre-selection of brands by the baker is almost unavoidable. Thus, it is not surprising
to find that most sale efforts are made to persuade the baker to carry a specific brand
and to fill the refrigerator with the company products before the competition does.
"We have to offer the retailer as many products as possible,
juices, milk, yoghurt, chocolate drinks...the more products you
have and the sooner you fill the refrigerator, the less the
chances for competition to sell."
In consequence, bakers usually develop opportunistic behaviour since they
know that they are in possession of a very important and scarce specialized asset: the
refrigerated shelve space. In order to appropriate quasi-rents from it, they usually lie
about how much margins the other manufacturers are offering in order to raise the
bids. As it was discussed in the theoretical framework, manufacturers can benefit
from vertical integration15, by avoiding post-contractual opportunistic behaviour.
14 This does not mean that manufacturers have totally given up the sales function to the owner
drivers. INLACA controls a salesforce which visits periodically the retailers.
15 Together with situations in which there is lack of competitive markets, barriers to entry
development or solving agency problems.
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This is exactly the situation here, the bakers own a specific asset: the refrigerator, the
suppliers market of goods is highly competitive since brand loyalty is very low, thus
bakers extract specialized quasi-rents by asking for higher margins.
The alternative would be to integrate forward into retailing, in order to avoid
the bakers squeezing manufacturers margins. Nevertheless, the costs which
manufacturers have to face to escape from this opportunistic behaviour are, besides
the obvious investment required in infrastructure: the governance or administrative
costs, and the losses in economies of scale and scope. These costs, in this case, are
higher than the benefits from integration. Developing a strategy of vertical
integration would imply a dramatic reduction of product coverage in retailers, since
probably a lot less than the current 12,500 retailers would be visited every day and
the volume of sales would be reduced drastically bringing the manufacturers income
below their equilibrium point
Hence, with the high costs from integration, manufacturers have decided not
to own retailers, nevertheless, some of them have decided to own refrigerators in the
store. INLACA, for example, has developed a strategy of offering refrigerators on
consignment to bakeries, with the condition of selling only INLACA products.16
Management claims that through this mechanism they have stopped price wars with
competitors and have restricted opportunistic behaviour from bakers.
With the same theoretical approach an explanation can be given for
INLACA's particular decision to retain the transportation function while all its
competitors have chosen to leave it to the market
"We have always performed the transportation function from
the farmers to the plants and from there to the wholesalers, we
think that it is one of our major strengths since it permits us to
offer better quality than the competition. We are the only
manufacturer who owns specially refrigerated transportation
units for that purpose."
INLACA is the only major company with nationwide distribution of
pasteurized products, which implies that their products have to travel longer distances
than that of the competition. For this reason, INLACA is also the only one who owns
a large fleet of cistern trucks for transporting mille This highly specific asset with
16 INlACA owns refrigerators in approximately 10% of the bakeries they visit. When this is the
case, the sales manager calls them "our bakeries" since only INlACA products can be sold
there, otherwise they take the refrigerator away.
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very little alternative use is a clear case of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour
avoidance. In other words, since as assets become more specific, quasi-rents are
created, management has decided to integrate the function in order to avoid the
possibility of opportunistic behaviour by third parties when trying to appropriate
quasi-rents.
v) Solving Agency Problems: Externalities and Risk Bearing
High perishability increases the chances for negative externalities, since the
brand name reputation can be badly damaged and sales can be negatively affected in
the long run 17. If a spoiled product is sold to a consumer and the brand image is
negatively impacted, the retailer can always sell products from competitors making
the manufacturer the only looser. Thus, it is in the best interest of the manufacturer to
defend product quality whereas the same is not necessarily true in the case of
retailers. Negative externalities have encouraged firms to integrate forward and to
control distribution as has been historically the case in U.S.A. for beer, chocolates
and meat industries (Williamson, 1985).
The alternative, for the manufacturer, for solving the externality problem
when vertical integration is too costly and its benefits do not outweighs its costs, is to
bear the risk of product damage. In other words, the manufacturer internalizes the
externality by assuming the cost of product damage instead of making other channel
members pay for it The way the manufacturer does it, is by implementing highly
flexible policies for returning damaged products. This explains why the risk bearing
function is hierarchically controlled by the manufacturer (Table 6). INLACA's
marketing manager points out:
"We have to be responsible for damaged products, if we do not
do it, it is our brand name that suffers and nobody but us
cares. "
But why do manufacturers usually set limits to the percentage of returned
products from the retailers? Why if they are solving externality problem do they
17 One of the strategies followed by brewers in Venezuela has been to remove from shelves and
destroy the products which have not been sold by the expiry date (beer has usually 3 months
of shelve life). When Nacional faced cash flow problems it stopped replacing old beer and
consumers responded by changingbrands.
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develop rules which could result in not solving the original problem it was designed
to face?
" They do not care about keeping the goods cold and in order
to save electricity they turn off the refrigerators during the
night. "
Thus, avoiding an agency cost by internalizing the risk-bearing function
induces moral hazard behaviour from retailers. Since the retailers, as agents, feel that
their actions are "insured" by the manufacturer, as principal, they develop moral
hazard actions like unplugging the refrigerators in order to save electricity, regardless
of the negative impact it has on product quality. In other words, the agents display a
conduct which works in their best interests but against the principal's. The alternative
policy for the manufacturer, in order to limit such moral hazard behaviour, is to
regulate the return of damage products according to pre-established ratios given by
quality control standards.
These apparent contradictions explain why manufacturers have preferred the
flexibility of market transactions instead of trying to defme self-enforcing contracts
within a hierarchical structure. In the five companies interviewed, management has
decided to leave to the market as many functions as possible, showing that as
opposed to the hot line, in this case, the market shows a clear superiority in solving
agency problems.
4.2.4. Final Comments
Throughout the discussion of the case the main objective has been to look at
management decisions with the analytical tools given by different theories. By doing
so those belonging to agency theory have proven to be more useful than others. Also,
using functions as units of analysis has proven to be better to evaluate strategic
decisions. Also, the reinterpretation of corporate behaviour by using the theoretical
framework given in Chapter 3 has allowed us to reach a deeper understanding of the
rationale behind management actions.
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CHAPTERS.
CASE 2. THE APPAREL INDUSTRY:
Financial Market Imperfections and Vertical Integration
into Retailing
Introduction
To identify the best channel structure for distributing and selling men's ready-
to-wear garments in Venezuela, a normative approach could be followed. Doing so,
such a channel would probably show the following pattern: manufacturers would be
using middlemen to serve smaller stores and shops, while selling directly to big
department stores. Products aimed at high income consumers might enjoy more
direct distribution through hierarchically controlled shops1, where brand awareness is
developed with top quality service and information. Following this concept, some
companies have set up franchises with the objective of increasing direct contact with
consumers without incurring the high costs of opening up the stores. In the apparel
industry, Bennetton, Ted Lapidus, Phillip Laurent and Christian Dior are successful
examples of this type of strategy.
Two apparel manufacturers will be analysed in this case, MONTECRISTO
and RORI INTERNACIONAL, with the objective of understanding why
management decided to integrate vertically forward into distribution channels after
25 years of operations.
The case we will be analysing is particularly interesting since one of the
companies interviewed (MONTECRISTO) has integrated forward into retailing for
other reasons than those mentioned above. The company decided to open its own
exclusive stores in order to break the monopolistic behaviour developed by retailers
who demanded increasingly longer and cheaper credit terms. This meant reducing the
number of outlets from over 100 to just 15. The other company in this case, RORI,
faced similar problems and also integrated forward into retailing, but with a different
and less radical strategy. Thus, a particular form of competition led companies to
1 These shops can also be set up by renting floor space in large department stores.
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offer increasing volumes of financing to retailers until it became cheaper for
companies to open their own stores.
In previous chapters, we argued in favour of the importance of this channel
function in distribution strategy and remarked the general lack of attention given to it
in the literature. Intra-channel fmanCing2, and its consequences is what determines
forward vertical integration in this case.
5.1. The Description
5.1.1. The Industry
The apparel sector in Venezuela is highly atomized, according to OCEI3
(Statistics Central Office) there are 957 manufacturers of which over 90% had less .
than 100 employees.
Nevertheless, the men's wear market presents the highest levels of
concentration with 6% of the manufacturing units producing 45% of the total
output4. Furthermore, within this market, men's suits, also called the "heavy line" is




Financing given onlyamong channel members, not consumer credit.
25 Anos de Encuesta Industrial, OCE!, 1986.
Estudio sobre la Competitividad del Sector de la industria de la Confeccion. Working Paper.
Alonso, Oswaldo. July, 1990.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF MANUFACTURERS ACCORDING TO LINE OF BUSINESS
AND NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES.
LINE OF BUSINESS LESS THAN 100 OVER 100
TOTAL
UNDERWEAR & BATHING 38 11 49
SHIRTS 116 5 121
BABY WEAR 16 2 18
JEANS 9 4 13
TIES 13 13
KNITIED WEAR 91 14 105
MEN'S WEAR 193 13 206
WOMEN'S WEAR 248 4 252
OTHERS 155 25 180
TOTAL 879 78 957
PERCENTAGE 91.8 8.2 100
SOURCE: ENCUESTA INDUSTRIAL, OCEI, 1988 and "Estudio Sobre la
Competitividad Industrial de la Industria de la Confeccion". Alonso, O. July 1990.
Higher degrees of market concentration in the production of men's suits are
common. Men's ready to wear suits have longer life cycles than casual or women's
wear, since they are usually designed with more traditional and classic lines. These
attributes make them less dependent on fashion and fad, which in turn permits mass
production and important economies of scale. Thus, the market is usually controlled
by fewer and larger manufacturers with mass production technology, mass
distribution and a strategy concentrated in lower prices.
This contrasts with the low volume, direct sales, personal service and higher
prices which have characterized tailor shops for decades. In fact, with technological
change, lower costs could be achieved by larger manufacturers. Also, with the
emergence of larger firms, the production and retailing functions -once unified under
the responsibility of the tailor- were separated into two different organisations with
radically different objectives. This has had important implications in their distribution
process and marketing strategies. The manufacturer faced the challenge of having to
develop a mass distribution strategy which could compete with the high quality
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service of tailor shops. The strategy chosen by MONTECRISTO and DORSAY has















In this case two companies will be analysed, Confecciones Paris C.A. which
from now on will be called by its trademark: MONTECRISTO, and RORI
Intemacional. Both have specialized in the production of men's suits for over 25
years, nevertheless they claim that they do not compete with each other since they
have developed strategies to serve "radically different" target markets. According to
the general manager of MONTECRISTO:
"We do not have competition. RORI and DORSAY are not my
competitors because they go to a different consumer. Dorsay's
suits are aimed to the lower income consumer and RORI's high
prices only appeal to the consumer who can afford it Our
target is the middle income consumer"
Even though MONTECRISTO's management insists on the issue of lack of
competition for their products, this could be a distorted perception which results from
the following elements. They are currently facing a seller's market situation where it
is very difficult for them to totally satisfy the existing demand for their products.'.
Furthermore, after they integrated forward they have been concentrating their efforts
on increasing sales through their totally owned stores where they sell only their
products. This highly controlled structure has induced them to concentrate on
5 They are evaluating an expansion plan project.
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efficiency, a dangerous inward looking strategy, without worrying about what
competition is doing6. According to management they "see" themselves as
manufacturers, while retailing is something they do because they have to have a
"place" to sell their products. Their major task: is to produce "a good value product
which would sell by itself'. Thus, they have not "seen" competition and even though
they have been constantly increasing sales, the question of what would have
happened if they had been more aggressive, remains unanswered.
Both companies have integrated forward into retailing with two different
strategies. MONTECRISTO was the fIrst? when management decided in 1984 to stop
selling to the 100 retailers which carried their products, while opening four
hierarchically controlled and totally owned stores. The number of outlets has now
been increased to 30 and the policy has been to "sell to the consumer at wholesale
prices", meaning 50% below the recommended retail price8. RORI on the other hand
has also integrated into retailing by opening three stores which operate as profit
centers. As opposed to MONTECRISTO, RORI continues to sell to independent
retailers. This arrangement has been possible since RORI does not compete in price
with its clients.
MONTECRISTO started operations in 1956 with three main products:
trousers, jackets and suits. Nevertheless, since 1984, after management decided to
integrate vertically into retailing, the company began a product diversification
strategy in order to be able to offer consumers the required variety of garments and
accessories in their hierarchically controlled retail outlets. To achieve this objective,
they diversified into shirts, ties and dinner-jackets. Additionally they began to
subcontract to smaller manufacturers the production of underwear, flannel shirts and
belts.
An interesting element of the company's marketing strategy has been to use




One of the elements mentioned by management, which was seen as a "relief" after
integrating forward, was the fact that they did not have to "listen any more" to the retailers
demands regarding fashion, colours, competition, etc.
DORSAY followed and immediately after, RORI.
In Venezuela the recommended retailing price "Precio de Venta a1 Publico" (P.V.P.) is set
and stamped by manufacturers.
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or by concessionaires. They have historically invested large sums in advertising to
create brand awareness. The success of this strategy was finally confirmed after
integration took place when management realised that consumers "looked" for the
MONTECRISTO brand and were willing to travel in order to buy their products in
their totally owned stores which are also named MONTECRISTO. These stores can
only sell MONTECRISTO products and within the same strategy, MONTECRISTO
products can only be sold in stores which are hierarchically controlled.
RORI, on the other hand, started operations in 1964 manufacturing "light"
products like shirts, swimming costumes and casual jackets. Eight years later, in
1972, they began production of men's suits. During the 80's, RORI decided to
diversify into women's wear and casual wear for both sexes.
Contrary to MONTECRISTO, RORI has followed a strategy by which they
use different names for a diverse variety of products which are targeted to specific
market segments. Thus, they use Christian Dior as a name for top quality suits,
Phillip Laurent for a less demanding market segment and JEUNESSE for casual
wear.
5.1.3. Channel Structure
The channel structure of both companies has been characterized by a lack of
wholesalers9 and a traditional direct relationship with retailers.(Figure 1 and Figure
3)
When they started operations manufacturers of men's suits were competing
for the scarce retailing services available in a situation in which large economies
scale pushed them to produce more. Retailers made good use of this circumstance and
benefited from their spatial monopoly demanding longer and better credit terms,
Manufacturers were desperate to sell more and began to compete by giving longer
financing periods to retailers. The following quote from a RORI manager illustrates
what happened:
"We do not know who started but we ended up with an average
of 240 days in pending collections, retailers just did not want
to pay, they were spoiled by us, the big manufacturers."
9 They have used wholesalers very seldom and for no more than an average of 5% of sales,
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The direct contact with manufacturers who were competing fiercely with each
other, was used by retailers to extract monopoly profits at the expense of
manufacturers margins. Thus integrating the wholesaling function and eliminating the
possibility of using a middleman (who has less degrees of freedom to negotiate prices
and conditions with retailers), automatically increased the manufacturers speed of
reaction to competitors price changes (in this case better credit terms to retailers)
which ended in a war between manufacturers to please the retailer. (Coughlan, 1985).
FIGURE 1
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MONTECRISTO decided to integrate into retailing in 1984 when
management stopped selling to their 100 clients and opened four totally owned stores
through which they sold 50% less than the previous year. By 1986 they had 15 stores
and 20 by 1987. In 1990, seven years after following the total integration strategy,
MONTECRISTO owned 30 stores. According to management it took them only three
years to reach the same sales volume they had before integrating:
"We had to face a fall of over 50% in sales volume the year we
decided to integrate but let me tell you, we felt a lot better with
the cash flow. We decided to aggressively collect our pending
receivables in order to finance our new stores. Besides, it took
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us only three years to reach the same sales volume. By 1987,
three years after integrating and with 20 stores operating we
were selling the same volumes as in 1984, before integration".
It is important to stress that it is management's perception that, regardless of
the costs they had to take the step to integrate forward if they were to "survive".
When management was asked about the high setting-up costs for their stores the
answer was:
" We had over 250 million bolivares lOin accounts receivables
and we calculated that to open a store would cost us between
10 and 15 million bolivares depending on the area. We could
open 20 stores with the money our clients had from us"
It is important to stress the fact that for management, the drastic decision of
decreasing the number or retailers from over 100 to 3 was perceived as a viable
alternative since 65% of their sales were (and still are) concentrated in two major
cities: Caracas and Maracay. The first 4 stores were opened there and they
recuperated sales volume very quickly.
"People looked for us, they had known us for a long time, they
wanted MONTECRISTO. With only one store in Maracay
during the first year we couldreach 60% of the sales we used
to have in the area."
When MONTECRISTO management was asked for the reasons for
integrating they answered:
" We got tired of the abusive conduct of retailers, they did not
pay us, when competition gave them 90 days credit we gave
them 120, then 150 and we ended up with over 360 days credit,
it was crazy. We decided to sell directly to consumers and
havinggotten rid of the financing problem, we could at the
. d . 11 "same time, re uce our pnces .
RORI's channel structure also suffered important changes when they faced the
same problems with retailers as well as having to respond to competitors integrating
moves. MONTECRISTO was gradually opening stores where they started selling at
10
11
$ 175 million at the official exchange rate.
In order to be able to maintain such long credit terms, MONTECRISTO had to keep
increasing prices to retailers.
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dramatically lower prices, 50% bellow market price. After MONTECRISTO decided
to integrate, it triggered a chain of reaction among competitors.
DORSAY, who had been a company which specialized in the retail business,
decided to integrate backwards into production, also with the strategy of selling at
lower prices. RORI decided to follow a different strategy. Since everybody was
integrating they saw an opportunity in continuing to do business with retailers since
now, with less suppliers, the suppliers market structure was less competitive. Thus,
RORI opened only 4 retail outlets, managed as profit centers and with the intention of
breaking their high dependability on retailers and reaching the consumer directly. In
other words, RORI's decision to integrate forward has more of the traditional
elements mentioned at the beginning of the case than MONTECRISTO's.
In the words of RORI's general manager:
"We wanted to reach the consumer directly, follow his taste
and needs, and serve him better. We also wanted to develop
our own brand image. On the other hand we did not want to
get into the same costly financial game with retailers, we
wanted to have an alternative channel in which to sell our
products".
RORI sells 30% of their annual sales through their stores 12, while the rest is
channeled through former clients. This parallel channel structure has allowed RORI
to enter the retailing business without sacrificing economies of scope, In other words,
since their stores operate as profit centers, they sell a wide variety of products from
other manufacturers.
12 As in the case of MONTECRISTO, RORI has a high sales concentration in major cities. For
example, Caracas represents 50% of its market
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FIGURE 3
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5.1.4. Channel Functions: Who Performs What?
One interesting characteristic which stands out in this case is the close
relationship which both manufacturers have maintained with retailers.
MONTECRISTO has never used wholesalers, and RORI only sometimes, to reach
very small retailers.
About this, MONTECRISTO's general manager stated:
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"Only once we considered the possibility of selling to
wholesalers. That was when we were thinking of opening one
distributor of our own, only for tax. purposes. We finally
decided not to do it We think that using wholesalers would
imply an unnecessary price increase. Why should we pay
somebody else to do what we can do better and cheaper?"
The wholesaling function, being highly "contestable"13 (Baumol, 1982) has
always been controlled by manufacturers. Both companies interviewed expressed
that, with little investment, they could reach retailers directly instead of having to rely
on independent wholesalers. Before the wave of integration, they used a sales force of
5 to 10 salesmen, who visited, with an average frequency of 3 weeks, around 150
retailers located in the most important cities of the country.
"We have always preferred to have our own salesforce.
Middlemen would increase needlessly the distribution
costs...With inflation the middlemen is bound to disappear"
An analysis of who Performs which function permits an evaluation of their
relative strategic significance to the manufacturer. According to the information
given by both companies, most functions have always been highly controlled by the
manufacturer.




WHO PERFORMED CHANNEL FUNCTIONS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF






































After integrating, all functions, except transportation, were assumed by
MONTECRISTO for 100% of sales and by RORI for 30% of sales.
5.2. The Analysis
Some important variables about market and channel structure have been
pointed out, as well as the strategies followed and decisions made by the companies
interviewed. Now, we will present an analysis of channel structure evolution
according to existing approaches and, while identifing the theoretical gaps, an
alternative explanation will be given using the theoretical framework.
5.2.1. Existing Approaches
According to the theories analysed in the literature review, the following
alternative structures should be expected as far as channel design is concerned.
According to Aspinwall's model -which is based in the evaluation of five
product characteristics to determine the "optimal" channel structure- men's ready to
wear suits are located between the red and orange products (Table 4). In other words,
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they should have a rather long channel structure with the use of middlemen for
smaller shops, and direct shipment from the factory to larger department stores.
TABLE 4





RED GOODS ORANGE GOODS MEN'S
REPLACEMENT RATE mGH MED MED
GROSS MARGIN LOW MED MED
LEVEL OF ADJUSTMENT· LOW MED LOW
TIME OF CONSUMPTION LOW MED MED
SEARCHING TIME LOW MED MED
TYPE OF CHANNEL Long Med. Med.
* Number of services applied to goods in order to meet the exact needs of the
consumer.
Nevertheless, neither of the companies interviewed favoured the use of
middlemen, as long channels may call for. They have always served retailers directly,
and furthermore, contrary to what Stigler's functional theory would predict14, they
have been re-orienting their strategy towards a more hierarchically controlled
channel.
Also, according to Williamson's transaction cost theory, managers should be
favouring less controlled channels. Furthermore according to the theory, retailers
should not be totally integrated since there would be high losses in economies of
scope, which would not be compensated by the gains in integration (Table 4).
14 Looser organisational forms as the industry matures.
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TABLE 4
VARIABLES WIllCH IMPACT VERTICAL INTEGRATION INTO
DISTRIBUTION: A TRANSACTION COST APPROACH BY FUNCTIONS.




a) Consumers ++ 0/+ 0/+ Unfavourable
b) Retailers + 0 0 Unfavourable
COLLECTION + 0 0 Unfavourable
TRANSPORTATION 0 0 0 Unfavourable
STORAGE
FINANCING TO:
a) Retailers ? 0 0 ?
MERCHANDISING ? ? + ?
RISK BEARING 0 + + Favourable
PROMOTION 0 0 0 Unfavourable
INFORMAnON 0 ? ? ?




? =difficult to assess with given variables.
* or scale.
** sale and post-sales services.
The following quote from Oliver Williamson evaluating integration decisions
reported by Alfred Chandler summarizes the transaction cost argument:
"...thus forward vertical integration is never observed if
externalities and asset specificity are negligible, or if it does
occur it is mistaken and will be eventually undone. There
simply are no governance or measurement purposes to be
served in those circumstances." (Williamson,O. 1985. p.113)
And in the next paragraph he specifically argues:
"Integration into [mal sales and service is mainly observed for
consumer and producer durables where considerable
knowledge is imparted at point of sale and specialized follow-
up on service is required."
Neither of the characteristics mentioned by Williamson are met by the
companies in this case but, in spite of that, they have both integrated into retailing.
Could it then be argued, along the lines of Williamson (1985), that by vertically
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. . th . h d . 15integrating e compames ave rna e a mistake ? The answer is may be, but as long
as management believe (as they do) that it has been a successful strategic move and
that they are much better-off now than before integrating, a deeper understanding of
their behaviour is required. In the following sections an evaluation of the elements
which have impacted management decisions will be presented.
5.2.2. Proposed Approach
We will now present an alternative view guided by the following questions
which remain unanswered.
* What are the determinants of management choice between "making" or
"buying" a specific channel function?
* Why did they integrate forward into retailing if, according to traditional
marketing theory and transaction cost theory, looser forms of organisation should be
found in this industry?
* Why did MONTECRISTO and RORI not use wholesalers and always
preferred to serve directly the client-retailer?
* Why did manufacturers end up giving such lax credit terms?
* Why competition among manufacturers was centered on longer credit terms
instead of lower prices to retailers?
* Why did they not spin-off the financing function?
* Why could retailers extract monopoly rents from manufacturers?
* Why, with the apparel industry reaching maturity, are MONTECRISTO and
RORI integrating into retailing if, according to the industry life cycle theory,
(Stigler,1957) (Mallen,1973) the opposite should be occurring?
15 See the concept of "mistaken integration" in Williamson, O. (1985), The Economic
Institutions ofCapitalism, First Paper Back Edition, Free Press, p.lll.. Also in Chapter 1,see
Williamson's model
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i) Barriers to Entry
One of the reasons for controlling distribution could be the decision to
increase barriers to entry in order to deter competition. In fact, with the recent wave
of forward integration, other manufacturers, which have not follow such strategy, feel
that lacking totally owned stores is hampering their competitiveness. The general
manager from Willson Athletics, a medium size apparel manufacturer for men's
sports wear and underwear, believed that they had made a historical mistake not
developing their own distribution network:
"Our lines do not sell well because retailers do not understand
the concept When we develop a beach line, it is because we
have made the effort to design different garments which can be
matched together. If retailers do not display the merchandise
properly, or if they do not inform the consumer, all the effort is
lost All the big manufacturers have their own stores and we
can not sell where the big sales are. Our distribution strategy
has been a mistake."
Willson Athletics was sold to a Colombian apparel corporation after new
economic policies were taken in 1989 and the apparel industry began to face foreign
competition.
Some manufacturers believe that barriers to entry in distribution have been
developing very fast since MONTECRISTO lead the vertical integration wave in
1985. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that drastic decisions such as
MONTECRISTO's, by which it decided to stop selling to independent retailers
regardless of the risk involved, looks more like a desperate response to a hostile
environment than a strategic move to build barriers to entry.
But as it has been found in other industries,(Cases 3, 4 and 5), since
organising distribution requires the harmonization of, usually conflicting objectives,
to design an efficient channel may imply to build barriers to entry.
In the following sections some of this conflicting objectives will be discussed.
134
Ii) Lack of Competitive Markets for Distribution Functions
For manufacturers the possibility to grow through mass production16 implied
that they needed to set up a faster and denser distribution network for which they
required more retail outlets than could be supplied by the market. Consequently both
companies dedicated important resources to develop such a specialized market:
"During the 70's we decided that, in order to grow, we had to
finance retailers. In those days RORI would take a client with
potential and would finance him with an inventory which the
client would never be able to buy himself. In this manner
RORI penetrated the market"
"We used to convince shop owners to carry MONTECRISTO
products, even if they were commercializing women's and
children's clothes, the idea was to leave them the garments on
consignment and wait until they sold them. In this manner we
used to finance all their inventories with the hope that they
would start carrying only our products17".
Therefore to take over the financing function was a strategic decision which
both companies adopted in order to develop specialized markets for retailing.
Following the same argument, one of the reasons why they did not use independent
wholesalers was because manufacturers had better access to loan markets.
"In order to finance our clients we used to get the credit form
the banks. We have always had a very good and healthy
relationship with them."
The other reason was that the wholesalers market was highly inefficient, since




Mass production in this product line is possible due to its less dependability on fashion and
fad.
This was the same strategy followed by POLAR (see the beer case) when they dedicated
large resources to finance inventories for bars in order to develop specialized markets for
retailing,
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iii) Monopolistic Power Enjoyed by Existent Suppliers: A
Retailer's Market
For all practical purposes the retailer became the relevant client and all
manufacturers efforts were aimed to please them. The reasons for this conduct are to
be found in the relative scarcity of specialised stores18 usually small, family owned
shops with very little managerial skills where the owner can influence the consumer
buying decision.
The consumer was important to the manufacturer because he could buy more,
but he would do it only if prices were lower, but, paradoxically, retailers'
monopolistic behaviour frustrated manufacturers efforts in lowering prices. The
longer the credit terms imposed by retailers, the higher the prices manufacturers had
to set for their products in order to finance retailers.
MONTECRISTO's management decided to integrate forward because they
were facing a difficult cash flow situation due to the previously mentioned lax credit
policy. Their accounts receivables averaged over 360 days and still retailers thought
that they deserved better treatment Until the very last moment they expressed their
discontent with MONTECRISTO's "pushy" attitude of trying to make them pay.
MONTECRISTO on the other hand decided that they could not continue with the
"ridiculous" credit terms they had been giving to their clients. This practice had
started during the 70's when manufacturers pushed sales to increase market share and
when the financing function became the most important competitive tool.
Retailers enjoyed their spatial monopoly and benefited highly by
appropriating the production surplus as would be expected in a situation of a retailer's
market19. Thus, even though MONTECRISTO had never thought of opening its own
stores -and that is why they tried to grow by extending better credit terms to clients-
they realized that it had become cheaper to integrate than to continue financing




According to the companies interviewed there have never been more than 150 retailers in
the whole country which would sell men's suits.
For the definition of a retailer's market see Chapter 3.
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Iv) Financial Market Imperfections
Imperfections in the loan market lead the distribution system to generate the
financing it needs through an internal credit market (Chapters 1 and 4). These
imperfections are the consequence of asymmetric information, moral hazard and
adverse selection problems which determine that the loan market reaches equilibrium
while in a situation of credit rationing (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). This rationing is what
induces channel members to provide the financing internally, especially when they
enjoy a cost advantage due to better access to information regarding business risk
assessment Since this is intra-channel financing -credit given among channel
members and not to consumers- this can also result in a cost advantage for the
channel member from better ex-post credit control.
In the case of RORI and MONTECRISTO, both companies decided to
finance retailers as a strategy for growth. This is, more than likely, due to the fact that
they enjoyed informational and control advantages when compared to banks in
extending credit to retailers. They probably had a cost advantage which they would
have been able to benefit from, nevertheless retailers, by exerting spatial monopoly,
appropriated all the rents20.
v) Losses in Economies of Scale And Scope
The costs generated by losses in economies of scale and scope was the major
consideration made by managers in MONTECRISTO before deciding to integrate:
"We were trapped since we knew that we could not escape
from the vicious circle we had started. They would not pay and
they knew that we did not have any alternative, we were
loosing money, and the more we sold the more we lost On the
other hand we could not implement the low price strategy we
had defined. By 1984 we evaluated the situation which had
deteriorated so much that we realized that we could be better
off by opening our own stores."
20 See Chapter 3 Financing; the Forgotten Function in Distribution.
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5.2.3. Final Comments
After having made the analysis in tenus of the costs and benefits of
integration for the companies interviewed, it seems that they have been generally
successful. Nevertheless, the high costs of setting up stores and the high losses on
economies of scale and scope are difficult to evaluate in the case of MONTECRISTO
since the comparison is always made only with the desperate situation that existed
before integrating. In fact, other less costly alternatives, such as franchise
agreements; have not been evaluated by management, in spite of the fact they would
allow them to have a higher presence in the market with considerably lower set-up
costs.
An obsessive preoccupation with control and lack of confidence in contracts
are the two factors which are mentioned by management as the main reasons not to




CASE 3. VERTICAL CONTROL IN THE BEER INDUSTRY:
Building Channels May Imply Building Walls
Introduction
This case will deal with the evolution of distribution strategy in the beer
industry in Venezuela. Forty years ago the two companies interviewed competed
strongly for market leadership. The performance of these companies show a
dramatically different evolution: POLAR, the success story, now controls 85% of the
market, whereas CERVECERA NACIONAL, after almost facing bankruptcy, is now
being taken over by POLAR.
The design and development of an efficient distribution network has been one
of POLAR's most powerful competitive tools; and nowadays it is considered an
important barrier to entry by local investors and foreign competition1. The crucial
element was to set up a network which would guarantee product freshness and
availability.
These two objectives triggered a strategy of heavy reliance on the distribution
system and required the development of an extensive network, which would keep the
product in good condition. At the end of the day, the distribution system became
synonymous to quality and competitive advantage.
Thus, what makes this case interesting is the analysis of how two companies
in the same industry, facing equal market imperfections, adopted different strategies
and how their behaviour has influenced the outcome. Moreover, it shows clearly how
managemet objectives in terms of quality and competitiveness may imply building
structures which in the end are perceived by other as barriers to entry, but which are
in fact just the sunk costs of necessary investments.
1 Heineken, the onlyforeign beer company which has set up local production and distribution
in Venezuela, could not compete with Polar and decided to leave the countryin 1968 after 15
years of operations. Anhausser Bush has expressed its reservations regardingthe Venezuelan




The beer industry is one of the oldest in the country. Venezuela ranks eighth
in world beer consumption per head, showing an average annual rate of 80 litres2.
Before 1893, when Cervecera NACIONAL started operations, only imported beer
was sold in the Country. By 1940, when Cerverceria POLAR entered the market and
opened its first plant, there were over ten different brands competing for the ale
market while Cervecera NACIONAL enjoyed leadership. Nowadays, the industry
shows a radically different picture, where POLAR dominates the market within a
highly concentrated structure (Table 1).
Table 1
INDUSTRY SALES VOLUME AND MARKET SHARE
1990










In fact, in spite of the fierce competition both companies have experienced for
over twenty years, they managed to maintain a very similar market share during the
sixties and until the beginning of the 1970's.
During the second half of the 1970's, when the beer market expanded
vigorously due to the first Venezuelan oil boom (Table 2), POLAR reacted very
quickly and began an important expansion plan which was ready to meet demand
increases by the second half of the seventies. NACIONAL, on the other hand,
miscalculated the importance of the boom in demand, and when they finally decided
to increase production capacity, POLAR was already controlling 82.1% of the market
by boosting its sales by 500 million litres, (industry sales increased by the same
2 In 1989 the average consumption per head fell to 63 Hues due to the macroeconomic
adjustment program adopted by the government which boosted inflation to 80% and induced
a 10% drop in GNP.
140
amount during the same period). (Table 2). When NACIONAL started operating its
new plant in 1982, it had to face a national economic depression and demand
contraction. Heavily indebted in dollars, the company's interest payments increased
with the successive local currency devaluations. Within this set of circumstances
NACIONAL could not recuperate and its market share fell from 40% in 1965, to 3%
in 1983.
TABLE 2
BEER INDUSTRY SALES IN MILLIONS OF LITRES AND LEADERS
MARKET SHARE
YEAR INDUSTRY POLAR POLAR NACIONAL
SALES SALES SHARE SHARE
1965 450 190 42.2% 40.0%
1970 545 270 49.5% 31.0%
1975 600 395 65.8% 25.0%
1980 1120 920 82.1%
1983* 1150 1080 93.9% 3.0%
1985 900 800 88.8%
1988 1480 1220 82.4%
1990 1210 1010 83.5% 12.0%
* Year in which the distribution agreement between POLAR and
NACIONAL was signed.
Source: Asociation of Beer Manufacturers Report
Another issue which should be mentioned in order to understand the evolution
of the competitive behaviour of both companies is that by 1983, and after loosing its
market share, NACIONAL was facing a positioning problem which management
failed to evaluate properly. Most consumers were favouring POLAR for its "better"
quality and taste3. The challenge for NACIONAL's management was, therefore, to
revise their marketing mix and strategy. Was there a market for two lagers? And if
there was, what was NACIONAL's differentiation strategy? What was its competitive
advantage? Should they segment the market and launch a different product? Should
they keep the product unchanged but lower the price in order to increase demand?
Why would they expect to sell a product at the same price as the competition when
consumers thought its quality was lower? Instead of trying to answer these questions
management focussed its attention on the barriers to entry issue. They believed that
"the only way" to recuperate market share, was to get into POLAR's distribution
network. They stressed the fact that POLAR's sunk costs were immense, and that they
3 Market research studies showed that better quality was a function of good taste plus uniform
flavour. POlAR spent important resources on water treatment in order to avoid the risk of
any alterations in flavour produced by the composition of the water.
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would never be able to match up POLAR's investments in distribution. This
argument, though undisputable, was only partly true since it failed to question other
strategic elements, like those mentioned above, which could be changed by
management
Nevertheless, they approached POLAR with the objective of reaching a
distribution agreement After long discussions they decided to found a new
distribution company, 30% owned by NACIONAL and totally managed by POLAR,
with the main objective of boosting NACIONAL's market share up to 25% in a
period no longer than 10 years. Thus, since NACIONAL was facing bankruptcy,
POLAR agreed to help them out of the crisis and avoid potential monopoly
regulations'I. Thus, since 1983, when POLAR's market share reached 93.9% (Table
2) while NACIONAL's plunged to 3%, both companies have been operating under an
agreement by which all products are distributed through POLAR's distribution
network.
Nevertheless, this agreement had negative consequences for both companies.
On the one hand retailers and consumers were disappointed when POLAR's
salesforce began to "push" strongly to sell NACIONAL. Since nobody wanted the
product, salesmen asked for a minimum of "lout of 12" -in other words one case of
NACIONAL beer for any order of twelve cases of beer. This "pushy" behaviour was
also adopted by retailers who forced consumers to buy NACIONAL, hiding the cases
of POLAR. In this way, consumers felt betrayed by POLAR and retailers felt that for
the first time, their interests were incompatible with those of the leader in the beer
market
As far as NACIONAL is concerned, the negative impact of the agreement had
to do with the fact that they lost all freedom to decide what was best for their brand
distribution. For example, even though management felt that they could use some
promotions to increase sales in certain areas, POLAR would not accept it because it
was against their "tradition" and that would "spoil" their salesforce.
Thus, after that 1983 agreement in Venezuela, to talk about channels in the
beer industry, means to talk about POLAR's distribution network, as 95% of the beer
4 There is no current monopoly legislation in Venezuela. Nevertheless, for more than ten
years different versions of Monopoly laws have been discussed, revised and changed in
Congress, without reaching political consensus.
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produced in the country reaches the consumer through their channels5. In December
1990, after a takeover attempt lead by a financial group, POLAR decided to buy
NACIONAL shares, supposedly, fearing foreign competition. This acquisition has
been possible due to the lack of local legislation on mergers, acquisitions and
monopolistic behaviour.
6.1.2. The Companies Interviewed
Cerveceria POLAR C.A. started operations in 19396, with a product that
consumers found too bitter. Three years later, after changing the formula with the
help of beer masters hired from Germany, the situation changed and the beer started
selling. The first plant was situated in Antimano (near Caracas) and now the
Company owns four breweries in different regions of the country: Caracas,
Maracaibo, Puerto La Cruz and San Joaquin. It is now one of the biggest and most
successful private companies in the country and remains family owned.
Cervecera NACIONAL, publicly owned, and recently acquired by POLAR is
one of the oldest Venezuelan companies and is about to reach its 100 birthday. It
started operations in 1893 with a production of 80,000 litres" per month which was




The other 5% is produced and distnbuted by REGIONAL, which only reaches the western
region of the country.
Forty six years after CERVECERA NACIONAL was founded.
Today CERVECERA NACIONAL has a monthly production of 11.5 million litres.
143
name changes8, as well as mergers and acquisitions9. Nevertheless the most
important decision had to be taken by management in 1983:
"In those days we were practically bankrupt and we had no
other choice but to design, with POLAR, a rescue plan which
was defmed in the following terms: we kept our products but
we had to delegate to POLAR their distribution in order to
guarantee the recovery of this company in a period of 10 years.
In other words this company had a sales department until 1982.
From then on, POLAR took the responsibility for the
distribution of our products. You see, they were as interested
as we were since they did not want to become a monopoly."
This quotations from NACIONAL's management shows how their survival
plan was based on getting into POLAR's distribution network. As it has been said
above, using POLAR's distribution facilities did not solve the positioning problem
which they were facing.
6.1.3. Channel Structure
Currently, 95% of the beer sold in the country is distributed through POLAR's
sales network which reaches 111,355 points of sale (TABLE 3). This situation has
8
9
CARACAS, ZULIA, MAIQUETIA and NACIONAL are some of the different brand
names used for their regular lager beer. They belong to companies which have merged over
time in order to form what NACIONAL is today. This diversity of names, which correspond
to different regions and cities, confused the consumer a little and POLAR, taking advantage
of it, started advertising its beer with its famous slogan: "Each region has its name, but in
Venezuela, the beer is POLAR".
Cerveceria Caracas, Cerveceria Zulia, CerveceriaUnion are some of them. Even Cerveceria
Heineken was bought by them when the Deutsche company decided to leave the country in
1968.
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been the result of 43 years of fierce competition and 7 years of imposed
cooperation10 in order to keep CERVECERA NACIONAL alive11.
One of the most remarkable characteristics of this channel structure is that
42% of the beer sold in the country is through what has been called the informal
retailing chain, which is by far the most important point of sale for the industry.
(Bars come second with 20% of sales). The reason for such denomination is because
they are not regular retail outlets, they only sell beer and they do not have a license to
sell liquor. They consist of 35,105 family houses located in marginal, lower class
areas, in which the owner of the house (usually a woman alone with her children)
keeps cold beer in the refrigerator for sale. Through this mechanism, almost 500
million litres of beer are annually sold. The reason for the existence of this peculiar
system is a combination of two factors: they offer much lower prices than bars (25%
less since they do not have any overhead costs.) and they are highly convenient
(availability) to consumers who live in marginal areas. The salesman does not visit
them individually, he stops in a specific pre-established area and the informal retailer
comes to buy a few cases each time and takes them to hislher home. (Visits are
normally twice a week). It has been calculated that in each stop the salesman makes
in these areas they serve approximately 10 houses.
10
11
The plan was to bring NACIONAL's market share from 3% to 15% in 10 years. In order to
achieve this goal, POLAR's salesforce (owner drivers) were instructed by man~ement t.o
sell one case of NACIONAL beer for every six cases of beer demanded by clients. This
provoked severe complaints from retailers who did not want the product, and an adverse
reaction from consumers who were forcedby retailers to buy it.
Due to this fact it was easier to find information from POlAR where management was more
willing to answer the questions in the interviews.
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TABLE 3
NUMBER OF OUTLETS AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES
TYPE OF OUTLET No OF OUTLETS % OF SALES
Supermarket Chains 126 2.00
Independent Supennkts. 1,400 1.00
Medium Grocery Shops 11,070 9.00
Small Grocery Shops 26,372 8.00
Bars 18,393 20.00
Family Houses 35,104 42.00
Liquor Stores 5,000 5.00
Other 13,890 13.00
TOTAL 111,355 100.00
SOURCE: POLAR's marketing denartment,
The changes in channel design were always lead by POLAR, and usually
NACIONAL would follow after POLAR had proven relative successful.
When NACIONAL began operating almost 100 years ago, they sold beer in
barrels with a very restricted distribution coverage: mainly to Caracas, the capital
city, and a few other major cities. Later they changed to bottles and started to use
independent distributors.
POLAR entered into the industry scene in 1940 and decided to position its
lager product in direct competition with NACIONAL's, who was the leader. In those
days both companies had a mixed distribution system with an important percentage
of sales channelled through exclusive independent distributors12, while the rest was
sold by a hierarchically controlled salesforce (Figure 1). There is no specific
information available about the number of retailers that were visited by them but the
following quote from a former POLAR salesman can give a flavour of how things
were:
"Things were very different in those days, the company had to
use independent distributors to cover as much area as possible.
I used to work in sales, we worked very hard and we got paid
on commission. You know, I remember how we felt in those
days, it was like being in a war, we had to win, we had to get
CERVECERA out, we had to gain as many retailers as we
could. We used to go everywhere, to all the small towns and
visit everybody, many times we had to pay mule owners to
12 They could not sell competitive products.
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deliver the beer to locations were we could not get with the
truck. In those cases we used to put the beer bottles in big bags
and hang them over the mules."
Road infrastructure was weak, transportation units were insufficient and
licensed retail outlets were also scarce. The combination of these adverse elements
for distributing products became an obstacle to growth and management understood
that overcoming them somehow was a requirement for success. In the words of
another former salesman:
"You would not believe this, but I remembered how we used to
bring with us, a whole bunch of liquor licenses and give them
to small unlicensed retail stores so that they could become our
clients."
During the 1950's POLAR decided to completely internalize the functions that
were being performed by independent distributors (Figure 2). NACIONAL made the
same move later on, but with a less aggressive strategy, it kept some independent
distributors for certain areas.
FIGURE 1
DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL STRUCTURE IN THE 1940'S














* NACIONAL kept independent distributors.
Later on, during the sixties, a new figure appeared in the structure: the owner
driver. They are now almost 2000 independent salesmen who own their trucks13, .
work under a exclusivity contract with the manufacturers, and have assigned routes
by the sales department Even though they are independent salesmen, for all practical
purposes, in POLAR's case, they are "company men". They attend regular sales
meetings, they follow the company rules and they maintain a close relationship with
the company.
13 POLAR financed all its owner drivers, NACIONAL did it only partially.
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FIG 3
CURRENT DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL STRUCTURE
MANUFACTURERS: 8 (*) OWNER
POLAR 4 PLANTS ~ DISTRIBUTION --+ 80 (*) t--..4'" DRIVERS
NACIONAL 2 PLANTS COMPANIES WAREHOUSES 2000
'-~I--'--.....J
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Channel functions have been performed by different agents since the
194O'sI4. The assignment of channel responsibilities by manufacturers have been
made according to their relative strategic importance in different periods.
Three periods have been identified (Table 4). During the first period functions
were shared by manufacturers and independent distributors. Sales departments were
not very well organized, and neither the routes nor the geographical areas were well
specified for the salesforce. They were like two systems working in parallel.
Independent distributors worked very much on their own and had little manufacturer
control over their relationship with retailers. These independent distributors were like
small wholesalers who also sold other products like canned food and nonalcoholic
drinks to stores. The second period is characterized by a more hierarchically
controlled channel in which manufacturers decided to reach retailers directly,
assuming the responsibility of all functions. For POLAR, the integration was total,
while NACIONAL decided to go direct for only a little over 50% of its sales. During
the next period (Table 4) an effort to decentralized some functions was pursued and
14 Even though NACIONAL had been in the market long before this date, 1940 will be the
starting date taken for comparative analysis since POLAR began operations that year.
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FUNCTIONS PERIOD I PERIOD U* PERIOD ill
1940-1950 1951-1961 1961 on.
* During this Period NACIONAL maintained an important part of its distribution in
the hands of independent distributors.
(1) The financing given is to buy trucks and not for inventory accumulation. All sales
are made in cash.
(2) POLAR always has borne the risk of spoiled products, NACIONAL on the
contrary did not control this function.
(3) Only NACIONAL. But after the distribution agreement in 1983 no further
promotions have been given.
I.D.:Independent Distributor.
MAN.: Manufacturer.(Hierarchically controlled personnel)
0.0.: Owner Driver.
RET.: Retailer.
T.C.: Independent Transportation Company.
It is important to stress the fact that during the third period, manufacturers do
not provide financing to retailers (Table 4). All manufacturers sales are made at the
80 warehouses (Figure 2) where owner drivers load their trucks and pay in cash. In
the same manner, owner drivers do not usually finance retailers. When they do it,
they run the financial risk without any cooperation from the manufacturer. We shall
see the reasons for this behaviour in the next section.
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6.2. The Analysis
In the following section an analysis of management decisions will be
presented. Firstly, we evaluate the existing theories and compare them with the data
from the beer industry. Secondly, we offer an alternative explanation for management
behaviour based upon the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3.
6.2.1. Existing Approaches
One of the flrst comments which can be made in the analysis is that the
periods described in Table 4 fit very well with Stigler's description (industry life
cycle), according to which firms are supposed to vertically integrate or disintegrate
into different functions15. As Stigler predicts, the degree of integration of functions
will depend on the size of the industry. When the beer industry was growing firms
integrated forward into channel functions (period 2) since, according to Stigler's
view, most functions will have decreasing returns 16. Later on, when the industry
reached maturity, firms hived-off their functions and let specialists benefit from
economies of scale. It should be pointed out though that, in this case, when
companies decided to hive-off their functions, they tried, at the same time, to keep
control over them. The way this problem was solved was with the introduction of the
figure of the owner driver, who is free to decide when to finance retailers, but is
heavily controlled for the functions which would conflict with corporate
goals 17.Beer is a consumer product with some degree of perishability which,





According to Stigler, firms should be viewed as performing a set of functions. He breaks the
Total Average Cost curve of the firm (TAC) into functions (purchasing, transforming,
selling) instead of factors (capital, land, labour). Thus, TAC would be the sum of functional
average cost curves: some of them with increasing returns (downward sloping), others with
decreasing returns (upward sloping) while the TAC would present its conventional Ll-shape.
According to this approach firms would tend to integrate those functions with decreasing
returns, (usually in young industries), since nobody else would perform them. Those with
increasing returns will be left to market specialists who can benefit from economies of scale.
POlAR owner drivers have well specified jobs. It is the responsibility of the sales manager
to define for each of them the following: sales volumes, routes, prices and their participation
in the special events which have been chosen by POlAR to enhance corporate image (e.g.
sports events).
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channels with a significant use of middlemen. According to Aspinwall's model (Table
5), beer characteristics are similar to those of red products. Long and indirect
channels are most appropriate for "red" goods, since these goods have low margins,
require intensive distribution and little customization.
Nevertheless, as it has been described, POLAR and NACIONAL have
undertaken different channel design over the past 50 years and only at the beginning
were independent wholesalers used for channel functions (Table 4, Period D. Since
the 1950's onwards, manufacturers have been increasingly controlling functions.
TABLES
COLOUR CLASSIFICATION FOR BEER ACCORDING TO ASPINWALL
PRODUCT RED GOODS YELLOW GOODS BEER
CHARACTERISTICS
REPLACEMENT RATE HIGH LOW HIGH
GROSS MARGIN LOW HIGH LOW
LEVEL OF ADJUST.* LOW HIGH LOW
TIME OF CONSUMP. LOW HIGH LOW
SEARCHING TIME LOW HIGH LOW
TYPE OF CHANNEL LONG AND SHORT AND
INDIRECT DIRECT
*Number of services applied to goods in order to meet the exact needs of the
consumer.
Venezuela is not a unique case, beer together with meat packing were
reported by Chandler (1977) as industries which integrated into wholesaling in the
early 1900s due to their refrigerating requirements. Nevertheless, integration into




VARIABLES WHICH IMPACT VERTICAL INTEGRATION: A
TRANSACTION COST APPROACH BY FUNCTIONS




a)Retailers 0 + 0 Favourable
b)Consumers ++ + + Unclear
TRANSPORTATION 0 0 0 Unfavourab e
COLLECTION + 0 0 Unfavourab e
STORAGE 0 + 0 Favourable
FINANCING TO
a)Retailers ? 0 0 ?
b)I.D. or O.D. ? 0 0 ?
RISK BEARING 0 ++ + Favourable
PROMOTION 0 ? 0 Unclear
INFORMAnON 0 ? ? ?
*Or scale




SOURCE: based on the model presented by Oliver Williamson in "Economic
Institutions of Capitalism",(1985) case 113.
Transaction cost theory predicts shorter channels for beer since the presence
of externalities due to product perishability and the need for refrigeration (asset
specifity) would force management to exert more control over distribution. If channel
functions are analysed according to the variables proposed by the transaction cost
approach, (Table 6), vertical control into wholesaling is to be expected.
6.2.2. Proposed Approach
The following analysis will give a new interpretation to management
decisions within our proposed theoretical framework The analysis will be made by
functions, and specifically, we will be led by the following questions which remained
unanswered by existing approaches.
*What are the elements which determine management choice between
"making" or "buying" a specific channel function?
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* Why would manufacturers commit important resources to help retailers to
set up and develop their businesses?
* Why did they not integrate all the way into retailing after spending so much
in developing the market?
* Why did they decided to buy the independent distributors and perform their
functions internally?
* Why did they decide afterwards to hive-off the transportation, finance and
selling function? Why through owner drivers?
* Why would manufacturers finance owner drivers? Why would they give the
financing at lower interest rates than market rates?
* Why did they keep the storage facilities under direct control after hiving-off
most other functions?
i) Absence of Specialized Markets
An interesting element which stands out in this case is how management spent
massive financial resources in developing specialized markets for retailing-specific
functions. In fact, in the 1940's beer manufacturers had to face the problem of
developing a distribution network because there were not enough retail outlets to sell
beer in the country. Furthermore, most of those which were available, did not have
enough refrigeration space.
Due to the elements mentioned above, retailer's spatial monopoly power was
enhanced. Since POLAR and NACIONAL were competing ferociously for the scarce
space available18 retailers benefited considerably from this situation. Very quickly
both manufacturers realized that in order to grow they needed, more retailers to offer
their products, and also to convince those who already existed to sell more of their
18 One of the most common practices was to collect the empty returnable bottles from the
competition, pay the retailer for them and destroy them. In this manner the seller could
occupy the space left by the empty bottles collected.
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products. Thus, the existing retailer became for a while the relevant client19 due to a
mixture of elements: the low brand loyalty which still existed in those days, the
spatial monopoly they enjoyed and the desperate need manufacturers had for retailing
functions. On the other hand new technology in beer production permitted higher
economies of scale which were only to be realised with future increased sales.
Thus, developing a suppliers market for retailing functions20 became one of
the most important strategic issues for management As it has already been mentioned
one way of achieving this was by manufacturers assuming the responsibility of
finding liquor licences for retailers. Nevertheless, manufacturers went much further
than that in their efforts to develop suppliers markets and to please existing ones:
"We knew that the lack of refrigerators was a problem,
potential retailers did not have them and our product needed it
Beer is perishable, if you kept it in the hot weather or in the
sun for more than three months it will loose colour, flavour
and in general it will taste terrible. Thus we had to maintain
product quality and appeal to the consumer by selling it cold.
We did not have any other choice but to spend the money and
provide retailers with refrigerated space. We also painted their
facade, got their store signs made with the name of the bar and
of course our logo. We gave them the furniture, gave them
tables, chairs, the domino game and sometimes we even
supplied the music."
According to the information given by the president of one of the distributors,
POLAR used to give retailers financing for redecorating the stores, amounts which
could sometimes equal. one year sales.
It should be stressed here that in order to achieve this, they had to internalize
the financing function, the selling function and the promotion function. As it is
shown in Table 4 manufacturers vertically integrated forward during this period
21




As defined in Chapter 3 a situation of retailers markets arises when manufacturers sp<:nd
considerable amounts of resources, which do not reach the consumer, developmg
competitive tools to please retailers. In this case the retailer becomes the relevant client.
Sales and post-sale service are specific channel functions for retail outlets.
POlAR totally and NACIONAL partially.
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with retailers. The goal would have been very difficult to achieve if independent
distributors were to be kept
Furthermore both POLAR and NACIONAL also had to provide inventory
financing.
"We asked the retail owner that what we wanted in return for
all the facilities we were giving them was exclusivity. They
could only sell POLAR, (the same conditions were asked by
NACIONAL). Nevertheless, we realized that it was not enough
and that we also had to give them huge inventory financing so
that they would always be up to their ears in our product so
that they would not have the space to keep inventory from
competition."
In this manner, both companies ended up giving over 6 months financing. It is
important to stress the fact that it was POLAR who started this strategy. Since it was
the attacker, it was trying to appropriate some of NACIONAL's (the leader) market
share. NACIONAL did not have other choice but to follow, though in a less
aggressive way.
With such an aggressive financing strategy to develop suppliers of retailing
functions, independent distributors could not live up to manufacturer's expectations.
A POLAR manager stresses:
"We wanted to grow and we had our strategy: a good product
and a strong distribution channel. Independent distributors did
not have the financial strength to support retailers the way we
wanted them to do. Thus we develop a strategy of buying them
out, one by one in a very friendly agreement Some of the
former owners became our salesmen and some of them are still
with us."
Thus the channel became more controlled and one of the links (the
independent distributors) totally internalized.
As a NACIONAL manager puts it:
"Maybe we should have done the same thing as POLAR did,
who knows now... but in those days we defmitely did not have
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the cash to buyout all the distributors, nor did we have the
cash to assume all the retailers fmancing22"
For POLAR this strategy was indeed very costly, according to one of the
senior managers who actively participated in those days decisions, the policy of
extending such lax financing terms made them lose large amounts of money in
accounts receivables that they could never recuperate.
ii) Monopoly Power Enjoyed by Existing Suppliers of Channel
Functions
In this manner POLAR managed to control all functions, nevertheless, after a
few years, as the network grew, some problems began:
"We were having too many problems handling the drivers,
they were always pushing for something new: higher salaries,
better conditions. They were unionized and strikes started to
become a common practice".
Thus, suppliers of the transportation function started to develop monopolistic
behaviour and extract monopolistic rents from manufacturers. When this happened,
and after a few strikes POLAR decided that in some way they had to break up such
conduct They started encouraging their most reliable people in sales, to buy their
trucks from the company and set up a small transportation company with an exclusive
contract with POLAR. But unfortunately the salesmen who tried to buy their
vehicles, could not find the financing to do it This problem will be analysed in the
following section.
iii) Saving Agency Costs: Solving Moral Hazard Problems
Parallel to the higher costs in distribution caused by drivers monopolistic
conduct, moral hazard problems also arose with the careless way they handled the
trucks.
22 POLAR started as a business developed by the owners of a soap and candle manufacturer
which had reached maturity. The shareholders knew it was a dying business and decided to
fund POLAR with the cash coming from it. According to the Boston Consulting Group
matrix. The soap and candle company was the "cash cow" financing a "question mark" which
was POLAR.
157
"In those days ~e whole thing was becoming unmanageable,
we were spending more and more money keeping the trucks in
good shape and the drivers seemed to be less and less careful.
The network was growing and we were finding it difficult to
manage."
As a consequence of these elements POLAR decided to spin-off the function
by selling the trucks to each driver. They specifically mentioned that they avoided
spinning-off the function to a big independent transportation company since this
would not permit them to keep the control they wanted over the quality of the
product They were also afraid of the risk of depending on only one company for
transporting their products. They were trying to get away from the monopolistic
behaviour shown by truck drivers, thus to depend on only one transportation
company would obviously not solve the problem; on the other hand to deal with
many could hamper their quality control efforts.
Thus the new system designed by POLAR aimed at avoid both moral hazard
and monopolistic behaviour costs, while maintaining the control required to
guarantee the quality of the product, was as follows:
First, they divided the Country into zones and assigned specific routes to
salesmen23. These routes have changed over the years but the logic stays the same.
They calculate the volume of beer sold in different areas in order to divide them into
routes. The division is made so owner drivers would have similar incomes. When the
volume of beer sold increases significantly, the routes are divided up again.
Second, the distribution companies owned by manufacturers were organized
in such way that each of them would be responsible for a specific region and for
managing a specific number of warehouses also owned by the manufacturer.
Third, POLAR decided that the best system would be to have the drivers (who
are also the salesmen) as owners of their trucks. The system was designed like this:
each driver with his truck would set up an independent company under a separate
legal entity. The assets of each of the newly established companies were the truck,
the inventory and the value of the route which POLAR sold to each of them24. Thus
23
24
In 1960 there were 100 salesmen compared to 2000 in 1991.
This mechanism also allows the manufacturers not to get "involved" in sales, which are made
by owner drivers to illegal retailers, which as pointed out, represent 40% of beer sales.
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today, there are 2000 drivers with their trucks who represent 2000 different
. 25 Thi h .
compames. s system as been copied by companies from other industries (see
chocolate industry) in order to brake monopolistic behaviour developed among the
unionized truck drivers. It has worked for POLAR.
It is important to stress here that the figure of the owner driver is more
efficient when the following elements are met:
1) When there is incentive compatibility between the company and the
driver.
2) When output is relatively easy to measure.
3) When contracts can be well defmed.
4) When products are mature.
5) When the environment is relatively stable and not many changes in
strategy are required.
Now that POLAR has taken over NACIONAL, the use of owner drivers have
become an impediment for launching new products and for creating the correct
incentives to make owner drivers sell marginal products. It is interesting to contrast
POLAR's historical success with the problems PERUGINA (See Case No 4) is facing
with its owner drivers mainly because their products are not the leaders in the market
iv) Financial Market Imperfections
Nevertheless bank financing was almost impossible to find for the salesmen
who wanted to buy their own vehicles. This situation induced POLAR to establish a
leasing agreement system by which the Company buys the truck26 in the market and
leases it for 7 years to the driver at a considerably lower interest rate than the
market's. By the end of the seventh year the vehicle is passed to the driver.
As discussed in Chapter 3, imperfections in the loan markets can impact
channel structure and make vertical integration of the finance function a more
efficient solution since manufacturers could have a cost advantage, compared to the
25
26
When margins are discussed with drivers the opportunity cost of the assets are also taken
into consideration.
The shelves on the back part of the truck are specifically designed for beer cases as they are
made with an upward inclination in the outer edge for a perfect fit to the cases and to avoid
spillage. This greater "asset specificity" guarantees less alternative uses for the truck and
higher chances of the driver staying with the Company.
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banks when extending credit to one of the channel members. This cost advantage
would be the consequence of manufacturers having less asymmetric information than
banks and less moral hazard problems due to a better 'knowledge of the borrower, of
the business risk and also having lower ex-post loan control costs. Thus, in the
presence of external loan rationing, an internally generated financial market, can
efficiently cover the channel member credit needs.
One of the interesting things about this case is that, the intra-channel
financing is serving as an instrument to aid the spinning-off of functions, (to the
owner driver) as opposed to other cases like in the apparel industry (Case 2) in which
intra-channel financing led to total vertical control.
The theoretical principle for lending is the same, and that is why POLAR has
been able to give cheaper fmancing27 to owner drivers.
"We have been able to develop a good system which does not
cost us very much. We get the financing to buy the trucks from
a financial institution and we sell it to the drivers at lower price
(lower interest) because otherwise they would never be
interested in buying the vehicles. Part of what costs us we can
recuperate through tax deductions."
POLAR meets the three main conditions which were discussed in Chapter 3
as those needed to become the source of intra-channel financing: large sums of
internally generated cash28, important informational advantage and excellent access
to loan markets.
v) Saving Agency Costs: Externalities
To solve agency problems, sometimes looser forms of organisation are
needed. A good example of this has been discussed above when POLAR decided to
eliminate the moral hazard problem of drivers with company owned trucks, by
spinning -off the transportation function.
27
28
The owner driver ends up paying 58% of the value of the loan, the rest is paid by POlAR.
An important part of the 42% assumed by POlAR is covered through .tax credits which are
given by law to companies which engage in leasing agreements. There IS a small percentage
(around 7%) which can not be covered by tax exemption and is registered as a "benefit" for
the driver.
POlAR does not extend any credit terms, all its sales are made in cash.
160
On the contrary, another agency problem, the dangers of quality debasement
of the beer in the channel, is a negative externality29 which has been solved by
maintaining vertical control over the storage and the risk bearing functions.
"One of our best decisions regarding distribution was to build
the 80 warehouses we have. This permits us to keep good
control of the service given to retailers and to keep the quality
of the products. For years we have been collecting the beer that
gets old on retailers shelves, bringing it to our warehouses and
throwing it away"
Product decay is a negative externality since it is a cost that nobody in the
channel pays, but which seriously affects brand image. Retailers do not suffer the
consequences of a bad product being sold, but the consumer will probably change
brands, affecting corporate profits in the long run. Manufacturers, in order to solve
this agency problem, usually assume the risk function. NACIONAL lost control of it
and its image was negatively affected. According to the information collected by
their salesforce when they wanted to know why were they losing market share, they
found out that one of the most important reasons was because consumers found that
their beer had a "metallic" taste and that it had a terrible dark yellow colour. They
found out too late that consumer's brand loyalty had been damaged by having bought
old beer.
vi) Governance Costs
One of the obvious costs from integration is the increase in the cost of
governing bigger corporate structures. POLAR and NACIONAL never considered
integrating forward into retailers because:
"It would have been too costly to set up the retailers network
we needed to penetrate the market the way we wanted to
penetrate it We have over 100,000 points of sale. Besides we
did not want to compete with our owner drivers, they would
think that we are trying to take a share of their cake."
It is obvious in this case that to develop a forward integration strategy into
retailing would imply an increase in governance cost which would far outweigh the
benefits of integration. This evaluation is even more obvious when considering the
consumer patterns by which over 40% of the beer is sold in illegal retailers.
29 A cost that nobody pays.
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6.2.3. Final Comments
POLAR's distribution network has become an important barrier to entry for
potential competition. Nevertheless, the process of building the channels looks more
like an effort to deal with market imperfections and solving agency problems, than an
aprioristic determination to build barriers in search of monopoly rents. As discussed
in Chapter 3 this is a case in which building an efficient distribution channel has been




CASE 4. THE CHOCOLATE INDUSTRY:
Dealing With Externalities
Introduction.
When analysing management decisions regarding the distribution of chocolate
products, one element stands out as guiding the design process: perishability. The fact
that high negative externalities could damage the brand and corporate image if
products are sold in a bad state has induced manufacturers to spend massive resources
in keeping tight control over their distribution networks.
What makes this case interesting is that two successful companies, within the
same industry, have chosen different ways of dealing with the same problems. In
both cases perishability, frequent transactions, negative externalities and the need for
control are some of the elements which management have had to face in different
time periods.
It is also an intriguing fact that the leader of the industry, SAVOY, has been
able to maintain the same channel design for almost 50 years without any changes
except size. With a highly controlled distribution network, over 1200 company
owned trucks, a hierarchically controlled sales-force, and directly visiting 100,000
retail outlets at least once a week, SAVOY is judged by the business community in
Venezuela as having one of the most successful distribution networks in the country.
7.1. THE DESCRIPTION
7.1.1. The Industry
The chocolate industry in Venezuela is a mature sector which had been led for
over 40 years, and until very recently, by two companies: Industrias SAVOY C.A.,
who now controls 75% of the market and its former main competitor, La India C.A.
whose market share has dropped from 40% to less than 10% (Table 1). The new actor
in the competition scene is PERUGINA which started operations in 1985 and had
become by 1990, SAVOY's closest competitor with a 10% market share.
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Two types of companies can be found in this industry: big manufacturers with
a wide variety of products and extensive distribution networks (SAVOY,
PERUGINA and LA INDIA), and small firms with craft based manufacturing
processes and limited distribution systems.
TABLE 1













SAVOY was founded in 1941 as a very small chocolate manufacturer. It
operated from a house in Caracas and was the result of a joint venture between a
Venezuelan businessman (who provided the capital) and an Austrian family who had
just arrived in Venezuela the year before, and had previous experience working in the
chocolate sector. Today, SAVOY is one of the largest companies in Venezuela, with
over 300 products and four product lines: chocolates, sweets, snacks and cakes.
Between 1982 and 1988, the company suffered drastic changes in ownership
and control, which have had an important impact on investment and personnel
strategies1. SAVOY was bought by Beatrice Foods, who in turn were taken over by
~ neither of whom had a long term interest in SAVOY. Thus, in 1988, after
numerous failed attempts to sell the company to different South American
corporations, the POLAR2 Group bought it. In doing so, POLAR sold to NESTLE
1
2
There have been delays in capital investment which have been blamed for having a negative
impact in product quality. Also, in distribution, the company-owned transportation units
were poorly preserved and deteriorated heavily during those years. Also, top management,
was almost totally replaced.
The same POlAR group which was discussed in Case 3 for the distribution of beer. The
acquisition was made through the Food Division of the Group which was also involved in the
production of com oil, com flour and ice cream.
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the chocolate manufacturing plant now called Chocoven C.A. while keeping the
distribution company, Comercializadora Chocoven C.A and the production processes
for snacks, sweets and cakes.
"We decided to sell the chocolate manufacturer to NESTLE
because they knew about chocolates and we didn't It was the
best way to guarantee that the quality of the products could be
maintained."
Even though the company names have been changed the trademark SAVOY
continues to be used for all products.
PERUGINA, on the other hand, is a younger company which began
operations in October 1986. It was the result of market research by Venezuelan and
Ecuadorian investors which in 1985 revealed that there was an important share of the
market which was not being serviced: the premium, gift chocolate segment. With a
franchise agreement from PERUGINA in Italy they got the name and the technology
to produce Bacci and Bacetti, their world famous gift chocolates. After five years of
successful operations, they have increased the number of their products to 17
different chocolate bars and wafers. In doing so, they have created a new product
line, Melty's, outside of PERUGINA's franchise SPecifications, which is targeted at a
cheaper, less demanding market Thus, even though the initial intention was to serve
only the premium segment, they are now threatening SAVOY by positioning some of
their less expensive products in direct competition with SAVOY's.3
7.1.3. Channel Structure
The companies interviewed show channel structures with important
differences (Figure 1 and Figure 2). When PERUGINA began operations it had the
intention of pursuing a "follow the leader strategy" by copying SAVOY's channel
design, nevertheless in dealing with its own circumstances it ended up with a
different approach. The reasons for this will be discussed in Section 2.
3 PERUGINA, the parent company in Italy, has been recently (beginning 1991) taken over by
NESTLE International. This is having important consequences on the strategy to be
followed by PERUGINA in Venezuela since SAVOY may end up with PERUGINA's trade
mark. One of the major changes has been to increase their efforts in developing the trade
markMELTY'S.
165
SAVOY's channel structure has changed very little since it started operations
in 1941. The company's strategy has always been to keep very tight control over the
distribution channel by having a sales-force with company employees driving
company owned trucks. SAVOY now owns 1200 trucks and serves directly 100,000
retailers (Figure. 1) who are visited at least once a week4:
" We have been visiting them once or twice a week for years
and we have always insisted on only selling small quantities to
ensure the product freshness,"
SAVOY employees have always maintained an excellent relationship with
retailers and they have used the channel as a continuous source of information about
consumer preferences, product acceptance and competition strategy.
The former president of SAVOY who worked in the company for 40 years
emphasizes:
"We got all the information we needed through the channel, we
have never made any kind of market research. We usually need
less than 15 days to know if there is any problem with the
product and we solve it immediately."
According to management, since they have never asked consumers about their
preferences, product development has always been induced through internally
generated ideas. This has been possible due to the highly flexible technology which
characterizes chocolate manufacturing. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it was
precisely because they never bothered to consult the consumer that PERUGINA
found an untouched segment of the market The counter-argument could be that the
gift chocolate market left unattended by SAVOY could not have been so important
since it did not take PERUGINA very long to start competing directly with SAVOY.
According to some sales and market share data provided by PERUGINA's
management, by 1985, the gift chocolate share was only 5% of the total chocolate
and sweet market, and even though it was boosted by PERUGINA to 10% in 1988
with its main product BACCI, a few months later, when the "novelty" was over it
went back to 5%. It was then that PERUGINA began a diversification strategy into
chocolate bars and wafers which positioned them in direct competition with SAVOY.
4 SAVOY has also opened totally owned retail outletsbut with the only objective of promoting
their ownproducts and showing their complete line of products.
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One of the questions which remains unanswered is whether PERUGINA
overestimated the potentialities of the gift chocolate market within a depressed
economy or, if after entering the market, they were unable to choose the correct
strategy for developing it
When SAVOY faced for the rust time the problem of developing a
distribution system, management's main concern was concentrated on avoiding
product decay. In order to cope with this perishability problem they decided that the
only alternative would be to perform the distribution themselves'. They felt that they
could not trust anybody else with the handling of the product to retailers and they
also wanted to make sure that product turnover would be high.
In order to achieve this objective they bought specific trucks with an












PERUGINA on the other hand, exhibits a more flexible structure with two
alternative channels using independent distributors and owner drivers (Figure 2). It is
interesting to note that while choosing a looser channel design, PERUGINA also
aims to maintain a high level of control over channel functions.
5 Chocolate requires to be kept under certain temperatures: between 10 to 20 d~gr~s. Drastic
changes in temperature may cause a separation of ingredients and a crystallization process
which gives the chocolate an unattractive white color.
167
They knew that if they wanted to succeed in the chocolate business they
would have to fight with a giant in distribution:
"We studied the different channel structures and we decided
that we had to imitate SAVOY, we had to try to serve retailers
directly, because it had proven to be successful. We also
realised that one of the reasons why La India had failed was
because of its weakness in distribution. ,,6
Figure 2
PERUGINA'S CHANNEL STRUCTURE




- DRIVERSCOMPANY (H.C.) - (46)
7.1.4. Channel Functions: Who Performs What?
The objective of this section is to go beyond the identification of the length of
the channel shown above, and specify which agent is responsible for each channel
function. The reason for doing this is because, as it has been stressed in Chapter 1,
the choice between controlling hierarchically a distribution system or "buying" it in
the suppliers market, is a decision management makes by analysing each function
separately. Thus sometimes, as can seen in Table 2 below, management keeps control
over some functions (financing, risk bearing, merchandising and promotion in the
case of PERUGINA) regardless of the number of intermediaries which can be found
in the chain.
6 La India uses independent distributors for most of its sales and has never placed too much
emphasis on controlling distribution.
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MAN.= Manufacturer. (Hierarchically controlled personnel.)
1.0.= Independent Distributors.
0.0.= Owner Driver.
* SAVOY has 5 totally owned stores with the only purpose of showing consumers
their product variety.
The designing of distribution channels has been approached differently
by the companies interviewed. There are some dissimilarities on the problems they
confront but the objectives they pursue are very much the same. In the next section an
analysis of their decisions will be presented.
7.2. THE ANALYSIS
The following section will explain management decisions regarding channel
design. In doing so, we will present an evaluation of the existing approaches in order
to asses their predictive value. Later, in order to explain issues which remain
unanswered, alternative views will be expressed based upon the proposed framework.
7.2.1. Existing Approaches
According to the traditional marketing theory (Aspinwall, 1958)
(Rosenbloom, 1987) the distribution channels for chocolates and sweet should tend to
be indirect since they would need an extensive (longer) and intensive (wider) network
in order to be able to reach consumers accordingly with their buying patterns which
are: impulsive and frequent Longer and wider networks would require, the argument
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follows, the participation of more agents and/or organisations in the process of
making products available to consumers.
As far as Aspinwall's theory is concerned, (Chapter 1) and as it is shown in
the table below, chocolates would belong to the red product category and would thus
call for longer channels which would also imply changes in ownership.
" A long channel is one in which the product moves through
several stages of location and ownership as from the factory
to a regional warehouse, to a wholesaler's warehouse, to a
retail store, and finally to the consumer." (Aspinwall, 1958.
Mallen, ed. 1967. page 89)
TABLE 3
COLOUR CLASSIFICATION FOR CHOCOLATES AND SWEETS
ACCORDING TO ASPINWALL'S THEORY.
CHARACTERISTICS RED YELLOW CHOCOLATES
GOODS GOODS
REPLACEMENT RATE mGH LOW mGH
GROSS MARGIN LOW mGH LOW
ADJUSTMENT* LOW mGH LOW
TIME OF CONSUMPTION LOW mGH LOW
SEARCHING TIME LOW mGH LOW
TYPE OF CHANNEL LONG & SHORT & LONG~~
INDIRECT DIRECT INDIRECIf
* Number of services applied to goods in order to meet the exact needs of the
consumer.
In this case, even though PERUGINA shows a longer channel than SAVOY,
both companies have developed relatively short structures with direct contact with
retailers. Thus, Aspinwall's classification fails to explain the reasons for management
choice.
On the other hand if a comparison is made between what management has
done as far as channel design is concerned and what is to be expected according to
different marketing variables (Rosenbloom, 1987), some contradictory results arise.
According to the summary of these variables presented in Chapter 1, shorter channel
structures can be expected since, due to the perishability of the product,
manufacturer's need a high level of control over distribution. On the other hand, long
channels are bound to be found in this industry due to the following elements:
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1) high market density (high number of points of contact with
consumers) required for these products,
2) frequent purchases made by consumers,
3) light weight of the product and,
4) its low technical development.
Transaction cost theories have stressed the fact that vertical control would
tend to be greater and channels shorter when:
-externalities are present,
-highly specific assets are required for channel functions and,
-economies of scope and scale are not significant (Williamson, 1987).
Thus, according to this theory, highly controlled distribution channels should
be expected in the chocolate industry. Manufacturers would tend to integrate forward
until the losses in economies of scope or scale would make the costs of integrating
greater than its benefits. This theory explains the behaviour of both companies in
trying to control functions without integrating into retailing which is where most
economies of scope and scale can be achieved.
Furthermore, if an analysis of the functions is made based on this model, it




VARIABLES WHICH IMPACT VERTICAL INTEGRATION INTO








TRANSPORT + ++ ++ Favourable
STORAGE + ++ ++ Favourable
PROMOTION 0 0 + Unclear
MERCHANDISING ? + 0 ?
INFORMATION 0 0 ? ?
SALES TO RET. + 0 0 Unfavourab ~
FINANC.TO O.D. ? 0 0 ?





SOURCE: based on the model presented by Oliver Williamson m "Economic
Institutions of Capitalism", (1985) page 113.
Nevertheless it fails to explain, with the same set of variables, the integration
of other functions like merchandising, sales and financing, (Table 2). Furthermore it
becomes even more difficult to understand why there should be differences at all
between the two companies if the same levels of asset specificity, externalities and
economies of scale/scope are to be expected in the same industry. In the following
sections these problems will be analysed and alterative interpretations for
management behaviour presented based upon the theoretical framework.
The industry life cycle approach (Stigler, 1951) (Mallen, 1973) predicts that
companies will tend to separate or spin-off functions as the industry matures. Under
this paradigm there is no explanation for SAVOY's tight control over channel
functions for more than fifty years.
7.2.2. Proposed Approach
We will now analyse management decisions using the theoretical framework
proposed in Chapter 3. Special interest will be given to the following questions which
remained unanswered when evaluated with the existing approaches.
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* What determines management choice between "making" or "buying" a
specific channel function?
* Why did SAVOY integrate forward if, according to the traditional
marketing theory, channels for chocolates should be long and loose?
* Why do they not use large independent distributors?
* Why did PERUGINA decide to spin-off functions to be performed by the
owner driver? Why does the company give them fmancing?
* Why does PERUGINA keep control over the merchandising and the
promotion function if it has assigned all the others to be performed by external
agents?
* Does hierarchical control necessarily mean better control or vice versa, and
do looser forms of organisation necessary mean less control?
i) Development of Barriers to Entry
The barriers to entry argument has been very popular when analysing the
behaviour of big and traditional companies with high market shares and strong
distribution channels. POLAR (Beer, Case 3), SAVOY and INDULAC (Milk, Case
2) are some of the most common examples.
In fact, SAVOY's behaviour could be interpreted as a strategic move with the
objective of setting up a distribution network as a barrier to entry for new
competitors. According to the results (75% of market share) one could conclude that
the strategy had been successful and that in fact SAVOY has achieved market
leadership by building barriers to entry and deterring competition.
Of course, it can not be proved that market leadership was in fact a direct
consequence of their historical decisions in designing distribution channels. What can
be said is that the company has spent immense resources in setting up a highly
controlled distribution network which turned out to be efficient. Furthermore, the
barriers to entry argument does not explain the successful entrance of PERUGINA
into the market In the following sections, alternative explanations will be presented.
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ii) Lack of Competitive Markets for Distribution Functions. Total
Absence
As it has been discussed in Chapter 3 the choice between "buying" or
"making" a distribution function can be assessed by management through a
costlbenefit approach. Total absence of specialised markets, according to the
framework presented, is one of the situations in which management can derive
benefits from integration since there exists nobody else to do it In this case,
according to Stigler, functions would have diminishing returns and thus specialist
markets would not have developed yet
When in 1941 SAVOY had to start distributing products to make them
available to consumers, management could not find, in the market, enough suppliers
of transportation. More specifically, there was a total absence of the insulated trucks
they needed to protect the chocolate from drastic temperature changes. The choice for
them was very simple, they had to perform the function internally. They decided to
buy the insulated trucks and to train a hierarchically controlled salesforce which
would visit retailers with the frequency they considered adequate in order to
guarantee freshness and availability of products:
"We had to buy special trucks with insulation in order to
guarantee the quality of our products. We also decided to visit
retailers very often, once a week, to rotate the products and
make sure that they would always be fresh when reaching the
consumers... We knew retailers would not care for these things,
so we had to do it"
There were not too many choices for management They even decided to set
up their own mechanic shop where their trucks would be repaired. They say they had
no other choice since they could not find any "reliable" mechanic to deal with.
Furthermore, since they decided that they had to maintain frequent visits to retailers,
they opened up warehouses in different regions in order to respond quickly to clients
demands. They still keep the same structure today (Figure 1).
This is an obvious case of a lack of specialists which characterizes early
stages of the industry life cycle. The question which remains unanswered is why
SAVOY keeps all functions vertically integrated after 50 years during which time
suppliers markets have developed and are now available to perform such functions.
When management was asked this question the answer was:
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"Well, this company has always done it like this, I suppose that
it is because they thought7 that they wanted control over the
distribution system. We think that it is the appropriate strategy
and we also believe in control. For consumer products, you
have to have control8. As far as your specific question is
concerned; no, if we had to do it now, we would probably have
to find cheaper ways of doing it, but since the investment has
already been made we are happy with the way it is."
There seems to be some confusion about the costlbenefit assessment of
SAVOY's distribution channels today. It was found that even though they consider
that they are very efficient, since distribution costs are 12% of the sales price
compared to the 25% charged by independent distributors, the accounting is done at
historical costs and depreciation is made accordingly. Some rough adjustments for
inflation and devaluation would increase their costs of distribution to 20%-22% of
selling price.
Of course the argument expressed above is only true from a classical point of
view in which firms are supposed to be maximizing by reducing production costs
regardless of the transactions costs involved (transaction costs and agency cost
theory). The argument here would be that total control of the salesforce is more
efficient since it is probably difficult to design a contract which would make
compatible the objectives of the principal, in this case the manufacturer, with those of
the agent, the salesman. But is it really true? Why has PERUGINA reached an
apparently efficient but less integrated design? In the next section, where the issues of
financial market imperfections are discussed, some of the problems with
PERUGINA's channel design will be analysed.
Also, moral hazard problems with truck drivers are often mentioned but very
seldom considered to be a solvable problem by SAVOY:
" We have so many conflicts with our drivers about the way
they take care of the trucks, and since we have so many of
them, sometimes we do not know if we are a chocolate and
sweet company or a car repairing shop. You see, that is why
we have to do the repairing of the trucks ourselves."
7 Current top managers have been there only since the take over.
8 It is interesting that management would think like this since control over the distribution of
consumer products isvery costly. From a pure theoretical standpoint, consumer products are
bound to have long and loose distribution channels.
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It is obviously not clear that they are better off like this than by spinning off
the transportation function. PERUGINA, coming into the market later in 1985, found
a different way of approaching this problem. This will be discussed in the next
section.
iii) Financial Market Imperfections
Neither SAVOY nor PERUGINA have financed large inventories to retailers
as has been the normal practice in the beer and apparel industries analysed in Case 2
and Case 3. One of the reasons might be the fact that chocolate products are more
perishable and thus require higher turnover and more frequent visits to retailers9.
Nevertheless, the problem of imperfections in the financial markets has had a
different impact in channel design for PERUGINA:
"Refrigerated transportation was a must in order to guarantee
the quality of our products. Remember that we are positioned
as a premium, high quality product and competing with a giant.
We are more expensive than SAVOY in most of our
products. 00 we can not afford any mistakes in the quality."
PERUGINA then decided to copy POLAR (Beer industry, Case 3) and
finance drivers to buy their own trucks through leasing agreements:
"We needed an extensive distribution through refrigerated10
trucks and we did not know where to find them. On the other
hand we wanted to keep good control over the network"
There was not a suppliers market for such functions. One of the reasons for
this is that imperfections in the financial markets make it almost impossible for some
individuals (in this case the truck drivers) to find credit financing. The problem has
9 SAVOY's account receivables have an average of 7 days. This has led management to express:
"this company is a fantastic cash machine". PERUGINA,. on the other hand, ~ used
financing as a competitive tool against SAVOY and has a policy of 15 or 30 day financmg.
10 SAVOY does not have refrigerated transportation units, they use insulated trucks to deliver
their products.
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been solved by PERUGINA by buying the trucks and leasing them to drivers who
become owner drivers after 8 years!!.
Nevertheless, the financial problem has reverted to PERUGINA since the
owner drivers engaged with the Company in this type of leasing agreement have had
great difficulties in meeting the financial payments. Low sales volume and high
competition with the leader, SAVOY, has undermined the expected returns for the
salesforce. In interesting contrast with POLAR, the leader of the beer industry for
which the leasing agreements have worked very well, PERUGINA is currently facing
important financial problems. The owner drivers have not been able to reach the sales
volume which would allow them to repay banks for the loans made to buy the trucks.
Therefore, PERUGINA has been assuming the payments.
It could be argued that the figure of the owner driver and the leasing
agreement are good only in cases where the products are mature leaders within a
stable market As it has been discussed for POLAR, in this situation there is incentive
compatibility between the manufacturer and the owner driver. Furthermore, market
leadership guarantees a sales volume to cover leasing payments. If products are new
with smaller market share, a hierarchically controlled salesforce offer better incentive
mechanisms. Owner drivers prefer to work for the market leader since it offers what
they are looking for: higher sales volumes with less selling effort
PERUGINA seems to be facing both problems with a wide range of products
in the early stages of their life cycle, while controlling a small percentage of the
market
Leasing transactions have been a relatively new phenomena in Venezuela. It
became a common practice only 20 years ago when investment bankers began
developing deals to alleviate capital investment expenditures for different business
deals. This may have been one of the reasons why SAVOY, having designed a highly
successful distribution channel with corporate controlled employees almost 50 years
ago, has found it difficult to find a good reason to switch to a system which may
include leasing agreements as PERUGINA has done.
11According to Article 39 from the Income Tax Law, "all paymen~ m~d: for the leasing of goods
used to produce income are deductible from the taxable rent. This IS one of the reasons why
leasing agreementswith ownerdrivers have become so popular.
177
Iv) Facing Agency Costs: Externalities
Two agency problems with opposite impacts on vertical control have to be
faced by management On the one hand, externalities and risk-bearing, which are
discussed here, drive management to search for more control over the functions, and
moral hazard (discussed below) inducing managers to choose looser organisational
forms.
Distribution channel externalities appear when products are subject to quality
debasement When brand products are perishable, special care must be taken by
manufacturers in order to guarantee that they arrive to consumers in a good
condition. If not, a channel member can sell a spoiled product damaging the
reputation of the brand name. It is a negative externality because it is a cost which
nobody pays for; prices do not change in the short run but future sales may be
affected. This has also been described as the "free-riding" effect, where people
performing a marketing function can "free ride" on the efforts of others. (Anderson
and Weitz, 1986). In this case the retailer would be "riding" on the brand reputation
by selling large volumes of the branded good, and spending very little on service and
quality. Nevertheless, the sales for other retailers and especially the manufacturer can
be negatively impacted by such careless behaviour.
The manufacturer's objective is to internalize the externality by making the
channel member's remuneration reflect the effort of avoiding the externality.
Since it is in the manufacturers best interests to keep brand loyalty, but not
necessarily in the best interests of independent distributors or independent retailers,
they usually devote important corporate resources to avoiding product decay along
the distribution channel.
This is what induces SAVOY to maintain a vertically integrated structure and
also why PERUGINA keeps hierarchical control of the merchandising function while
leaving others to owner drivers (Table 2). In the words of PERUGINA's marketing
manager:
"The retailer would not care less if the product is in a good
condition or not, we do. We also try to make the owner driver
and the independent distributor feel responsible for .it..b~t it is
not enough and so we have to have our own supervisors.
PERUGINA has also deliberately chosen small distribution companies in
order to have more power to negotiate agreements which would guarantee a
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convenient handling of the products. Nevertheless the supervisors visit all retail
outlets and make sure that the merchandise is well displayed and never beyond the
expiry date.
v) Facing Agency Costs: Moral Hazard Problems
In Case 1 and Case 2 we discussed the issue of truck drivers developing
undesirable behaviour with company owned trucks which negatively impacts on their
maintenance costs and operating life. Some companies deal with this problem by
spinning-off the function to an external agent, such as an independent transportation
company.
PERUGINA has solved the problem the same way POLAR did, by leasing the
trucks to drivers. In this manner the contract reflects an incentive for the driver to do
what is also in the best interests of the manufacturer.
In the words of the PERUGINA general manager:
"Well, they know that this is the only way (the leasing
arrangement) they would ever own a truck. Therefore if is in
their best interests to take good care of them . Furthermore, it
is established within the contract that every night they have to
leave their trucks in our depots where we have the opportunity
to check if they are being as careful as we required. If they are
not, we immediately break the contract"
vi)Governance Costs
Increasing governance costs explain why vertical integration into retailing has
not been seen as an efficient solution for the companies interviewed. Chocolates and
sweets are sold in over 100,000 retail outlets throughout the country, and even though
perishability has been determinant in channel design for functions, integrating into
retailing would imply costs which would outweigh the benefits of integration. The
atomic structure of the retailing network with small, low capital, family owned shops
and with little centralized purchasing power, increases the governance costs of
integration. Nevertheless, in this case SAVOY, as opposed to other manufacturers of




It is interesting to see how two companies, which have entered the same
market in different periods have adopted different channel structures guided by
relative market imperfections and product characteristics. Now they are facing new
challenges mainly due to new competitive forces within the industry.
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CHAPTER 8
CASE 5. ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES:
Consumer Service Impacts Channel Structure
Introduction
Distribution channel design in the electrical appliance industry has been
significantly influenced by one channel function: after sales service. This has historically
been one of the most important competitive tools used by management in order to
increase brand loyalty and corporate image. The decision of who gives this service, and
how or where it is provided, has stimulated vertical control by manufacturers.
This case is an interesting comparative analysis of two companies which are
competing in the same market and have developed small, but important strategic
differences. The leader MADOSA, (formerly General Electric) integrated into retailing
in order to control sales and post-sale service. The strategy followed by FRIGILUX
could be defined as one of, follow the leader...but watch your step. When integration is
not feasible, controlling strategic functions may be a more viable alternative.
This case also shows the complexity of the financing problem. The appearence of
independent retailers offering consumer credit through part-exchange deals is putting
strong pressures towards functional spin-off.
8.1. THE DESCRIPTION
8.1.1. The Industry
The electrical appliances sector has become increasingly concentrated due to the
continuous process of mergers and acquisitions which changed the structure of the
industry during the 1970's and 1980's. The three biggest companies who presently
compete in the market are the result of the consolidation of eight former independent
firms which manufactured white line products (i.e, refrigerators, washing machines and
dryers) and small electrical appliances (e.g. toasters, mixers, blenders). It is interesting to
note that one of the objectives for merging has been to acquire new technologies and
diversify into other product lines (Table 1).
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One of the two hypothesis which will be discussed is that the product
diversification strategy followed by firms has been partly induced by channel constraints
(i.e, the need to develop totally controlled retailers or exclusive dealers) in order to offer
the required variety of products and benefit from economies of scope. The other
explanation for the product diversification strategy is that new entrants (FRIGILUX)
need to offer a high variety of products which are different from the competition in order
to penetrate exclusive distribution channels. That would explain why INSANOVA, as
opposed to MADOSA and FRIGILUX, does not get involved in any distribution
functions while concentrating on economies of scale by producing only a narrow line of
no-brand stoves, refrigerators and washing machines. In the words of INSANOVA's
general manager:
" We think that as manufacturers we can defend ourselves very
well, but that is not the story when the task is to distribute
products. You see, there are people who know how to sell to
consumers, we prefer to use them and join with them in order to
bring the product to the consumer in the most efficient manner."
MADOSA and FRIGILUX, on the other hand, have diversified into new product
lines, absorbing new technologies and developing different distribution strategies for
their products. These are the two companies which will be analysed.
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Thus, in this industry, two main manufacturers strategies are found. The first is to
produce and distribute a wide variety of products with several brand names aimed to
different consumer segments. The second to focus on manufacturing large quantities of
few no-brand products and selling them, in the plant, to original equipment
manufacturers (O.E.M.s).
Another characteristic of this industry is the high level of backward vertical
integration. In the three companies interviewed, it was found that management has
devoted important resources to the objective of achieving total control of their input
markets. As the general manager from FRIGILUX stressed:
"In this business if you want to survive you need quality, which
means that you need technology and you need to have the right
type of inputs at the right time. If you don't control this, you are
out."
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This behaviour can be explained in transaction costs terms by saying that firms
tend to integrate backwards due a combination of the following elements:
1) Highly specific assets required in their production process
2) Lack of competitive input markets, ,
3) High degrees of uncertainty on future prices of inputs, quality of the input
and availability of price/quantity combinations1. (Blair and Kasennan
1983) ,
It must be pointed out that while backward vertical integration has become an
increasingly important strategy in the industry, forward vertical integration has decreased
and companies are trying to get out of retailing and wholesaling by leaving distribution
functions to be perform by specialists. We shall discuss this development in Section 2.
There has also been an increasing proportion of local investors in the business.
The less dependant the industry has become on imported goods, the less the competitive
advantages shown by multinationals which have left the country and sold their assets to
national investors. One of the arguments stressed by FRIGILUX and INSANOVA was
that their main strength was based on the high flexibility they enjoy in responding to
environmental uncertainties. They were much faster than multinationals in responding to
competition, government policies and consumers preferences:
" Westinghouse and General Electric could not compete with us
because they had to ask for permission for everything. If we
lowered our prices they could not respond until it was too late.
Here, we are just three people, we get together every morning and
we decide fast"
Specific market shares in this case can only be defined by product lines. In the
refrigerators business MADOSA and INSANOVA are competing with around 40% of
the market each, whereas in the air conditioning market, FRIGILUX claims to have over
35% of the market with MADOSA 30% and CARRIER 25%.
8.1.2. The Companies Interviewed
Even though three companies were interviewed MADOSA, FRIGILUX and
INSANOVA, the following analysis will concentrate on the strategies chosen by
MADOSA and FRIGILUX since INSANOVA sells mainly (80%) to OEMs.
1 All three companies expressed their worries about their former high dependency on imported
goods and the negative impact which successive devaluations of the currency had on the
price/quality combinations which could be suitable for the local market.
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INSANOVA decided only in 1990 to develop a brand name (Comet) which they
distribute through independent wholesalers and retailers.
MADOSA (Manufacturera de Aparatos Domesticos S.A.) reached its present
status in 1984 after the fusion of General Electric de Venezuela S.A. (consumers division
operating since 1951), Sociedad Industrial de Electrodomesticos de Venezuela, S.A.
(SIADCA) and MADOSA, who had been operating since 1967.
MADOSA has three different product lines aimed at different market
segments.(fable 2).
TABLE 2
MADOSAS'S BRAND NAl\fES AND TARGETS
PRODUCT BRANDS TARGETED MARKETS
GENERAL ELECTRIC Higher Income Consumer
ADMIRAL Middle Income Consumer
CONDESA Lower Income Consumer
No-brand products (20% of production) are also manufactured by MADOSA who
sells them to OEMs. These OEMs, brand and distribute products according to their own
marketing strategy. The brand names which are used to label these MADOSA products
are: Luferca, Venerama and Regina. All of the brands are targeted to the lower end of the
consumers market Thus, only General Electric products are targeted at the higher
income consumer.
Even though some of their products still demand some imported components
(such as luxury refrigerators which require imported ice and water dispensers), the
company has followed a backward vertical integration strategy with the objective of
freeing themselves from external suppliers:
. bl 2"
"Who make costs very vana e
MADOSA claims to control around 30% of the market in most product lines. The
following are some of the numbers given by management.
2 Input price uncertainty.
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Refrigerators : 36%
Washing Machines : 32%
Dryers : 33%
Stoves : 29%
Air Conditioners : 30%
FRIGaux started operations in 1965 with the objective of entering the market
for "cooling" systems. They began by producing cooling systems for drinking water,
freezers and refrigerated shelves for different types of retailers.
By 1976, Westinghouse from Venezuela was up for sale and FRIGILUX
management saw a good opportunity to acquire new technologies and enter new markets.
Thus, they acquired the company and entered the market for air conditioners,
refrigerators and stoves.
8.1.3. Channel Structure
The channel structure in the industry shows a variety of organisational forms:
I)In one extreme, highly controlled distribution networks, with retail outlets
owned by manufacturers.
2)Exclusive dealers, which operate almost like franchises, with specified
controls and service qualifications.
3)Authorized dealers, which do not have to be exclusive but are authorized by
manufacturers to sell and to offer post-sale service to consumers.
4)Independent retailer chains, with no exclusivity arrangements, which usually
give financing to consumers and with higher negotiating power with
manufacturers.
The companies interviewed show some important differences in their distribution
pattern. In the 1940's, when General Electric begun operations, they had hierarchically
controlled retailers and authorized dealer. MADOSA (formerly G.E.) presents now a
mixed structure by which products are distributed through two parallel systems. One,
only for General Electric products is totally controlled with 10 G.E. retail outlets3.
MADOSA's management has expressed concern about the possibility of maintaining
these outlets since they are not being profitable:
3 These outlets are managed as profit centers. This can be explained by the fact that in this case, as
opposed to the others like the strategy followed by MONTECRISTO (Case 2), the reason for
hierarchically controlled retailers is not to compete with price but to beat competitors in service
186
"We are seriously thinking of selling them to specialist retailers
chains4like IMGEVE, especially now that the small line5 is
having problems with imported competition."
The other is for Admiral and Condesa lines which are distributed through two
hierarchically controlled warehouses to 700 independent retailers and small distributors
with whom MADOSA has specific exclusivity agreements',
FIGURE 1
MADOSA'S DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL STRUCTURE
(10) (H.C.*)(2)





MANUFACTURERS (OEMs) RETAll..ERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS
H.C. *= Hierarchically Controlled until 1990. Now they are exclusive dealers.
MADOSA sells around 20% of their production to original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) . In this case the sales are made in the plant and it is the OEM's
responsibility to develop its own distribution and marketing strategy. (Figure 1)
FRIGILUX on the other hand, has chosen a design by which all their sales to
consumers are made through independent retailers. They have total control of the





By the beginning of 1991 they sold them to "authorized retailers".
Home appliances like toasters, blenders, mixers, etc..




FRIGILUX'S DISTRIBUTION CHANNEL STRUCTURE
IMANUFACfURERI-----lwAREHOUSESI JINDEPENDENTI
. (H.C.) (8). i RETAILERS
Nevertheless as far as controlling retailers is concerned, they have developed an
interesting strategy in order to sell their products through MADOSA's exclusive
distributors and retail shops.
They consider that one of their major strengths is the manufacturing flexibility
they enjoy. Thus they produce a large variety of products within the same line and
penetrate MADOSA's exclusive distributors by offering them slightly different products
in terms of size and power. Since the exclusivity contract permits selling products from
competition only "when they are not produced by MADOSA" it can always be argued
that, in fact, the product is different FRIGILUX general manager describes it very
graphically:
" What we try to do is to help them (the retailers) to act
unfaithfully...contracts are to be broken and just like in marriage
you can be unfaithful but you have to have a good excuse. We give
the retailers the excuse."
FRIGILUX management has found a strategic window derived from contract
incompleteness (Williamson, 1975). Since it impossible to write a contract with all the
specification and characteristics for actual and potential products, channel members
argue that in this case, they are indeed different products and therefore they are not
breaking the contract
8.1.4. Channel Functions: Who Performs What?
In this section the channel will be divided into functions with the purpose of
being able to analyse vertical integration and control with a functional approach. In other
words, in order to understand the strategic value manufacturers give to each function and
therefore to understand the reasons for selecting different agents to perform them.
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I.T.C.= Independent Transportation Company
(1) Only in General Electric Shops. MADOSA is trying to sell them.
(2) Paid by Retailers.
I (3) He who bears the risk of returned merchandise.
Functions in both companies are highly controlled by manufacturers. Only the
transportation function has been spun-off, by both, to independent transportation
companies. The explanation for this can be found, according to the theoretical
framework, in the fact that for these products, the selling and the transportation functions
can be separated (structural separation of the channel) and performed by different agents.
The opposite situation exists for perishable products ( See Cases 1, 3 and 4). For them
this separation is usually inefficient, since very frequent visits are needed to a large
number of retailers in order to maintain the freshness of the products.
It is an interesting element in the financing and promotion functions that retailers
are increasingly using part-exchanges deals7 as competitive tools in order to be able to
sell more expensive products.
It is important to stress that FRIGILUX has stopped financing retailers8 while
MADOSA gives up to 90 days financing. According to FRIGILUX management this has
7 The consumer brings an old product as part of the payment.
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been possible for them because they have developed a "pull" strategy by advertising their
products heavily and making consumers ask for their specific brand:
"We decided to spend in advertising the money that we would
otherwise had spent in financing".
The reasons for the specific allocation of responsibility for channel functions
displayed in Table 4 will be discussed in the following section.
8.2. THE ANALYSIS
In this section an analysis of management decisions regarding distribution
channel design will be presented. In doing this analysis we use the theories evaluated in
the literature review and the theoretical framework.
8.2.1. Existing Approaches
According to established marketing theories (Aspinwall, 1958) (Rosenbloom,
1987) discussed in Chapter 1, distribution channels for electrical appliances and specially
for white line products should be short and with relatively high control from
manufacturers.
In fact, the colour classification provided by Aspinwall predicts for electrical
appliances short and direct distribution channels since product characteristics match
almost perfectly with those defined for yellow goods (Table 4).
8 To stop financing in Venezuela means to give less than 30 days to pay.
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TABLE 4
COLOUR CLASSIFICAnON FOR WID'fE LINE AND ELECTRICAL
APPLIANCES ACCORDING TO ASPINWALL.






















* Number of services applied to goods in order to meet the exact needs of the consumer.




Only the adjustment element is not congruent with the other variables since
electrical appliances are in fact mass produced and do not go through a SPecific
adjustment process in order to please a particular consumer. Nevertheless if the product
concept is broadened, and post sale services are included as expected product attributes
(Levitt, 1980) it could be said that there is some adjustment of the product to consumer
needs, Le. specific guarantee services and small installation modifications.
On the other hand, according to variables presented in Chapter 1 for market and
product characteristics, (Rosenbloom, 1987) what the marketing theory anticipates fits
very well with decisions taken by management among the two companies interviewed.
According to these variables the channel should be shorter since:
1) the frequency of purchase is low,
2) the products are relatively heavy and bulky which increases transportation
costs,
3) the price of the products is high and also their income/price relationship,
and
4) because the products have a higher level of technical development.
Nevertheless, again, in the check list for market and product variables,
standardization is considered as a variable which encourages longer channels.
These theories, although accurate in this case for predicting channel structure, fail
to explain "why" it is that a company chooses a specific channel design. Sometimes the
answers seem to be too obvious, like: "due to the information required by the consumer,
products with a high degrees of technological development will tend to have shorter,
more controlled channels". To which it could be asked again: "yes, but why?".
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It is also difficult to explain within this framework, why did both companies spin-
off the transportation function and leave it to be performed by an independent company.
(Table 3).
Transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1987) also predicts that in this case
vertical integration will tend to be preferred over looser forms of organisations since:
1) Externalities are high: negative externalities may develop if customer sale
and post sale service does not meet consumers expectations. In this case
brand image is damaged and future9 sales negatively impacted.
2) Important levels of human asset specificity are present since the sales-force
has to be trained in order to give customers the information and service
required to make the buying decision.
3) Economies of scope are not as important as for other goods such as
consumer products. Thus losses in economies of scope at retail level are
not as high, thus permitting vertical integration into retailing.
Furthermore, this could also explain the diversification strategy followed
by the companies interviewed.
According to the three conditions described above, manufacturers would tend to
integrate vertically forward into retailing. Nevertheless this has not been the case for the
companies interviewed which have been increasingly using independent or "authorized
retailers". A functional analysis helps to evaluate management strategy behind channel
design; if a transaction cost approach is followed in order to evaluate vertical integration
of channel functions, sales to retailers, to consumers, post-sale service and risk bearing
show favourable characteristics for vertical integration. (Table 5). Nevertheless it fails to
explain why some companies would tend to be more integrated than others. Furthermore,
some functions can not be evaluated properly (financing, information and promotion)
with the three variables proposed by Williamson in his model.





VARIABLES WIllCD IMPACT VERTICAL INTEGRATION INTO
DISTRIBUTION: A TRANSACTION COST APPROACH BY FUNCTIONS
FUNCflONS ECONOMIES EXTERNALITIES ASSET VERTICAL·
OF SCOPE· SPECIFICITY INTEGRATION
SALES TO:
a)retailers 0 + + Favourableb)consumers + ++ + FavourableTRANSPORT. + 0 0 Unfavourable
STORAGE + 0 0 Unfavourable
POST-SALE·
SERVICE + ++ ++ Favourable
RISK BEARING** 0 ++ ++ Favourable
FINANCE TO:
a)retailers ? ? 0 ?
b)consumers ? ? 0 ?
INFORMATION 0 ? ? ?.
PROMOTION 0 ? + ?
* Or Economies of Scale
** of returned merchandise




SOURCE: Based on the model presented by Oliver Williamson in "Economic Institutions
of Capitalism". 1987.n. 31.
On the other hand, Stigler's functional approach explains that as the industry
matured, specialists for channel functions emerged. This has been the case for sales to
consumers and transportation (Table 4). This framework though, does not explain why
other functions, like post-sale service and risk bearing have not developed specialists
markets.
8.2.2. Proposed Approach
We will now analyse by functions, management decisions on channel structure. In
order to do so the proposed theoretical framework will be used. The following questions,
which remained unanswered within the existing frameworks, are put forward in order to
guide the analysis:
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* What determines management choice between "making" or "buying" a specific
channel function?
* Why have manufacturers spun off the transportation function?
* Why did General Electric decided to integrate vertically into retailing?
* Why is MADOSA thinking of selling their retail outlets and in general why are
manufacturers spinning-off retailing-specific functions?
* Why have manufacturers kept the storage, servicing and risk bearing functions?
i) Lack of Competitive Markets: Total Absence
When General Electric began operating in the country during the 1950's, they
could not find suppliers of channel functions in the market As with other pioneer
companies like SAYOY (Chocolate), INDULAC, (Milk) and POLARINACIONAL
(Beer), the decision between "buying" or "making" the functions was obvious -either they
made them or nobody else would.
The difference between this case and the others is that General Electric (G.E.)
integrated forward including retailing functions since they required product-specific
services at retail level which they could not find in the market They needed a trained
sales force 10 which would know how to explain to consumers about product properties
and alternatives. In this market, consumers buying behaviour is not impulsive, they
invest time (in searching ) gathering the necessary information before making the final
decision. Customer service at the retail level plays a very important role in providing this
information.
There was also another important element pointed out by a former G.E. manager:
"The fact that those were, and are General Electric shops, gives the
consumer confidence".
This is even more important considering the brand image for high quality
products which is the MADOSA strategy for their G.E. line.
10 Human asset specificity.
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if) Facing Agency Costs: Externalities and Risk Bearing
Avoiding negative externalities as a result of product quality debasement, would
induce companies to have more control over their channels. As the theoretical framework
indicates, product quality debasement is not only a consequence of perishability, product
decay or fashion. In fact, negative externalities can also be the result of client
dissatisfaction with the actual service received when compared with that expected or
promised by the manufacturer.
This has been the reason why MADOSA has kept hierarchical control over the
retailers they bought from General Electric:
"General Electric has always had its own retailers because it was
the only way of guaranteeing a General Electric service...this
means good quality service and information, spare parts supply,
and to comply with guarantee provisions."
It also explains why MADOSA keep totally owned retailers for their expensive
brands which they have targeted at the high income consumer.
Apart form investing in retailing, MADOSA has devoted important resources in
order to avoid externality problems. They have totally owned repair shops for post-sale
service, they do delivery repair service for customers and they have designed a strict
supervision system by hierarchically controlled personnel. These supervisors are in
charge of visiting retailers to check the merchandise display and sales service to
customers.
Also, FRIGILUX has had to face this problem, and even though they decided not
to integrate vertically into retailing they have developed important control mechanisms
through supervision and a combination of totally owned and contracted repair shops. To
deal with externalities they have chosen to control hierarchically the following functions:
1) storage,
2) post sale service,
3) risk bearing,
4) information.
By controlling these functions, the company has faced the externality problem
and defended brand image without integrating into retailing. Once more, a functional
view of the channel permits us to understand why management would strategically
decide to keep some functions while spinning-offothers.
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ill) Facing Agency Costs: Moral Hazard Problems
We have discussed in Cases 1, 2 and 4 how moral hazard problems may have
induced firms to spin-off functions in order to solve the problem of information
asymmetry between the principal (manufacturer) and the agent. In the previous cases
usually what happened is that the manufacturer decided to leave the transportation
function to an independent company since drivers usually handled company owned
transportation units very carelessly. This could be one of the reasons why MADOSA and
FRIGILUX have done the same.
Nevertheless, this case presents an interesting situation of moral hazard behaviour
which may be the explanation 11 for the manufacturers tendency to get out from retailing.
'~ere is one retailing-specific function which deserves special attention since it has
..ne an important competitive tool: consumer financing. This has been particularly
'- :)p- .--' by specialised retailing chains when selling white line products, televisions
ana othc which represent a high price/income relationship.
.. act is that these specialist retailers have developed, among other financial
~=- ~ .aanisms, part-exchange deals in order to improve unit sales. The part-exchange deal
introduces a problem of asymmetric information in the transaction: the owner of the old
appliance possesses information which is impossible for the retailer to know. Thus the
transaction becomes subject to moral hazard behaviour from the customer who is
bringing an old appliance to be exchanged for the new onel2. Specialised retailers have
information advantages, if compared with manufacturers, to deal with these moral hazard
problems.
8.2.3. Final Comments
We have analysed the evolution of distribution channels in three leading
companies in the electrical appliances industry. This has been a particularly interesting
case to evaluate how competitive forces impact managerial decisions on the way
11 Besides the development of specialised suppliers markets as is predicted by the industry cycle
theory. (Stigler, 1951).
U The same phenomenon has been identified as "market for lemons" by (Akerlof, 1984) when
analysing information asymmetries in used car markets.
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distribution functions are organised, and how channel dynamics induce product
diversification strategies in firms.
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CHAPTER 9
CASE 6. THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
Bilateral Monopoly and Integration
Introduction.
The analysis of the pharmaceutical industry considers the behaviour of
manufacturing firms within a highly atomistic and competitive market structure.
Nevertheless, important degrees of concentration at distribution level, combined with the
impact of government regulations- which increase entry barriers- set up an interesting
dynamic of market power and monopolistic conduct among agents. One of the impacts
on channel structure has been vertical integration between wholesalers and chemist
shops.
Furthermore, channel design is strongly affected by the fact that the physician1
often makes the buying decision while the consumer remains passive. Manufacturers
develop a parallel channel to sales, only for the functions of promotion and information,
in order to reach the decision maker directly. Two elements guide marketing managers in
the industry: product development and a "push" strategy concentrating on direct access to
medical doctors2.
Product perishability, and the need for highly specific assets in order to perform
certain channel functions are also key elements in defining "buying" or "making"
decisions for vertical control.
1
2
The other agent who influences the decision is the chemist who can recommen~ an alternative
product to the patient. In Venezuela, where prescriptions are very seldom reqwre~ by law, the
local chemist recommends, and sells, medication for different illness. As household mco~e level
decreases, the influence of the chemist increases and the chemist tends to totally substitute the
doctor.





The pharmaceutical industry in Venezuela is highly atomistic. A total of 75
laboratories, with less than 3% of market share each3, compete in the production of
drugs and medicines. They are called laboratories because their manufacturing process is
focused on the production of drugs with imported chemicals, patented by large
multinationals. These local companies are usually subsidiaries who pay royalties for the
use of these patents.
This lack of concentration within the manufacturing process makes it possible to
gain important economies of scope in wholesaling and retailing. The need to offer variety
becomes one of the most important elements in distribution due to:
1) the existence of a wide variety of goods produced by a large number of
manufacturers,
2) the fact that consumption patterns are highly specific with a low substitution
rate among products,
3) the fact that it is usually the medical doctor, and not the consumer, who
makes the decision for most products (and for all prescribed medicines).
4) the existence of informational asymmetries about drug benefits which
refrain consumers from using alternative products.
The influence of the chemist in the consumers buying decision has the opposite
effect by inducing product substitution.
The distribution system shows a totally different structure to that of the
manufacturers'market Only two wholesalers control almost 60% of sales (Table 1) and
they are vertically integrated with more than 100 chemist shops. It will be argued in
Section 2 that vertical integration has been the result of a bilateral monopoly developed
between wholesalers (high market power) and chemist shops (spatial monopolies).
3 There is one exception, lABORATORIOS VARGAS, a corporate group who owns four
different companies and controls around 9% of the market.
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The industry is also highly controlled by government agencies who set:
1) quality standards,
2) prices,
3) margins at retail level: 30%,
4) margins at wholesale level: 14.5%,
5) the number of chemist shops within a specific geographic area4.
In this case government controls hamper competition while increasing spatial
monopoly at retail level by limiting the number of chemist shops.
On the other hand the evolution towards standardization has impacted industry
structure. Before standardized products were developed, chemists "manufactured" drugs
with the chemicals they bought from sales representatives of big multinationals. As
technology changed and markets developed, products became increasingly standardized
and laboratory-subsidiaries began to manufacture them on a large scale with specific
brand names. (Figure 1 and Figure. 2)
When the manufacturing process was shifted from the chemist to the laboratory,
the middlemen emerged to Perform the following functions:
1) Reduce the transactions between the laboratories and the chemists.
2) Reduce the discrepancies between production (high scale) and consumption
and
3) Provide the required variety at the chemist level.
Also the perishability problem was reduced since new technologies permitted
laboratories to improve sterilization by packaging. Nevertheless, adequate storage and
transportation is required in order to insure the quality of products (asset specificity).
4 Barrier to entry developed by government policies.
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Figure 1




EVOLUTION OF AGENTS IN THE INDUSTRY AND CHANNEL CHAIN:
Second Period.
IPARENT COMPANYI-...~lsUBSIDIARyl-~·IWHOLESALERS*HCHEMISTSI
* These wholesalers are called drug distributors.
Another element which is important to stress is that prescribed and over-the-
counter products require totally different marketing and distribution strategies. The latter
are considered consumer products with similar distribution and advertising strategies.
This analysis focuses on the former.
TABLE 2
MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE DISTRIBUTION CHAIN.
AGENTS No. % OF MARKET SHARE











(I) Location of chemist shops are under municipal regulations which determine a
maximum number of outlets for specific areas.
9.1.2. The Companies Interviewed
Two companies were interviewed: LABORATORIOS FARMA C.A. (2.95%
market share) which started operations in 1937 and LABORATORIOS HOECHST
(2.25%. market share) which was founded in 1962. Two managers from FARVENCA,
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the biggest distributor, were also interviewed in order to incorporate their views about
the distribution process.
Both manufacturing companies began their operations in Venezuela as sales
representatives for multinationals. During the 1960's the Venezuelan government
developed aggressive incentive policies to induce multinationals to change their strategy
and, as a result, sales representative offices were substituted by local manufacturing.
Both companies interviewed have been the result of such policies.
9.1.3. Channel Structure
FARMA and HOECHST present identical channel structures mainly
characterized by the use of independent wholesalers who visit chemist shops. One
interesting element is that wholesalers buy from all manufacturers. This enables them to
offer the chemist the total range of products available in the market5.
This has two important implications:
1) The economies of scope achieved at wholesaling and retailing level are
equal.
2) Chemists do not need to use more than one supplier to offer the required
variety at retail level. Another supplier is, however, a new source of
financing and/or a means to increase relative negotiating power over
suppliers in general.
This could explain the relatively higher levels of concentration in the wholesaling
market when compared to the manufacturers and/or retailers (Table 2). There are
important gains in economies of scope at the wholesaling level since variety becomes one
of the most important issues in distribution. An average chemist shop carries around
5000 products of which 50% are medicines and the rest are "miscellaneous,,6. According
to FARVENCA's management, as far as medicines are concerned the variety of products
offered by them is equal to those at chemist level:
5
6
The major difference with the industries analysed in the other five cases is that, in the
pharmaceutical industry, exclusivity contracts in distnbution are totally absent. Low market
power enjoyed by manufacturers is the main reason.
A wide range of products e.g. cosmetics, baby care and sanitary products.
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"Wec~ 25~0 different ~edicines. You can usually find the
same v~ety in any chemist shop. Besides that we carry around
2600 miscellaneous products."
Figure. 3






-I sales r 4000(50)* CHEMISTS
5%-10% sales i
* 2 distributors control 50% of sales to chemists.
9.1.4. Channel Functions: Who Performs What?
The two companies show identical channel structures and responsibility allocation
for channel functions (Table 3). The agents have reached the same design in which the
most powerful link is the wholesaler. More than 90% of sales to chemists are made
through them, nevertheless the risk bearing, promotion and information functions are
hierarchically controlled by both manufacturers.
It is also interesting to note that the financing function has been assumed by the
wholesalers who, in spite of being the most powerful agents in the chain have accepted
the responsibility for such a risky function. An explanation for this apparently
paradoxical behaviour will be given in Section 2.
When the general manager from one of the companies was asked why they were
not selling directly to chemists, he argued the following7:
"To be efficient we have to specialize. Our philosophy is to
manufacture not to distribute. We would need a lot more capital
investment in transportation, in storage capacity and especially we
would need a lot of patience, experience and money to finance
chemists since they do not like to pay."
7 Managers from both companies asked for discretion. They did not mind being quoted as long as
neither their namesnor their company's were attached to a specific quote.
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I.D. = Independent Distributor
I.T.C.= Independent Transportation Company
(1) Only 5%-10% of sales.
(2) Detailing usually through a "promotion force" who often visit medical doctors (who
make the buying decision for patients).
I(3) Agent who bears the risk for returned products.
Transportation from the manufacturer to wholesalers is made through an
independent transportation company but is paid for by the manufacturer. The wholesaler
assumes the transportation function to chemists.
The storage function is controlled mainly by the wholesalers8 who are
responsible for the stability of the supply between manufacturers and chemists.
The promotion and information functions are performed by manufacturers with a
hierarchically controlled and highly trained personnel, who constantly visit medical
doctors and chemists in order to provide them with information and free samples of
drugs, while asking doctors their opinion and experience on different products
(information). Manufacturers are willing to spend important resources in these functions
especially in the case of new products. On the other hand, independent distributors
dedicate resources to exchange information with the chemist.
8 Manufacturers also do some storage.
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9.2. THE ANALYSIS
In the following section an analysis of management decisions will be presented.
First, we will discuss the existing theories and we will compare them with the empirical
data collected for the case. Second, an alternative view will be presented where the
proposed framework will be used to give a functional perspective and to explain the
issues which can not be understood within the existing frameworks. As with the rest of
the cases, the discussion will be centered on the competitive dynamics facing
management
9.2.1. Existing Approaches
There are a wide variety of products within the pharmaceutical industry; some
more perishable than others and with different replacement rates. Nevertheless, an
evaluation according to Aspinwall's framework would predict longer channels and looser
organisational structures than those shown in this case. Vertical integration between
wholesalers and chemist shops could not be explained under this framework. (Table 4)
TABLE 4
COLOUR CLASSIFICATION FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
ACCORDING TO ASPINWALL
CHARACfERISTICS RED GOODS YELLOW GOODS PHARMACEUTICAL
REPLACEMENT RATE HIGH LOW ?
GROSS MARGIN LOW HIGH LOW
ADJUSTMENT* LOW HIGH LOW
TIME OF CONSUMPTION LOW HIGH LOW
SEARCHING TIME LOW HIGH MED
TYPE OF CHANNEL LONG AND SHORTAND
INDIRECT DIRECT
*Number of services applied to goods in order to meet the exact needs of the consumer.
According to other marketing theories which consider market, product, firm and
environmental variables as determining channel structure (Rosenbloom, 1987),
pharmaceutical products should tend to have longer and looser channels. Low density of
the market, small market share, product standardization, and low price income
relationship are variables which are present in these type of products and, according to
this approach call for longer channels. Only the perishability of some products would be
considered as an element in favour of integration or control. Integration between
wholesaler and chemist is thus not explained through this scheme.
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On the other hand, transaction cost economics predicts vertical control when:
1) externalities are present,
2) high specific assets are required to perform channel functions and
3) lo~s in ~onomies of scope and scale do not outweigh the gains from
integration.
Thus, according to the transaction costs approach, the phannaceutical industry
should have highly controlled channels if there were not high losses in economies of
scope or scale. In fact, some degree of asset specificity is required for the sales9, storage,
promotion and transportation functions. Also externalities are present since products are
subject to quality debasement with an important impact on consumer well-being.
Nevertheless, manufacturers distribute over 90% of their sales volume through
independent wholesalers (Figure. 3).
We would expect to find vertical integration into wholesaling, while integration
into retailing would be less likely since losses in economies of scope are high.
If the transaction cost analysis is made by functions, as it has been proposed
before, a clearer picture emerges (compare Table 3 with Table 5). In fact, the promotion
and risk bearing functions show favourable conditions to vertical integration according to
the parameters given by Williamson (Table 5). Nevertheless, information which is also
vertically controlled can not be explained within the same framework. Neither can the
financing and transportation functions be explained. Also, an explanation is needed to
understand why the transportation function has not been spun-off. In the following
sections a discussion of these issues will be presented.
9 At the retailing level the degree of human asset specificity is greater since it is required by law,
that there is at least one pharmacologist per chemist shop.
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TABLES
VARIABLES WHICH IMPACT VERTICAL INTEGRATION INTO
DISTRIBUTION: A TRANSACTIONAL COST APPROACH BY FUNCTIONS
FUNCTIONS ECONOMIES EXTERNALITIES ASSET VERTICAL •
OF SCOPE(l) SPECIFICITY INTEGRATION
SALES TO:
a)Chemists + + + Unclearb)Consumers ++ + + UnfavourableCOLLECTION
TRANSPORT. + + + favourable
STORAGE + + + Favourable
FINANCING TO:
a)I.D. ? ? ? ?b)Retailers ? ? ? ?
RISK BEARING(3) 0 ++ + Favourable
PROMOTION(2) 0 + + Favourable
INFORMATION 0 ? ++ Unclear






3 A ent who bears the risk of returned roducts.
Stigler's functional theory explains why the transportation function is not
vertically controlled, the reason is that in mature markets specialists emerge to benefit
from economies of scale and scope for required channel functions. In this case,
transportation can be more efficiently performed by specialists. Nevertheless it fails to
explain why the market has not developed specialists for other channel functions which
continue to be vertically controlled by the manufacturer.
9.2.2. Proposed Approach
In this section we will analyse the data with the proposed framework. In doing so
the following questions will guide the discussion:
* Why has management decided to "buy" or "make" specific channel functions?
*Why have manufacturers not integrated into distribution?
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* Why do manufacturers keep vertical control of the promotion, risk bearing and
information function?
* Why, if financing retailers has been considered risky, the most powerful agent
in the channel chain, the wholesaler, ends up performing it?
* Why have retailers integrated backwards into wholesaling?
i) Lack of Competitive Markets for Distribution Functions. Bilateral
Monopoly
Bilateral monopolies (Bowley, 1928) (Morgan, 1949) are characterized by
situations in which a monopolist sells to a monopsonist The core of the argument is that
since each agent has a market power over the other, bargaining costs tend to be very
high, transactions very costlyl0 and therefore, vertical integration socially desirable11
(Chapter 1). From the firms point of view, vertical integration can also be beneficial
when such a strategic move implies higher net present profits: a better price/output
relationship with less bargaining costs.
In the pharmaceutical industry, high degrees of vertical integration are found
among wholesalers and chemists. The first move came from a group who owned a chain
of chemist shops and decided to integrate vertically backwards into wholesaling:
" We knew we could get better conditions from wholesalers and
they would not give in. We got tired of it and we decided to have
our own wholesaling company ... you see, we thought it would be
better to negotiate with the laboratories than with independent
wholesalers...and we were right"
In distribution channels, different members can engage in bilateral monopoly
relationships when:
10 Bilateral monopoly has been widely used defending verti~ integration ~~t ~onopoly
U· E th ugh neo-classics tend to ignore transaction costs economics, in this modelaccusa ODS. ven 0 • •
high b .. ts are formalized and considered the main cause of integration.argammg cos J.I
11 Since the output is higher after vertical integration and prices for the good sold would be, on
average, lower.
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1) manufacture.rs enjoy some kind of monopoly power due to high degrees of
.concentration or brand loyalty,
2) high ~t specificity is required to perform distribution functions.
3) the spatial monopoly power or retailers is exacerbated due to consumer
buymg patterns, government regulations or monopolistic behaviour.
The following elements made possible the development of bilateral monopoly
relations with increased bargaining costs between wholesalers and retailers:
1) Market concentration in wholesaling.
2) Increased spatial monopoly in retailing due to government regulations and
the emergence of chemist chains.
3) Since most economies of scope are achieved at wholesaling level12,
independent distributors push for orders with wide variety of products.
Chemists on the other hand, conscious of their spatial monopoly, insist on
getting better deals for bigger orders by threatening to buy from
competition.
4) Also consumer prices are controlled by government This sets a price
ceiling at the retail level which stimulates price bargaining in input
markets.
Some authors have argued that the reason for the vertical integration trend in the
distribution of pharmaceutical products is to be found in the profit margin differential
allowed by government regulations between chemist (30%) and drug wholesalers
(14.5%). According to this argument, wholesalers would integrate forward, searching for
higher margins at retail level. Nevertheless, this would not explain backward vertical
integration where chemist shops buy drug distributors, which has been in fact the most
common case. This behaviour, as it has been explained, can be better understood within a
bilateral monopoly framework.
ii) Lack of Competitive Markets for Distribution Functions. Financial
~arketIrnperfections
Financing to retailers is only given by wholesalers (30 days) since manufacturers
consider it as a high risk function. Wholesalers in turn enjoy up to 90 days financing
from manufacturers.
U To provide variety has been one of the most important competitive tools for ~dependent
distrib I . id d that the same variety can be found at wholesale and retail level.tn utors. t IS CODS! ere
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When a sales manager from one of the companies was asked specifically about
the financing function he stressed:
"We ~ve the wholesalers up to 90 days fmancing, it is impossible
to achieve any reasonable arrangement with chemists they pay
when they feel like it.. it is good that we only sell dU:ectly to them
for a very small percentage of sales. "
Intra-channel financing in this case can be explained by the concept of financial
cost advantage developed in the theoretical framework. Wholesalers extend credit to
chemist shops because they enjoy cost advantages in doing so when compared to
manufacturers and banks. As is reflected in the above quotation, manufacturers do not
have the power to exert any ex-post control over retailers which in turn induces moral
hazard problems, which can end up being very costly for the lender. As one of the
managers expressed when explaining why they had stopped given them fmancing.
"We were not very happy with the chemists behaviour, they
manage their business as a small family shop: if the money is in
the cash register they take it home, spend it and then tell you that
they can not pay you".
When financial market imperfections are high, as is the case for Venezuela, intra-
channel fmancing is more likely to appear since it would be more difficult for some
channel agents to get fmancing in the loan market, in this case chemist shops. Thus,
when there is a cost advantage when compared to banks, the fmancing function is usually
assumed by the most powerful member of the channel. In those cases in which it is more
expensive for channel members to extend the loan, the fmancing function is usually
imposed to the weaker agent (Chapter 1). In this case the most powerful agent is the
wholesaler, he imposes credit conditions on the manufacturer who, in fact, gives him up
to three months credit And, since ex-post control to chemists is cheaper for him than it is
for manufacturers and/or banks he is willing to perform the function. These control
abilities solve the informational asymmetries and the moral hazard costs which could be
present if either the bank or the manufacturer extended credit to retailers.
iii) Facing Agency Costs. Externalities
One of the functions which is vertically controlled by manufacturers is risk
bearing, to avoid negative externalities as a consequence of product debasement or
damage (Chapter 3). A quotation from one of the managers illustrates:
" We have to assume the risk, we are the only ones who care,
besides you are dealing with people's healf:h her~,' you can not play
around with it, one mistake and we are finished.
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In other words, the agency problem arises because it is in the best interest of the
manufacturer (the principal) to maintain brand loyalty through excellent quality. This is
not necessarily the case for independent distributors or chemists (the agents) who can
always buy from other suppliers. The negative externality, future reduction of sales
volume due to changes in consumer choice, (buying a different brand) is a cost that only
the manufacturer pays in the long run. To "internalize" the externality, manufacturers
assume the risk of damaged products. This is probably the result of the inability to design
a contract which would permit the manufacturer to share the risk with other channel
members.
Manufacturers use detailing to visit medical doctors but also to control the
turnover of products at chemist shops and hospitals. Thus even though sales have been
almost totally spun-off to wholesalers, manufacturers keep tight control over a function,
in this case risk bearing which they consider strategically important for brand loyalty and
corporate image.
iv) Governance Costs and Losses in Economies of Scale and Scope
It could be argued that one of the reasons why manufacturers have not integrated
forward into wholesaling is because high governance costs would outweigh the benefits
of integration. Nevertheless, 4000 outlets is not a large number to serve, especially when
compared to other industries where manufacturers serve directly 7000 retailers (Dairy,
Case 1) or 100,000 retailers (Chocolates, Case 4). However, in those cases, the industry
was highly concentrated so that a large proportion of the whole market was supplied by
each manufacturer. At the same time, products were very standardized. By contrast, the
pharmaceutical industry is very atomistic and product variety is much larger. When
deliveries are made, specific items are demanded out of a large list of possibilities, thus
requiring much more logistical effort. This tends to generate important economies of
scale in distribution which are not outweighed by the benefits from control.
9.2.3. Final Comments
This case has permitted the evaluation of bilateral monopoly relations and their
impact on channel structure. The forces towards integration, as predicted by the seminal
papers in the field seem to be present, even though the way they actually appear in the
world has significant complexities. This case is also interesting in noting how the




Theoretical and Empirical Findings
Introduction
In this Chapter, we present a summary of the empirical findings and their
relationship to existing theories and to the proposed framework. In Section 10.1, we
explain the research questions and study propositions. In Section 10.2, a summary of
the existing applied theories and empirical research is given in order to identify the
gaps which inspired the research and the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter
3. Finally, in section 10.3, we carry out a cross case analysis in order to identify
common patterns, differences and surprises among the six cases and fifteen
companies analysed in Chapters 4 through 9. Finally, we consider agreements and
conflicts between the empirical findings and the theory.
10.1. Research Questions and Study Propositions.
Two specific questions guided the research design :
R1: How are distribution channels perceived by management.'.
~: Why do managers choose more complicated forms of transactions
when designing channel structure (e.g. vertical integration and
contracts) instead of keeping to the classic market exchange.
The research interest was to find out how important channel design was
considered within corporate strategy and what were the factors which determined the
alternative types of organisational forms chosen by management.
Given the objectives of the research, a case study method was chosen:
"The form of the question -in tenus of "what", "who'> "where",
"how" and "why"- provides an important clue regarding the
most relevant research strategy to be used. The case study
strategy is most likely to be appropriate for "how" and "why"
1 Only from the point of view of the manufacturer. The pe.r~pective of retailers and
wholesalers is analysed only in so far as it affects the strategic deCISIOns of manufacturers.
212
questions, so your initial task is to clarify precisely the nature
"of your study questions in this regard (Yin, 1989, p. 29)
A list of study propositions was defined for each question. The way in which
these propositions contrast with the empirical results is presented in Section 10.3.
10.1.1. The Research Questions: a JustifICation.
In the managerial literature, strategic decisions regarding distribution channels
"
are often analysed as part of the "marketing mix . In this context, the emphasis is
placed on the development of products which "satisfy consumer needs" while channel
design is often regarded as a complementary process. Managers are supposed to
"choose" the best alternative, based on product characteristics/', to make goods
available to the targeted consumer. The specific impact which channel decisions have
on the fum's competitiveness is very seldom mentioned.
In spite of this, as the empirical evidence presented indicates, manufacturers
are willing to spend substantial resources, which often do not reach the consumer, in
order to achieve control of the channel. Furthermore, strategic decisions for channel
design, as it was found later in the empirical work, have been far more complex than
"choosing" among available alternatives. Sometimes managers have had to create
and/or develop the markets for channel functions. In other circumstances they have
dealt with imperfections in the existing markets, which have had important
consequences in channel design and on the firms' competitive advantage. Old and
traditionally successful fmns3 have strong distribution channels which are seen as
important barriers to entry by local and foreign competition. We also wanted to know
what variables affected management decisions to integrate vertically into distribution




For example, Aspinwall (1958) suggests that high quality products should have short and
exclusive channels, standardized consumer products should have long and dense networks.
Bysuccessful we mean firms with high market share.
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10.1.2. The Study Propositions.
The elements mentioned above inspired the following study propositions",
i) For question R1:
1) I?istribution channels are viewed by management as a particularly
important competitive tool.
In other words it is not only important to make the product with attributes the
consumer wants. It may be of greater strategic importance to decide how the product
reaches the consumer.
2) The length and width of the channel is not the issue but who performs
which functions and why.
The strategic decision does not rely only on how long the channel should be
(e.g. number of wholesalers and retailers, as in Frazier, 1991), nor on which type of
wholesalers or retailers to use. The channel is seen by management as a set of
functions, e.g. transportation, storage and financing, which have to be performed
efficiently within different markets. Strong market imperfections in less developed
economies exacerbate this fact Thus the problem of channel design is not only how
long, wide, or exclusive the channel should be, but which agent should undertake
which function.
ii) For question~
In the search for study propositions for this question, different theories were
found in the literature. A summary of them is presented below.
A multi-disciplinary approach was followed combining economic and
managerial theories in order to formulate a list of the elements which would induce
manufacturers to integrate forward or to control marketing channels ( see Table 1).
4 Study propositions direct the attention to issues which should be an~ysed in an a.ttempt ~o
answer the research questions. They can be compared to the role which hypothesis have m
surveys.
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In the economic literature, special attention was given to those which related
to the causes of vertical integration and to the limits of the firm, Scattered concepts
and theories were found, but no comprehensive framework in which to understand









Elements not found in the
literature
Firms would tend to integrate forward:
In the presence of bilateral monopoly with suppliers
of channel fUnctions
When industries are new
When markets are too small to obtain economies of
scale
When the are high degrees of uncertainty
When there is high asset specificity
When externalities are high
When transactions markets are small and frequent
When losses in economies of scope and scale are not
large
When post-contractual opportunistic behaviour may
be costly
To increase barriers of entry
To avoid market rationing
To avoid price and tax rezulations
When the replacement rate is low
When gross margins are high
When the level of adjustment is high
When the time of consumption is high
When searching time is high
When markets are small and dense
When firms are large
When products are complex and custom made
When oroducts are perishable
When there are imperfections in the credit markets
When there is a total absence of suppliers for channel
functions
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The study propositions derived from the literature review are presented in
Table 1. The degree to which the empirical results contrast with these stud
propositions will be discussed in the Section 10.3. y
10.2. The Theory
10.2.1. Existing Empirical Research and Applied Theories.
Different strategic issues are often mentioned in the literature regarding
distribution channels. Nevertheless, very little emphasis has been given to the impact
and role of distribution design on corporate strategy and performance. Among the
strategic decisions which are commonly accepted, the following have been
summarized by Frazier's survey article (1991, p.256-7):
1) What is the required intensity of distribution (i.e. width or breadth of
the channel.
2) Which functions (e.g. merchandising, storage, delivery) need to be
performed in the channel and what are their relative importance.
3) Should the firm go direct, indirect or use a combination approach in
terms of its distribution channels? If indirect, what type of inter-firm
linkage (i.e., market linkage, leadership linkage, contractual linkage)
should be utilized? Finally, how many channel levels (i.e. depth of the
channel) are desirable?
4) Which parties should perform the necessary channel functions (i.e.
specification of channel roles) 'l
5) What type of organisational structure in terms of centralization and
formalization is necessary?
6) How many territories are needed and what are their nature?
In the literature, we found theoretical and empirical research regarding
intensity of distribution and vertical control. A summary of these works is presented
below. Little has been done in the other areas (numbers 2, 4, 5 and 6 above). Frazier
concludes:
"Unfortunately, little in the way of systematic research has
been conducted on the nature of necessary functions in the
distribution channel, ... To this point, most attention given to
channel functions in the literature has been directed towards
developing lists of potentially relevant functions". (p. 267)
More specifically Frazier stresses in defining future research needs:
"Theory must be developed to explain (1) why and how
given functions need to be performed by members of the
channel, (2) what the exact specification of each channel
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function should be, (3) how functions will vary across different
channel contexts, and (4) what drives the relative importance
of functions across different channel contexts... Empirical
research should foll?w the development of improved theory
about channel functions. The contributions of such research
~ould. be maj.or ~onsidering that, except perhaps for the
intensity of distribution decision, all the other design decisions
are likely to be influenced by the nature of the functions that
must be performed within the channel". (Frazier,1991 p.268).
We believe that this work is a contribution in this area while it also helps to
unveil some of the strategic implications of channel design and its impact on
corporate competitiveness.
The following is a summary of the theoretical approaches from which most of
the study propositions were derived. Empirical research has also been found in some
of them:
1) The marketing approach where theories are based on product attributes,
firms characteristics and consumer buying patterns (Aspinwall,1957)
(Buckling,1966) (Rosenbloom,1987). Empirical research has established that
channels tend to be direct when: purchase frequency is low, searching time is high
(Lilien,1979), and when products are custom made and highly differentiated
(Anderson,1985) (Coughlan,1985), (Anderson and Coughlan, 1987). Empirical
research supports the marketing approach prediction that channels will tend to be
direct when firms are large and sales are high (Lilien,1979) and (Klein,1987).
2) The functional, spin-off approach (Stigler,1951) (Mallen,1973) which also
includes what has been called the "scale economies approach" (Frazier, 1988)
according to which companies will hive off functions where middlemen can benefit
from economies of scale. No empirical research checking this theory has been
reported. Nevertheless, research by Lilien (1979), who found that direct channels are
preferred during early stages of product life cycles, can be considered as a partial test
for this theory.
3) The transaction cost approach (Williamson,1985). Empirical work has
been done by Dwyer and Welsh (1985) Anderson(1985) Anderson and Coughlan
(1987) and Klein(1987). According to them, direct channels correlate with higher
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degrees o~ asset specificity in performing channel functions and also higher levels of
volatility in the environment
4) The strategic view (Scherer,1980) (porter,1980). This approach has
stressed the fact that managers vertically integrate to discourage potential competitors
from entering the market Empirical work by Karakaya and Stahl (1990) found that
vertical integration into distribution was graded by management as a less important
strategic issue than other sources of entry barriers (e.g. economies of scale, product
differentiation, capital requirements and customer switching costs.)
10.2.2. Theoretical Gaps:
After conducting the literature review (Chapter 1) and identifying the study
propositions, it was surprising to find that management decisions about distribution
strategy in the cases studied could not be fully explained by those theories. Several
gaps were found, and a considerable number of questions would have remained
unanswered in each case study, unless an alternative theoretical framework was
developed.
For example, in Case 1, we found results conflicting with transaction cost
theory since distribution channels with higher asset specificity requirements (e.g.
refrigeration), present looser and less vertically integrated organisational forms than
products which do not require any specific assets for distribution. Also, results
conflicting with Aspinwall's predictions and other managerial theories were found,
since channels for juices and dairy products are expected to be long and with a
considerable number of middlemen while in the dairy and fruit juice case, high
degrees of vertical integration are found. Stigler's and Mallen's functional spin-off
approach also fails to explain why firms in mature industries decided to go direct
after using independent distributors for over 20 years.
In Case 2 (men's wear), the theories were particularly ineffective in explaining
the strategy followed by manufacturers. Channel design could not be understood by
5 Volatility is a specific type of uncertainty. It has to do with environments ~her~ outco~es are
difficult to predict. This, it has been found (Klein,1988) encourages vertical m~egration. On
the other hand uncertainty due to environmental diversity, calls for more flexible forms of
organisation and thus discourages vertical integration.
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using the approaches suggested by Aspinwall, Stigler or Williamson. None of them
could explain tota16 vertical integration into retailing.
In Case 3 (beer), channel design contradicts some the theoretical predictions.
We found that channels were much shorter than expected and that manufacturers
have spent considerable resources in financing retailers directly. Furthermore,
contradicting what Stigler and Mallen, independent wholesalers have disappeared
from the market
In Case 4 (chocolate) product Perishability induces the leader of the industry
to have a highly integrated channel. Aspinwall, and other marketing "check list"
theories, are unclear in their predictions. Perishability should induce shorter channels
to guarantee more control? Nevertheless, according to other product characteristics
(e.g. margins, time of consumption and level of adjustment), longer channels should
be more appropriate. Transaction cost theory, though useful to understand vertical
integration, fails to explain the differences shown by the two companies analysed.
Case 5 (electrical appliances) shows that even though channel design IS
largely explained by existing theories, it remains unclear why, if forward vertical
integration should be expected, companies are hiving-off retail functions. Also,
important differences between the strategies followed by the two companies studied
are not explained.
In Case 6 (pharmaceuticals), long channels were found, as would be predicted
by marketing and managerial theories. However, transaction costs theory would
predict more vertical control by manufacturers into wholesaling than was found.
Instead, we encountered that most integration was actually taking place between
wholesalers and chemists.
In spite of these shortcomings, each approach has important theoretical
elements which can be combined to explain channel design. Furthermore, it was
6
7
Only selling through totally owned retail shops.
In the literature, shorter channels are always considered equivalent to more control. The
empirical results show that this is not necessarily true.
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found that when the theories are applied by channel-function separately, instead of to
the system as a whole, their predictive power increases8.
We consider the following elements to be responsible for the limitations of
the theoretical approaches considered to account for the facts observed in the cases:
1) Theories are highly industry" and! or product10 specific, leaving very
little room for management discretion. Thus, differences in strategies
followed by companies in the same industry can not be explained.
2) When theories try to take account of strategic behaviour11, they only
seem to consider the desire to set up barriers to entry. Instead, the
menu of strategic objectives followed by firms seems much broader.
(See Section 10.3.10)
3) The different objectives for channel control are also ignored. This
leaves out other important strategic considerations (e.g. quality control
or sales promotion, see Section 10.3.8)
4) Market dynamics are ignored and thus monopolistic behaviour12 by
channel members are ignored. This leave out crucial elements
affecting the strategies followed by manufacturers (See items 2,5,6
and 7 in section 10.3).
In order to reach a better understanding of the cases, other elements had to be






See, in the cases presented the application of Williamson's model by channel function.
Transaction costs and Stigler's approach.
Aspinwall and other managerial theories.
digm d P rte 's analytical framework.Structure-conduct-perfomance para an 0 r
For a theoretical differentiation between "monopolistic" and "opportunistic" behaviour
developed in transaction costs economics, see Chapter 3.
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10.2.3. The Absent But Useful Theory: Agency Costs.
The elements of agency theory incorporated in the proposed framework
(section 10.2.4.) proved to have high explanatory and predictive value.
Distribution channels are complex systems where individuals and
organisations participate in making products or services available to the consumer.
Two important characteristics are to be stressed in order to understand the way such a
system works: first, the channel has to be viewed as a set of functions13 which have
to be performed by different individuals or organisations. It is possible to eliminate or
change the agents involved, but the functions can only be shifted backwards or
forward, never eliminated14.
The second characteristic is that the agents may cooperate or conflict in the
process. In other words, objectives of individuals usually differ along the channel and
the systemic expression of the distribution function can be difficult to achieve.
Within this dynamic set of elements, the distribution channel is an active
organisational structure which can show important changes over time. The task for
the manufacturer, (or for the most influential agent who usually has the systemic
view of distribution), is to design contracts where individual objectives are
harmonized with those of the system as a whole.
Principal and agent theory or agency cost theory has formalized this problem.
The gist of the argument is that an agency problem emerges in a situation of
delegated choice among two self-interested individuals and the solution rests in
fmding the optimal contract which would induce the agent, with the right incentives,
to successfully complete the delegated action according to the principal's best interest.
(Chapter 3).
Finding self-enforcing contracts for channel members to reduce conflict is of
significant strategic value since it induces agents to conform with corporate
objectives with the lowest monitoring costs.
13
14
E.g. sales, transportation, collection, storage, promotion, information and service.
This is called in the literature "the shifting principle".
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For example, for the manufacturer of a brand product, it is strategically
important to maintain the optimal quality standards for his products. However, this
interest may not coincide with the objectives of other channel members, who would
be willing to reduce the effort spent in of keeping brand quality standards (it is not
their brand) so as to obtain higher margins.
No theoretical or empirical research was found which used the agency theory
approach to explain channel design. Yet we found it to be very useful and with great
potential for understanding management behaviour.
10.2.4. Proposed Approach.
The framework proposed in Chapter 3 is the result of combining some
elements from the theories mentioned above (Section 10.2.1), with some concepts
from agency theory and some insights derived from the interviews. The framework
emerged as a more comprehensive scheme to explain the main issues related to our
research, which had received unsatisfactory answers.
i) Elements Which Induce Vertical Control.
The proposed approach has the following list of determinants which would
generally stimulate vertical control.
1) Lack of competitive markets:
l.a) Absolute absence of specialized markets.
1.b) Monopolistic power enjoyed by existing suppliers of channel
functions.
+....:1 ial I 15l.c) Retailers spati monopo y .
l.d) Bilateral monopoly.
. ~ ti 16I.e) Financial Market imperrec ons .
2) Development of barriers to entry
3) Avoiding post-contractual opportunistic behaviour
15 Wh rtical integration is not possible due to high administrative and governance ~sts, or
en ve 1· . t s in-off channel functIons tolosses on economies of scale and scope, the so ution IS 0 P
independent agents.
16 In some cases financial market imperfections may also induce vertical spin-offs.
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3.a) Appropria~on of specialized quasi-rents.
3.b) Contract remterpretation.
4) Solving agency problems:
4.a) Externalities.
ii) Elements Which Stimulate Vertical Spin-Off.
In the proposed approach the following elements are considered to induce




2.a) Administrative and informational costs.
2.b) Scattered, low capital retail shops networks with no centralized
purchasing power.
3) Losses in economies of scale and scope.
In the following section the empirical findings will be presented.
10.3.Empirical Findings:
Empirical findings show that channel design can only be explained if market
structure for each channel function is incorporated in the analysis17. Usually,
research on channel design and structure has been carried out separately and with
different theoretical tools from those used to study channel functions. Such an
approach has the following misleading theoretical consequences:
1) The two elements used for the design: number of middlemen18 and
the type of organisational structure are only evaluated for the totality
of the distribution process instead of by channel function. This
approach fails to explain the case of highly integrated firms which buy
one or more functions, or those who may decide to have vertically
integrated functions within a very loose organisational structure.
17
18
This result goes beyond what was expressed in the study propositions.
Considering "middlemen" the number of organisations or individuals which participate in the
distribution process performing different functions between the producer and the consumer.
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2) Imperfections ~ the markets for channel functions (e.g. transportation
sto~a~e, fmancmg and customer service) are usually neglected as is '
their impact on channel structure. '
3) There is a ten~enc~ to co~sider control as positively related to the
de.gree of vertic.al.mtegration and inversely related to the number of
middlemen. This Ignores two facts: that control can also be achieved
through ve~c~ integration of specific functions and/or that agency
problems WIthin the same organisation may be difficult to solve
making it more efficient to spin-off some functions.
A cross case evaluation is carried out in the next section.
10.3.1. Channel Control is not the Issue, But the ControlofSpecific
Functions
To understand the evolution of organisational structures in distribution and
the elements which influence management decisions about the type of transaction
(e.g. market, contractual, hierarchical) which best fulfills corporate goals, distribution
channels have to be analysed by function (e.g. transportation, storage, financing,
merchandising) and not as a monolithic vertical structure.
A distribution channel is a set of complex and interrelated functions: imposing
a characterization to the whole set (e.g. length and width of the channel) may hide
specific features of how each function operates. In other words, distribution channels
are not to be seen as "channels" but as systems where functions can be organised and
controlled in different ways.
Usually, in the literature, channel control is associated with channel length.
The shorter the channel and the more vertically integrated (less number of
middlemen), the higher the control. (Aspinwall,1958) (Rosenbloom 1987)
(Williamson,1975,1985) (Frazier,1991).
In fact, the empirical results do show that channels are shorter (less number of
middlemen) as the number of vertically integrated functions increase. (Fig. No 1)
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FIGURE 1
THE RELATIONSIllP BETWEEN THE CURRENT NUMBER OF
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Nevertheless, there are other interesting results. Regardless of the number of
middlemen, there are functions which are always controlled by the manufacturer:
promotion, risk bearing, information and merchandising when applicable (Table 1).
For example, the five companies which in the sample produce highly perishable
pasteurized products (Cold line in Case 1) use a long channel with three middlemen.
However, they perform five functions with hierarchically controlled personnel: the
risk bearing function 19, promotion, information and financing to distributors. Four of
these functions imply supervision of retailers. In other words, manufacturers have to
visit shops with hierarchically controlled personnel.
19 The risk of accepting merchandise returns.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF COMPANIES IN EACH CASE WIllCH DIRECTLY
CONTROL SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS
CASES(l)
No.1 No.2 No.3 No.4 No.5 No.6FUNCTIONS H C R.M. P.N. S.P. F.M. PH.H.SALES TO:
a)Retailers 4 0 2 0 1/0 III 2b)Consumers 0 0 2* 0 1*10 OIl 0COLLECTION 0 0 2 0 1/0 1/1 2TRANSPORTATION 0 0 2* 0 1/0 0 0STORAGE 4 0 2 2 1/1 III 0FINANCING TO
a)Retailers 4 2 1/0 OIl 0b)Wholesalers 4 5 0 0 1/0 2
MERCHANDISING 4 5 2 0 III 0 0
RISK BEARING 4 5 2 2 III 1/1 2
PROMOTION 4 5 2 2 1/1 1/1 2
INFORMATION 4 5 2 2 1/1 1/1 2
POST SALE SERVo III
(1) Fifteen companies were analysed in six cases. Letters H. and C. above, stand for
channels in "hot" and "cold" lines for 5 companies. The letters below ases No.2
through No.6, are the initials of the two companies interviewed in each case.
* Functions which the manufacturer shares with other agents.
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF VERTICALLY INTEGRATED FUNCTIONS AND NON·













































On the other hand, there are functions such as transportation which20 are very
seldom performed by manufacturers . Moral hazard problems with employees
driving company owned vehicles (see Section 10.3.9) makes it more efficient for
manufacturers to leave that function to be performed by the market.
The internalization of other functions depends on product characteristics and
on the evolution of relative imperfections in markets for channel functions.
10.3.2. Market Structure Affects Channel Structure
Market imperfections in each function affect management decisions about
channel structure. Each function is purchased in a different market with a different
structure, and thus, may have a very different impact on channel design. For example,
manufacturers may find, as the empirical results show, that supplier markets for
transportation, collection and sales are more competitive than for financing,
merchandising or service. The more competitive the market, the more efficient it is
for manufacturer to "buy" the function instead of "making" it internally.
This also has important effects on control. Sometimes, manufacturers would
like to exert more control since product characteristics may demand it, e.g.
perishability, sale and post sale service, required information, or in Williamson's
terms, when more specific assets are required for channel functions. Nevertheless, the
market structure for these functions may stand in the way of achieving these
objectives and managers may have to settle for other alternatives.
lO.3.3.Imperjections in the Loan Market May Induce Vertical Integration
or Functional Spin-Off
Imperfections in the loan market have important implications in channel
design. The existing literature has concentrated on the issue of consumer credit while
intra-channel financing has been totally ignored in theoretical and empirical research.
However, we found that financing between channel members has an important impact
on channel structure.
20 Only Savoy (chocolate) performs this function without using independent transportation
companies (See Table No 1).
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In fact, structural imperfections in the loan market forces the emergence of an
internal credit market Even when they are equilibrium, loan markets are
characterized by credit rationing. In this case rationing has to do with other elements
different from price rigidity such as moral hazard and adverse selection problems
derived from informational asymmetries. When a bank gives a loan, what it obtains
in exchange is a promise of repayment of the principal plus a fixed amount of
interest The banker has no way of evaluating with certainty, the quality of the
promise nor can he costlessly monitor the behaviour of the borrower (moral hazard).
Furthermore, if the bank decides to increase borrowing rates, it may have a
contradictory effect: it attracts riskier projects. Higher interest rates induce firms to
undertake projects with a lower probability of success but a higher payoff when
successful.
There is an interest rate r (Figure 2) which is the bank optimal rate, and
maximizes the expected return to the bank n (Stiglitz as Weiss, 1981). Hence by
charging this profit maximizing rate, there is excess demand in the credit market
(Figure 3).
FIG. 2







Thus because of the adverse selection effect, borrowing rates do not increase
, ilib . . situation of
until the market clears and the financial market reaches equ num in a .
credit rationing. As a consequence, channel members generate their re~u1f~me.nts
through an internal credit market. If fmancial markets were perfect, the distribution
channel would not perform any credit operation since it would be unable to compete
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~ith b~ in .the provision of funds, so that nobody would be better off. These
imperfections in the credit market, though structural te d b
, n to e exacerbated in
underdeveloped economies.
FIGURE 3








qR qE quantity of loans
E =perfect market equilibrium
R =credit rationing equilibrium
i R =profit maximizing interest rate
Internal financing impacts channel structure in three different ways. First, the
non-financial agent may find some loans profitable which banks do not. The channel
agent usually has better ex-post control, better information about the business and
about the borrower, easing the asymmetric information problem and the moral hazard
effect. In otherwords, the channel member sees the same financing function with less
risk than the bank21.
The empirical research shows that some companies have been able to spin-off
channel functions by lending important resources to channel agents. This is the case
for POLAR and PERUGINA who have been able to spin-off the transportation
function to owner-drivers through leasing. In this manner the driver buys a truck
when it would have been impossible for him to obtain financing at a bank. These two
companies were able to design a more efficient channel since they could avoid
21 For the theoretical discussion of these issues, see Chapter 3.
229
agency problems and moral hazard issues which arise when employees drive
company owned vehicles. (See section 10.3.9.)
Second, high inventory fmancing to retailers in order to develop the market
has been on~ ~e most ~~mmon strategies for industries and products in the early
stages of their life cycle . When wholesalers did not have the financial strength to
develop suppliers of retailing functions, manufacturers integrated into wholesaling.
Thus, imperfections in the financial market in this case caused the vertical integration
into wholesaling, since retailers could not find financing in the loan market and the
manufacturers had to internalize the function.
POLAR and NACIONAL in the beer industry, had to integrate the financing
function to retailers and to do so were forced to buy-out the wholesalers they were
using during the 1950's. Thus, finance to retailers impacted channel structure
inducing vertical integration.
In Case 1 the opposite is true. YUKERY, FRICA, INDULAC and ll..APECA
use small wholesalers for the distribution of their products to smaller shops (about
15% of total sales) because they perceive these outlets as representing a higher
financial risk. Two issues should be stressed in order to explain this difference. First,
the beer industry is highly concentrated whereas the juice industry is much more
competitive. This affects the ability of retailers to play one supplier against the other,
by accumulating debts with all of them, as in the case of men's wear. Second, the
brewers needed to develop retail services (i.e. bars) in order to expand demand for
their product, while this was not a strategic objective in the dairy or fruit juice
industry, where consumption is done mostly at home.
Even if cost advantages are not present because neither the asymmetry of
information nor the moral hazard problem can be improved by internalizing the
financial function, some channel members may be able to impose non-profitable
financing on others. To avoid this, the latter may decide to integrate vertically. In the
case of MONTECRISTO and RORI, both companies integrated forward into retailing
because competition with other suppliers made it difficult to recover loans, causing
them to realize that it was becoming more expensive to fmance retailers than to set up
their own shops.
22 Inventory financing to develop retail functions was present in all cases except for those where
highlyperishable products were distributed.
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In the pharmaceutical industry intra-channel fmancing is given by the
wholesalers (the strongest in the chain) to chemists while manufactur . . t
' ur, ers insis on not
selling directly to chemists because they "pay when they feel like it". Wholesalers in
this case extend credit to chemists because they enjoy a cost advantage in doing so
when compared to manufacturers and banks. Manufacturers do not have the power to
exert the ex-post control which wholesalers have.
10.3.4. Moral Hazard Behaviour in Consumer Financing May Induce
Retailing Spin-Off
In the electrical appliance industry, firms are getting out of retailing and
selling outlets to specialists. Even though this behaviour supports industry cycle
theories, it is important to stress that according to other approaches (transaction costs
and marketing), vertical integration into retailing should be expected given the need
to have trained sales personnel and post-sale service.
It was found in this case, that due to the general slowdown in the economy,
consumer fmancing became an important competitive tool. This is to be expected for
electrical appliances (e.g., televisions, refrigerators) given their high price/income
ratios. However, independent retail outlets began to offer part-exchange deals. This
fmancing mechanism introduces an element of asymmetric information into the
transaction: the owner of the old appliance possesses information which would be too
costly for the retailer to discover. As a result, the part-exchange transaction becomes
subject to moral hazard behaviour from the owner of the used appliance23.
Specialized retailer chains may be able to deal with this problem more effectively
than the manufacturer. Given this form of consumer fmancing, it may be more
efficient to leave all retail-related functions (e.g. sales and post-sale service) under
the responsibility of specialists.
10.3.5.1Ack ofSpecialists May Induce Vertical Integration and/or
Suppliers Development: An Explanation for the Absence of Wholesalers
Another element which came out strongly in the empirical research as
impacting channel structure is the lack of market alternatives (suppliers) which would
23 Akerlof (1984) identifies the same phenomenon in his famous article "market for lemons"
when analysing information asymmetries in markets for used cars.
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permit to "buy" functions in the market. There is little choice for companies which
may prefer not to perform channel functions when there is a lack of specialized
markets. In this situation, the manufacturer is forced into vertical integration.
The oldest companies which began operations in the 1940's and 1950's
controlled hierarchically almost all channel functions. This can be explained through
different approaches. The industry life cycle theory (Stigler,1951) stresses that lack
of specialists is the consequence of diseconomies of scale in certain firm functions
when markets are too small or when industries are new. According to this theory, as
markets grow, economies of scale and scope develop and specialists emerge in order
to benefit from them.
All industries analysed in the empirical research have reached maturity.
Hence, we would have expected to identify a trend towards less integrated structures,
but this result was not found. Instead, some companies had spun-off some functions,
but also that others had become even more integrated.
According to the functional (Mallen, 1973) and life cycle (Lilien,.1979)
theories, products would tend to have more integrated distribution channels during
early stages of development and, as markets grow and mature, they would tend to
leave the functions to be performed by specialists who can accumulate the economies
of scope and scale that individual manufacturers can not.
It is true that when NESTLE (non-pasteurized dairy products and juices, now
called INDULAC) began operating in the 1940's, it carried out almost all functions
(e.g. sales to retailers, collection, transportation, storage, financing, merchandising,
promotion and information) and sold directly to retailers. However, in contrast with
life-cycle theories, 50 years later, INDULAC still keeps hierarchical control over all
functions except transportation, as do all other firms in the industry 24
When SAVOY (the leader in the chocolate and sweets industry) could not
find markets for the required distribution functions when it started operations in 1941
it integrated vertically and directly served retailers. The key element was product
perishability and the lack of insulated transportation units needed to maintain product
quality. Fifty years later, SAVOY still keeps a fleet of 1000 trucks and serves directly
24 This is true for 85% of sales. The rest is distributed through very small wholesalers to very
small retailers.
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100,000 retailers. It is the only company in the sample which keeps hierarchical
control of all functions including transportation. (See section 3.9.)
The alternative explanation could be that markets are structurally small and
that no important economies of scale or scope can be achieved by specialists.
Nevertheless, large independent wholesalers have been operating in the country for
over 50 years, distributing consumer products. Most of them started with the
distribution of imported liquor, incorporating later other imported products and
finally locally manufactured goods. The shared criticism among managers is that
these distributors have been extracting monopoly profits from their clients by
constantly increasing prices without improving service. They have been showing this
monopolistic behaviour by increasing margins at higher levels than it would cost
manufacturers to perform the functions themselves. According to managers from one
of the fruit juice companies interviewed, they had to cancel the agreement they had
with their distributor since they were charging them 15% of sales while after
integrating, distribution is only costing them 8% of sales.
Managers expect independent distribution companies to perform other
functions besides transportation. On the other hand, independent distributors do not
see themselves as promoting sales and they expect manufacturers to spend more in
advertising to increase demand.
In recent years, the merchandising function, for example, has become an
important tool since markets have become more competitive. Due to policy changes
oriented to open the economy to foreign competition, the seller market conditions
enjoyed by most firms for many years has changed. Independent distributors have
never wanted to perform merchandising, thus leaving it to manufacturers.
Manufacturers have also traditionally controlled other functions such as customer
service, risk bearing for returned merchandise, storage and financing.
Thus, from the manufacturers point of view, distributors are "expensive
transportation companies". A more efficient solution has been to vertically integrate
all other functions including sales and collection, which were performed by
independent distributors, and subcontract the transportation to independent
transportation companies.
It has been argued in the cases that the reasons for manufacturers to have
maintained vertical control over the functions, contradicting life cycle theories, are:
1) that monopolistic behaviour shown by independent distributors has
made vertical integration profitable for manufacturers and
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2) ~at age~cy costs make the spin-off of functions like merchandising,
nsk beanng or sales to retailers too expensive for the manufacturer.
In these cases, hierarchical organisations offer a more efficient solution
because:
1) they generate better incentive scheme and
2) they lower monitoring costs.
MONTECRISTO and RORI in the apparel industry as well as POLAR and
NACIONAL in the beer industry also had to face lack of specialized markets, but in
their case, they had to invest important resources developing retailing specific
functions25(e.g. fitting, alterations, amenities).
Aggressive campaigns to develop retailers had to be launched. POLAR and
NACIONAL needed to increase the number of bars, which they did by financing
inventories, improving facades, giving away refrigerated space, furniture and liquor
licences. On the other hand, MONTECRISTO and RORI wanted to grow through
mass production. They needed a faster and denser retail network and hence more
outlets. They left the merchandise on consignment until retailers had no more
inventory space, until they could sell it.
With such an aggressive strategy to develop suppliers of retailing functions,
existing independent distributors could not perform up to manufacturers expectations.
In the beer industry, manufacturers, and specifically POLAR, integrated vertically
into wholesaling by buying-out all independent distributors26. In the apparel




Manufacturers invest important resources in order to develop retailers, and very often, .due
to their oligopolistic structure and to the absence of wholesalers, manufacturers and retailers
evolve into bilateral monopoly relationships.
As opposed to what could be predicted by the life cycle theories, they became more
integrated with time.
It is important to establish the differences between the wholesaling .function ~ the beer
business and the apparel industry. There are approximately 250 r~tail o~tlets ~ ~e becher
.. 's h lin Also the pncejweight ratio IS muindustry for each retailer m the men s eavy e wear. . '
lower which makes the transportation function more expensive.
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For the same reasons, in the electrical appliance industry, General Electric
integrated forward into retailing when they started business in Venezuela during the
1940's. In this case, specialists markets have evolved and G.E. is now selling their
retail outlets to them.
One of the issues which has hampered the development of independent
wholesalers in Venezuela is the highly oligopolistic nature of many industries. This
gives manufacturers important market power which they can use to demand
exclusivity contracts with wholesalers. In other words, wholesalers cannot distribute
products from other competitors. This has hampered wholesalers from benefiting
from economies of scale and scope. The opposite case was found 10 the
pharmaceutical industry, where manufacturers, being highly atomistic, do not
demand exclusivity and big wholesaling companies have developed.
10.3.6. Retailers Monopolistic Behaviour May Induce Vertical Integration
or Functional Spin-Off
Individual retailers can enjoy important market power by being spatial
monopolies. This monopoly power according to the empirical results is enhanced
when:
1) The transactions are over the counter. This element gives the salesman
more power to influence consumer choice and to have more control
over sales. We found that in many retail outlets, consumers do not
have direct access to the merchandise (e.g. bakeries, small
supermarkets, chemist shops, bars, men's clothes shops and some
electrical appliances stores).
2) Economies of scope are large. Especially when, according t~
consumers buying patterns, a specific variety of ~oods.pe~ts them to
save searching time. e.g. complementary goods like SU1ts,. shirts ~d
ties, or fresh bread, milk and juice which consumers buy 10 bakenes
every day.
3) The asset specificity required for selling functions is ~gh: e.~...
refrigerated space, highly trained personnel, and physical facilities
(store design).
4) Brand loyalty is low, thus consumer searching time is also low.
5) Consumers have limited means of transportation.
. . t th pply of retailing functions.6) When government regulations restnc e su. .. ill
( e.g. regulating the number of bars or of chemists within a spec 1C
area).
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Retailers use such power to extract monopoly rents from manufacturers or
independent distributors. The strategies followed by manufacturers or wholesalers
have been mixed. Some of them have integrated forward into retailing
(MONTECRISTO in men's wear) whereas others, such as the producers of
pasteurized goods, have preferred market transactions or even to spin-off functions to
another agent in the chain: the independent wholesaler.
Analysing the problem in agency theory terms, the incentive incompatibility
between the principal and the retailer (the agent) may be addressed in two contrasting
ways. In some cases, the principal decides to use a hierarchy (See Case 2, Apparel) to
eliminate the problem and undertakes forward vertical integration into retailing in
spite of the losses in economies of scope. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that
MONTECRISTO, who assumed the most drastic strategy, (selling only in totally
owned stores) had to develop a product diversification plan which included
subcontracting complementary lines in order to offer consumers the variety they
expected.
The opposite strategy has been to design a more flexible structure where
transactions with retailers are left totally to the market (Case 1, Pasteurized Products).
Since manufacturers could not develop incentives within a hierarchy to make their
employees negotiate successfully every day with retailers, they decided to spin off
some functions28 (e.g. transportation, sales to retailers, storage, collections and
financing) to independent agents. For other reasons (quality control) which we will
discuss below, they decided to keep other functions under direct control.
Differences in strategy are a consequence of relative losses in economies of
scope and/or scale; and of differences in set up costs for retail chains which are much
higher for companies who chose the second alternative. Nevertheless, "partial" efforts
in the direction of vertical integration have been made by some of them; INLACA
gives refrigerators without cost to retailers as long as only sell their products.
28 It is also a highly competitive market with very lowbrand loyalty.
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10.3.7. Bargaining Costs Within a Bilateral Monopoly Relation Affects
Channel Structure '
As a specific case of lack of specialized markets in the theoretical framework,
the impact of bilateral monopoly on channel structure deserves special attention. The
core of the argument is that, since each agent has market power over the other,
bargaining costs tend to be very high and transactions very expensive. Moreover,
output is lower and the price higher than under competition. In these cases, vertical
integration is privately and socially desirable (Chapter 1). For the individual firm, it
is beneficial when such a strategy implies higher net present profits: a better
price/output relationship with less bargaining costs.
We found in the pharmaceutical industry that wholesalers and retailers have
engaged in bilateral monopoly negotiations which have in tum induced vertical
integration (Case 6). The spatial monopoly of chemist shops has been exacerbated by
government regulations setting a maximum number of chemist shops per
geographical area, and bilateral monopoly negotiations have also been increased due
to government regulations which set maximum margins at retail and wholesale levels.
We did not find vertical control from manufacturers to wholesalers as
predicted by other theories (e.g. the transaction cost approach).
10.3.8. The Objectives ofControl Affect Channel Structure: the Presence of
Externalities Force Manufacturers to Perform Key Functions Internally
Manufacturers who produce branded products, always want to control the
channel. In the empirical research only one company expressed unwillingness to
participate in any distribution activity. The company, INSANOVA, is an electrical
appliance manufacturer who produces unbranded white line goods and sells them to
other original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who then perform all marketing
activities29.
Thus, in some cases, the need for channel control comes from the fact that
there is a brand name to protect. This makes the brand keeper the agent with the
29 INSANOVA has recently changed its strategy since they have started to develop its own
brand which now represents 8% of total sales.
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highest interest in keeping product quality and avoiding negative externalities along
the channel30.
We will define channel control the possibility which brand keepers have to:
a) Maintain quality and avoid negative externalities and to
b) Stimulate dernani3 1 through sales promotion.
30
31
Externalities arise when there are costs which are not paid (negative) or benefits which are
not charged (positive). Negative externalities arise when a spoiled product is sold or a
guarantee is not respected by the dealer, damaging the reputation of the brand name.
(Chapter 3)
The alternative way of stimulating demand is through advertising, creating brand awareness
and brand loyalty with the objective of making consumers search for the product. This
strategy has been defined in the literature as a "pull" strategy as opposed to the "push"
strategy which stimulates demand through the distribution channel.
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Nevertheless it is important to stress th
strategically important, stimUlating demand a~ even. though both objectives are
advertising) whereas quality standards, avo~: e achi~ved by o~e: means, (e.g.
riders" on the company's brand name is onI hig nbelgative externalities and "free-
, y ac eva e through channel control.
. . Depending on the strategic value which the company attaches to either
objective (product quality and/or sales promotion) th .
. . e unpact on structure will be
different since the functions to be controlled differ.
1) If quality is the main reason behind the need to control, the functions which





2) If alternatively, promoting sales is the dominant objective, functions like
the following will tend to be vertically integrated:
a) sales to retailers,
b) sales to consumers and consumer service,
c) promotion,
d) information,
e) financing to retailers and
f) financing to consumers.
The integration of the transportation function will depend on whether or not it
can be separated from sales.
The empirical research shows that the companies that produced brand
products had vertically integrated functions which impact quality control with the
objective of avoiding negative externalities. FRIGILUX (electrical appliances) does
not own retailers and does not have, as its competitor does, exclusive dealers.
Nevertheless it does exert control: it provides post-sale service through vertically
controlled units. Pharmaceutical laboratories, which sell over 90% of their products
to independent distributors, vertically control the risk-bearing function and company
supervisors visit chemist to check expiry dates and storage conditions. The same
happens in pasteurized products, where manufacturers may find it difficult to use the
channel in order to promote sales but do control vertically the risk-bearing function
and have supervisors visiting retailers in order to check the products, their expiry
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dates and th~ way they are displayed. POLAR decided to have vertically controlled
warehouses in order to guarantee quality and rapid delivery.
On the other hand, the objective of promoting sales is more difficult to
achieve and usually more costly. This can be concluded by just looking at the list of
functions which would have to be controlled. The investment required to open
retailers, or to buy the transportation units in order to sell directly to retailers can be
too high if compared to the potential sales increase. In the next section the problems
associated with transportation will be analysed.
10.3.9. Agency Costs in Transportation Impact Channel Structure
Transportation costs are usually very high, and empirical results show that
companies tend to spin-off transportation when possible. The different elements
which influence such possibility will be evaluated.
Financial costs associated with the price of trucks may be important
depending on product characteristics (e.g. bulk, weight and perishability).
Nevertheless, what stands out in the research is that agency costs are perceived by
management as the determinant issue for functional spin-off. In fact, moral hazard
problems associated with careless behaviour by drivers in company owned vehicles
induce companies to leave the transportation function to an external agent. This
element, though absent from the literature, has shown to be an important factor in
channel design and was thus incorporated in the theoretical framework.
There are different issues in transportation which impact channel structure:
a) The possibility of separating the transportation function from other
functions.
b) The financial costs of transportation,
c) The agency costs of transportation.
Usually transportation and sales cannot be separated when the number of
transactions is high (numerous retailers and frequent visits) because it is more
efficient to concentrate in one person, the driver, the sales, transportation and
collection functions.
This is particularly true when the distribution network is characterized by
small, family owned and low capital retail shops. As opposed to environments
dominated by big retail chains, these scattered outlets have very little centralized
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purchasing power and storage capacity32. These characteristics make visits more
numerous (to each retail outlet) and more frequent (smaIl inventories); and thus,
transportation and sales become more difficult to separate since all functions collapse
under the responsibility of the driver.
If transportation can be separated from sales, then companies spin-off
transportation to specialized third parties, while they keep hierarchical control of
sales to retailers (Fig.No 5).
The reasons for spinning-off the function are two: the costs of buying and
maintaining the transportation units and the agency costs due to moral hazard
behaviour displayed by truck drivers with company owned vehicles.
The owner driver has become an efficient alternative for dealing with both
problems: less agency and fmancial costs but with individual drivers with whom sales
agreements can be negotiated.
32 For a discussion on the impact of the transportation function in less developed economies,
see Chapter 3.
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According to the empirical results, owner drivers are an efficient solution
when:
a) transport costs are relatively high (bulk and weight of products)
b) when the need to promote sales is low. '
Manufacturers with mature products, longer life cycles and with leadership
power, usually have less need to promote sales through the channel. These elements
reduce incentive compatibility problems between the company and the owner driver,
since these usually arise when merchandising and sales promotion are important
tasks. If manufacturers have to launch frequently new products with short life cycles,
the incentive scheme is more difficult to design and company controlled employees
are a more efficient solution.
POLAR, SAVOY and PERUGINA illustrate these elements very well.
POLAR beer began to use owner drivers after they had achieved market leadership.
Before that, they completely controlled sales and transportation. Now, they are
having important problems trying to make owner drivers promote sales of new
products. POLAR has a strong distribution network to sell mature products but
cannot control the channel enough to promote sales for products in the early stages of
their life-cycle.
On the other hand SAVOY, in the chocolate industry has smaller
transportation costs, shorter life cycles for their products, and more need to push sales
for new products. For them, a hierarchically controlled sales force has worked very
well and that is probably the reason why they have not changed to an owner drivers
system, in spite of what many theories would predict. PERUGINA, SAVOY's new
competitor, imitated POLAR's distribution system with owner-drivers, but since they
need to push new products, with shorter life cycles and without leadership power,
they are facing difficulties with owner drivers who are not happy with the
arrangement.
10.3.10. Barriers to Entry are the ResultofDealing with Different Market
Imperfections and Agency Problems. Ex-Post, Building Channels May
Imply Building Walls
According to the strategic approach, distribution channels can be important
barriers to entry, designed by firms to deter competition. Theoretical frameworks like
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm and competitive advantage theories,
have stressed that distribution channels are important strategic elements for corporate
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performance. Threatened by a new entrant, incumbents may decide to hamper their
access to channels. To be able to do so companies may spe d . rtan
' n impo t resources
needed to control the channel so as to be in a position of imposing the restriction.
According to the empirical results, many of the older companies have strong
distribution networks which are seen by potential competitors as important barriers to
entry (SAVOY, POLAR, INDULAC, MADOSA and MONTECRISTO).
Nevertheless, what the specific cases show is that, in these companies, management
never made a strategic ex-ante decision to build barriers to entry with the objective of
deterring competition.
What emerges from the cases is that these companies have been making
decisions on channel design by facing a wide variety of problems: imperfections in
the financial markets, retailer markets, absence of specialized markets for distribution
functions, monopolistic behaviour by some suppliers, and agency problems.
The theoretical argument and study proposition that firms ex-ante decide,
(because of its strategic impact), to integrate forward so as to increase barriers to
entry was not confirmed by the research. What was found, is that organising
distribution functions can become so costly when dealing with agency problems and
market imperfections, that once the channel is built, it constitutes ex-post a barrier for
future entrants.
The popular barriers to entry argument has been applied too readily in many
attempts to judge distribution activities. This, we believe, is the result of a limited
understanding of the intrinsic complexity of designing efficient distribution networks.
10.3.11. Avoiding Post-Contractual Opportunistic Behaviour. How Does it
Affect Channel Structure?
The concept of opportunistic behaviour has been dangerously extended to
portray different types of human conduct. It has been defmed as: a type of "self
interest guided by deceit", or "self interest seeking with guile" or a "devious kind of
self-interest behaviour" (see Chapters 1 and 3). The concept has been abusively used
by subjectively evaluating human conduct, making it difficult to distinguish it from
rational competitive self-interest behaviour of firms in imperfect markets. For
example, if a retailer in a well located shop asks for higher margins to carry a specific
product line, this could be called opportunism instead of profiting from spatial
monopoly. Opportunism has also been confused with moral hazard behaviour, which
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as an agency problem, can be approached and solved differently. In the proposed
theoretical framework, (Chapter 3) an effort to separate both has been made in order
to evaluate rational competitive conducts as such, and to separate them from
behaviour guided by deceit (opportunism).
In doing so, opportunism was confined to two very specific situations: post
contractual opportunistic behaviour in the presence of specialized quasi-rents33 and
contract reinterpretatiorr'f.
In the empirical research these elements were very seldom found. Only in
Case 1, opportunistic behaviour by appropriation of specialized quasi-rents was
shown by retailers (the bakeries), who enjoy high monopoly power by owning scarce
refrigerated space. In these circumstances they lie about margins given by other
suppliers in order to extract higher rents from them, hardly a deceit that is likely to be
long-lived.
The reasons for the absence of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour as
defined in the framework can be the following. First, the danger of appropriation of
specialized quasi-rents occurs when high asset specificity is required, and this is more
common in manufacturing than in distribution; and second, that transactions are more
frequent in distribution which make spot negotiations more important than long term
arrangements.
10.4. Final Conclusions and Comments.
The cross-case analysis made in this chapter permitted us to use the empirical
findings to extract general lessons which have enriched the theoretical framework
proposed. It has also allowed us to evaluate the adequacy of the different approaches
found in the literature. The main conclusions are derived from the fact that
distribution channels are complicated systems where different functions have to be
performed by the most efficient agent; that each function belongs to a different
33
34
.. t d and opportunistic behaviour mayAs assets become more specific, quasi rents are erea e
arise to appropriate them (Chapter 3).
. . . Th b h .our is opportunistic when deceitFavorable reinterpretation of contract provisions. e e avi
is guiding the logic of such reinterpretation.
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market with its specific competitive forces and intrinsic characteristics; and that each
function can be organised differently. These issues have different implications.
From the point of view of organisational theory, one of the most important
findings is that highly industry specific or product specific theories have little
explanatory value for the cases. They fail to explain differences in channel design
among firms belonging to the same industry and the changes over a time made by a
company. On the other hand, agency theory proved to be useful, because its unit of
analysis is more generic: contracts among self-interest-seeking individuals. This
approach permits a better comprehension of individual firm strategies and also of
management discretion.
Another implication is that channel design is a dynamic and continuous
process which requires important managerial skills. Firms have to constantly respond
to changes in market forces which affect channel functions; and the way
organisations respond to those changes can have an important impact on corporate
performance and market power.
Also, this function/market approach to distribution has allowed us to identify
specific market imperfections, (e.g. fmancing and transportation) which have
interesting theoretical explanations and strategic implications for firms.
Finally, even though the case studies were carried out in a specific country,
Venezuela, the elements which came out in the analysis lead to broader issues which
are likely to arise in most managerial contexts.
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CHAPTER 11
LESSONS, IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the implications of our research for
managerial practice and public policy issues. Also, some guidelines and ideas for
further research will be discussed.
1. Managerial Implications
Our study can be used to derive practical guidelines for management to
identify those elements which should be considered when "designing" distribution
"channels". However, it is clear now that distribution channels are not "channels"
and, they are not "designed" either. The process of building or structuring a
distribution network is dynamic and highly competitive, resembling very little the
image of managers sitting at their desks drawing alternative paths, avenues or
motorways for their products to reach the consumer. It is instead an active process
where competition forces operate on a daily basis, shaping and reshaping the way
transactions are organised and causing considerable organizational change over time.
Since sales are made through the distribution network, competitors usually
meet in this arena But one of the lessons stemming from our empirical research is
that in building distribution channels, managers have to face not only changes in
market forces from competitive products, but also from markets for channel functions
such as transportation, financing. storage and services.
The following elements offer a "check list approach" of the theoretical
framework presented in Chapter 3. The issues presented below are only guidelines for
a process which should be continuous, strategic and dynamic. The list is presented as
if it were being put directly to managers.
a) Identify all channel functions (actual and potential) which have to be
performed for your products, or product lines. Sometimes it is difficult to list the
array of functions which are performed within the channel and there is an erroneous
tendency to consider transportation and storage as the most important ones. The
following list will help to recognize them:
1) Sales to retailers




6) Financing to retailers or any other channel agent




11) Information: to the channel and from the channel
12) Post-sale service
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b) Identify your channel objectives (e.g. quality control and sales promotion)
and choose the functions with higher strategic value accordingly. Examples are
presented in the following table.
c) List the specific skills needed to perform the functions (e.g. level of
education or specific knowledge required to sell your product to retailers or
consumers and type of transportation and delivery service required).
d) Check which functions can be structurally separated. For example, if the
transportation function can be structurally separated from sales you can also separate
the skills needed for transportation from those for sales.
e) By analysing competitors of similar products develop function/market
matrices where market structures and competition forces for each function can be
analysed. For example, who and how many are the suppliers of transportation? What
kind of service do they offer? Are they unionized? Who can provide credit to the
consumer? To the retailer? If post-sale service is needed to comply with guarantee
commitments, how many suppliers of the specific repair service required are there? Is
it a competitive market? Do any of them have ties with your competition?
STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS ACCORD










2.1) Sales to retailers




2.5) Financing to retailers
2.6) Financing to consumers
2.7) Transoortation1.
f) Identify possible agents to perform each function.
g) Try to arrange transactions by developing self-enforcing contracts for each
function, that is, contracts which would make channel agents comply with your
objectives (defined above) through self interest behaviour.
h) You may find that due to market imperfections some of those contracts are
easier to achieve by internalizing the function, thus assigning them to your own
employees. However, do not act just on first impressions. In many cases, you may
also find that due to informational asymmetries it is hard to control certain functions
through a hierarchy and these may be easier to achieve with looser forms of
organisation. The variables which impact this decision are presented in the following
table.
1Especially when the transportation and the sales function can not be separated.
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VARIABLES WHICH IMPACT VERTICAL CONTROL OF DISTRIBUTION
FUNCTIONS








-Difficult for channel members to
find bank financing?
-Do you know the borrower and his
business skills?
-How are your ex-post control
costs?
BaATERAL MONOPOLY:
-Are the products you offeran
important proportion of the products
offered by your retailers?
OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOUR:
-Is the alternative value (use) for
the assets required for the channel
function you are analysing?
-Are contracts easy to be reinterpreted
by the channel agent for his own benefit?
AGENCY PROBLEMS:
-How are your channel objectives
when compared with the channel member
you are evaluating? ..
_To monitor the agent behaviour 1S
GOVERNANCE COSTS:
-Are your clients numerous?
-Does the distribution network
. . ?have a centralized purchasmg capacity .
ECONOMIES OF SCOPE AND SCALE:
-Are large suppliers more efficient
-Are exclusivity agreements
usual practice? .






























i) Make an initial decision to control by analysing each function individuall
Y d
. y.
ou may ecide to control as many functions as you need oi .
• • (:)4ven your strategic
ObJec~:es ..Are ~ere synergies be~~n. the individual functions which you may
exploit? Is 1t feasible to separate the individual functions you require?
2. Further Research
One of the principal contributions of this research has been to propose a
theoretical framework where channel decisions can be analysed by functions. In
doing so, we have stressed the need to view channel decisions strategically given that
the structure and the imperfections in the markets for functions have an impact in the
way the distribution network can be organised efficiently. Furthermore, given the
presence of multiple agents with different individual objectives, attention must be put
to the agency problem caused by incentive incompatibility both among channel
members and within each organisation. As the empirical evidence suggests, these are
crucial in determining the evolution of contract forms and organisational structures.
In this sense, it can be said that this research attacks one of the problems
identified in the survey on the distribution channel literature made by Frazier (1991)
who stated that:
"What is needed in the future is to change the solely
descriptive orientation of the research on channel
functions" .(Frazier, op. cit p.268).
Frazier specifically mentioned the lack of research on the "nature" of
necessary functions in the distribution channel, on the "why" and "how" given
functions have to be performed by members of the channel and on the "relative
importance" of functions across different channel contexts.
We would stress that it is also important to understand why given functions
have to be performed by specific channel members and how an efficient division of
responsibilities is accomplished. We believe that the way functions are divided
among channel agents in successful cases is the result of a cost minimizing process
by which the most efficient agent ends up performing the task, whether by design or
by chance, taking into account the financial. transactional and agency costs involved.
In other words, there is an implicit optimizing mechanism in choosing specific agents
for channel functions which links functions with structure and which is highly
important for the development (or not) of the firm's competitive advantage. We
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believe that these issues have been ignored in the literature h din
. . . w ere accor g to the
usual division of research areas, research on functions is mistakenl ..... . d
uu., y u eate separately
from research on Structure such as vertical integration or other types of inter-fIrm
linkage.
We believe that the general orientation of future research should be less
product and/or industry specific, and more geared to understanding the strategic
elements which allow managerial discretion in a competitive environment. This
research has shown that numerous battles are fought in this arena and that managers
have made important changes in the distribution network, even in circumstances
where products and industries have changed little in the period analysed.
1) We believe that in general (the specific areas of research are mentioned
below) this opens an important new area of research on competitive advantage in or
through distribution channels by exploring how the dynamics of markets for different
channel functions mold alternative channel structures.
2) Comparative studies of multinationals beginning operations in other
countries with similar products would be a good place to start. This would permit an
evaluation of the different strategies followed by the same corporation with identical
products in different countries. In other words, with this set of variables, new insights
could be drawn from the way different market structures impact channel design. We
have analysed how companies, with different products in various industries have
faced the problem of building a distribution network. In doing so, interesting
problems emerged dealing with the way: a) functions are organised, b) contracts are
designed and c) differences in market structure impact channel decisions.
Multinationals must take distribution decisions in different countries with radically
dissimilar market structures. For example, how would strategies followed in less
developed economies by Procter & Gamble, Colgate-Palmolive or Nestle differ from
those chosen in environments where markets for suppliers of channel functions are
more competitive?
3) The financing function offers interesting new avenues for research. Two
types of financing must be distinguished as impacting channel structure: consumer
and intra-channel fmancing2. We have analysed how intra-channel financing has a
considerable impact on the way a channel structure evolves. Also, we have discussed
2 Financing among channel agents.
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how new ways of cons~er fm~cing such as "part-exchange deals" are affecting
channel structure. These issues reuse the question of how intra-channel financing is
affected by consumer fmancing. For example, if alternative sources of fmancing
(besides the retailer) are available for the consumer how does it diminish the pressure
on the needs for intra-channel financing (e.g. financing from manufacturers to
retailers. In particular, has the emergence of credit cards and other new possibilities
of consumer credit impacted channel structure by, for example, lowering capital
requirements of retailers?
As far as intra-channel fmancing is concerned, further research is required in
order to achieve a deeper understanding of the impact of imperfections in the loan
market on channel structure3. A survey research can be conducted in order to asses
how channel structure varies according to the following variables:
a) The existence or not of a cost advantage of a specific channel agent
when compared to banks (e.g. the manufacturer, the wholesaler or the
retailer) and
b) The market structure of each channel agent (e.g. monopolistic or
competitive).
The results from this research will bring new insights on issues such as tied
loans, forced financing and profitable intra-channel financing, which would shed
some light on competition policy issues. Also, it would help to understand the logic
of the illegal and informal distribution structures (also called "rackets") which usually
distribute agricultural products and pay very low prices to farmers.
These "undesirable" distribution networks are very common in less developed
economies where market imperfections are high4. Sometimes they work in parallel
with more formal distribution systems but are sometimes preferred by producers for
3 A theoretical parallel can be drawn between the emergence of an inte~al loan. mar~et in
distribution due to imperfections in the loan market and the effect imperfections m the
capital markets have had on firm structure (e.g. through the emergence of the multidivisional
form).
4 Chandler (1m) has reported that in the U.S. similar problems were radically reduced with the
invention of the telegraph and the construction of railroads..The telegraph allowed ~e
farmers and local banks to have rapid and accurate informauo? from unportant trading
d th trai ffered fast, cheap and safe transportation. These two elementscenters an e am ou.e~ ...ul al od cts in a far an
diminished the perceived risk of the transaction (buymg agne tur ~r u . .
isolated part of the country) and the competitive advantage of the informal distribution
system disappeared.
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being faster and more reliable or for offering financing or im licit i .
.. P Cl insurance against
crop .failures.. In this area the following issues should be researched. For example,
how informational asymmetries and structural imperfections in the loan market affect
markets where homogeneous products are the object of transaction in risky conditions
(e.g. agricultural products such as meat, potatoes and tomatoes which are common
"rackets,,5 in Venezuela).
4) Spatial monopolies enjoyed by retailers have been underestimated in the
theory6. The theoretical approaches analysed view integration into retailing as a
manufacturer's strategic move in which the countervailing power? of retailers is not
evaluated.
In this research we have found that there are very often circumstances in
which the opposite can be true and we have argued that the impact of spatial
monopolies enjoyed by retailers may be very important.
This opens new research questions. How have manufacturers reacted to the
spatial monopolies enjoyed by retailers? What strategies have they followed to
circumvent this source of market power? How have new technologies impacted this
relationship? For example, the spatial monopoly enjoyed by public houses (pubs) in
the D.K. has made vertical integration into retailing an attractive strategy followed by
British brewers. In other countries, and specifically in Venezuela, breweries have
never contemplated forward integration, but have chosen instead to give heavy
fmancing and support to retailers. What explains these differences? A comparison of
strategies followed by both industries would be useful to understand different
corporate strategies for similar products and to shed some light on their public policy
implications.
As far as the implications of technological changes is concerned, the
following questions are put forward. How has the spread of information technologies
5 The name commonly used for this type of distribution networks is "roscas"
6 It is important to mention that spatial monopolies are key concepts in regional theory and
location economics. See Isard, W.(1956, 1975 and 1990) and Czamanski, S. (1974).
7 ailing. P It Reprinted in The MarketingGalbraith, J. (1956) "The Concept of Counterv ower.
Channel a Conre. Viewpoint. Edited by Bruce Mallen. John Wiley & sons Inc. N.Y.
London, 1967.
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impacted retailers' spatial monopolies in the service industry, where information is an
important component of the product? For example, the relationship between airlines
and travel agencies must have been affected by the expansion and integration of the
telephone and computer networks. Were airlines, in the past, more dependent on
travel agencies for reservations and the provision of information than they are now?8.
Another example can be found in the banking sector where the introduction of
Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs) organized through networks accessible to several
banks may change the need or importance of directly controlling the banks retailing
operations which are traditionally carried out by agencies. This would constitute a
spin-off of previously integrated functions. Is spatial monopoly (proximity to the
nearest branch), an increasingly unimportant competitive advantage in the banking
sector?
On a more theoretical or normative dimension further research is needed in
the following areas.
5) Existing theories of channel structure can be tested by applying them, not
to the channel as a whole, but to specific functions, instead. Can Stigler's or
Williamson's approach be used to explain channel structure by functions. Can the
transaction cost theory enhance its predictive value if vertical integration decisions
are analysed by functions rather than by number of middlemen?
For example, there are firms which are subject to considerable externalities
and require highly specific assets which have not integrated forward into retailing, as
predicted by the transaction cost theory. In this research we have found that, instead,
they may integrate only the relevant functions, such as those required to maintain
product quality or reduce negative externalities (e.g. merchandising, risk bearing
and/or consumer service).
6) Agency theory can be studied in order to analyse its eventual use in
channel and contract design. The issue of achieving "incentive compatibility" among
network members may be a crucial task for channel leaders in order to accomplish
the systemic view of the channel.
8 A hypothesis would be that since today reservations can be made directly by telep~~:e to ~e
ical ' ti made possible by intormanonairlines this constitutes a case of vern integra on
technology,
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A specific research area is the evaluation of the use of a rti all
. ve c y controlled
sales force vs. independent salesmen. We have identified some of the elements which
help to. de~me self-enfo~Cing contracts in the organisation of the sales-force by
evaluating circumstances in which a vertically integrated sales-force is more efficient
than independent salesmen (e.g. owner drivers). A survey will be useful to identify
how market and product elements affect the transaction and how they determine the
relative efficiency of different incentive schemes.
This research has stressed the importance which manufacturers give to their
distribution channels and how they may help in achieving and maintaining a
competitive advantage. Further research is needed to understand how each channel
function can be used as a particular competitive tool and how design decisions over
those specific functions affect corporate competitive advantage in the long run.
3. Pollcy Issues
Every firm is vertically integrated to some degree, and this degree changes
continually. One of the initial motivations for this research was the concern that
vertical integration strategies into distribution channels were acting against the public
interest We wanted to fmd out whether the logic behind distribution channel
strategies was consistent with the commonly held view that explains it in tenus of
building barriers to entry or other anticompetitive goals. This view has been called
the "inhospitability tradition" by Williamson and is characterized by the fact that:
"The possibility that business practices are motivated by
efficiency purposes is not even considered. Instead, attention is
focussed on the possibility that some anticompetitive effect,
however remote, might be connected with the practice in
question." (Williamson,O. Antitrust Economics. Basil
Blackwell Ltd. Oxford, 1987 p. 153)
Thus, we wanted to go deeper and find out why managers choose more
complicated forms of transactions instead of keeping to the traditional market
exchange when designing distribution channels. If efficiency instead of monopoly
reasons guide management decisions then the policy implications are quite different.
Our view after conducting the research is that very little is known about the
forces which determine the way contracts are made for the distribution of products
and services. This implies that to have a set of laws which prohibit or restrict
contractual arrangements, as has been proposed for Venezuela, can be dangerous.
Contracts attempt to address agency problems, market imperfections, incentive
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incompatibilities, free riders, moral hazard issues other :...+ ti al .
. . . ' uuonna on asymmetries
and externalities. Given the complexity of these lSS·ues th d
, ere oes not seem to be a
role for government regulation of contract design9.
The barriers to entry argument seems like an incorrectly used metaphor when
compared with the real process by which distribution channels are built The fact that
distribution channels may require large and unavoidable capital outlays can be seen
by potential competitors as entry barriers. However, their existence may owe more to
successful management than to an ex-ante strategic commitment to deter competition.
Moreover, free access to such a system may lead to severe free rider problems which
the distribution system may have been designed to prevent
The question for policy makers should not be whether barriers to entry exist,
but whether they are avoidable and whether they adversely affect the public interest
Finding an answer to this question requires a detailed analysis of the existing
structure and of the potential changes which may be improve social efficiency.
In more general terms, we believe that, since the structure of contracts in
distribution channels responds to a complicated combination of variables, each
channel is almost unique in its nature and structure and, therefore, "general" policy
restrictions are bound to be inadequate. If the structure of a specific distribution
network is proven to have negative effects on the public interest then the case should
be analysed within its unique context and conditions. Policies should be developed on
a case-by-case basis, avoiding general prohibitions by law.
The impact of imperfections in the financial market also needs to be better
understood by policy makers. The liberalization of the financial market is bound to
have an impact on channel structure. Developing economies have usually repressive
fmancial policies (e.g. interest rate control) where real interest rates are negative.
These policies tend to create excess demand for credit, which exacerbates the
structural imperfections of loan markets described by Stiglitz & Weiss (1981). The
presence of excess demand for loans causes banks to direct their credit to large
companies with solid fmancial positions. Other members of the distribution channel
may be restricted, limiting potential entrants and increasing the importance of intra-
channel fmancing. As they say in Venezuela "banks only lend money to those who do
not need it".
9 This does not mean that competition policy should not exist, we will discuss that matter later.
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We have analysed extensively the impact which these imperf ti hec ons ave on
ch~el structure. It sug~ests that competition in the market for goods may be
positively affected by the liberalization of the financial sector.
The importance of a clearer understanding of the financial imperfection
problem on channel structure is highlighted by the recent row over the tied-loans in
the U.K. beer industry.
"We recommend the elimination of all loan ties. Those in force
at the date of publication should be allowed to run their course.
We intend that this measure should restore a substantial
measure of genuine freedom to the "free" trade. It should force
competition at the wholesale level on to prices, discounts and
quality of service, and should permit the emergence, over time,
of a more flourishing independent wholesale sector."
(Monopolies and Merger's Commission report on the Beer
Industry. 1989, p.5)
The report went further to recommend that the common practice of brewers
owning pubs and leasing them to tenants should be restricted. In 1989, these
recommendations were adopted with the intent to increase competition, "drive down
beer prices, and give pub-goers a wider choice of beers". Instead, two years later the
effects appeared to be the following:
"The beer industry is now dominated by four big brewers
instead of six (and City analysts predict the number might
shrink to two or three); beer prices have shot up by a real 10
percent or so over the past 12 months; and the largest brewers
are fixing deals which will ensure that their brands remain
dominant". (The Economist, August 31 - Sept 6, 1991)
Imperfections in the loan market affect channel structure because channel
members have informational advantages when compared to banks. The common view
places anticompetitive objectives in these tied-loan policies. This view fails to
understand the following issues:
a) Intra-channel financing is a consequence of imperfections in the
extemalloan market.
b) As with any other channel function, financing is perfo~ed within a
specific market structure to which the firm has to react 10 order to
compete.
c) There are imperfections (informational asymmetries) in the loan
market which may imply fmancing cost advantages for manufacturers.
In other words some manufacturersmay f10d ~om~ loans pro~table
while banks do not The reason is to be found 10 differences 10 the
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amount and structure.of the information available to banks relative tomanuf~turers regarding the borrower and on their relative difficulty
of exerting control after the credit is granted.
Competition policy has also tended to prohibit exclusivity contracts and
territorial restrictions. This is particularly true of the recent proposal being discussed
in the Venezuelan Congress, which is based on current legislation in Spain10. The
implicit assumption is that the abolition of these practices would cause the emergence
of a broader wholesale or retail distribution system. However, it may well be that
when confronted with these prohibitions, firms may choose to become vertically
integrated. For example, if market restrictions oriented to guarantee quality control
are prohibited, the firms may decide to integrate forward. If this is not allowed either,
product quality debasement will occur causing a negative effect on consumer welfare
that should also be considered.
As mentioned earlier, some of the entry restrictions and exclusivity
agreements intend to deal with free rider problems. For example, exclusive
distributors of a particular product are often also responsible for advertising. Free
entry may lead to insufficient incentives for each participant to carry out promotional
investments, as they would all try to get a free ride on their competitors expenditures.
In conclusion, the complexity of the determinants of efficient distribution
channels makes each channel a unique structure which is still very poorly understood.
Legislation based on the outright prohibition of specific practices may be socially
very costly as it may hamper the use of arrangements which deal efficiently with pre-
existing market imperfections. Consequently, competition policy would be better
served by relying on a commission capable of performing case-by-case in depth
analyses. It should also achieve a more efficient distribution of the "burden of proof'
by asking for specific justifications of given practices. However, given our limited
understanding of the complex problems involved, government analysts should be
very careful before imposing practices and predicting outcomes, as if regulations can
easily improve upon markets and managers.
10 See Congreso de la Republica, "Proyecto.de r:ey para Garantizar la Libre Competencia",
Caracas 1991. These prohibitions are descnbed m Chapter n.
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